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Abstract
This thesis is comprised of three main chapters. The first chapter, “Asymmetric Liquidity
Persistence”, is based on a working paper co-authored with Jianxin Wang. In this paper, we
identify a new autoregressive property of daily liquidity that contributes to sudden liquidity dry-
ups. While liquidity is generally highly persistent, this persistence is conditional on past market
states. Large negative returns cause liquidity persistence to initially decrease and then increase
in the longer-run. We call this Asymmetric Liquidity Persistence (ALP). We show that ALP
is present in both market-level and stock-level liquidity. We demonstrate that our ALP model
can generate more accurate in-sample and out-of-sample liquidity estimations. According to the
predictions of the Amihud (2002) liquidity premium model, our ALP model provides for a superior
characterisation of the daily liquidity process.
The second chapter is titled “Discretionary Trading Surrounding Anticipated Distraction Events:
the Case of the FIFA World Cup”. This chapter demonstrates how anticipated market-orthogonal
events can induce discretionary trading. Following Ehrmann and Jansen (2017), this study uses
FIFA World Cup matches that occur during trading hours as an exogenous shock to the opportu-
nity cost of monitoring markets. World Cup football matches have an impact on contemporaneous
trading and an asynchronous impact on the rest of the trading day. In particular, when World Cup
matches occur in the middle of the trading day, there is an abnormally large amount of trading
between market open and kick-off time. Dollar trading volume between 120 to 90 minutes before
kick-off is 23.4% of a standard deviation higher than normal levels. This is due to a temporal
substitution effect whereby traders submit their orders prior to kick-off in order to avoid trading
during match time. During this pre-match period, markets exhibit greater liquidity, volatility and
price discovery. During matches, markets exhibit reduced liquidity, volatility and price discovery.
The extraordinary market conditions that occur on match days follow the theoretical predictions
of the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) discretionary trading model.
The third chapter, “Sports Sentiment and Stock Returns: An Intra-day Study”, builds upon the
behavioural finance literature and in particular, the influential study of Edmans, Garc´ıa, and Norli
(2007). Edmans et al. (2007) demonstrate that sporting results can predict overnight stock returns.
The authors attribute this to a sports sentiment effect. In this thesis chapter, I demonstrate that
the Edmans et al. (2007) daily sentiment effect is still present in a more recent sample of stock
market data. In addition, I utilise all FIFA World Cup matches that have occurred during trading
hours since 1998 to determine that there is an analogous intra-day sentiment effect. Winning
full-time outcomes are associated with positive abnormal stock returns for the remainder of the
trading day. Moreover, unexpected victories and victories over traditional rivals have a significant
and positive marginal impact on abnormal stock returns. Using trade and quote data, this study
also documents abnormal order imbalance and quote revision activity surrounding half-time match
outcomes. Evidence suggests that both liquidity takers and providers are influenced by investor
sentiment. Small trades exhibit the greatest sentiment effects.
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Following the three main thesis chapters, I provide concluding remarks and discuss limitations
and future research opportunities for each research project.
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1. Asymmetric Liquidity Persistence
1.1. Abstract
We identify a new autoregressive property of daily liquidity that contributes to sudden liquidity
dry-ups. While liquidity is generally highly persistent, this persistence is conditional on past market
states. Large negative returns cause liquidity persistence to initially decrease and then increase
in the longer-run. We call this Asymmetric Liquidity Persistence (ALP). We show that ALP
is present in both market-level and stock-level liquidity. We demonstrate that our ALP model
can generate more accurate in-sample and out-of-sample liquidity estimations. According to the
predictions of the Amihud (2002) liquidity premium model, our ALP model provides for a superior
characterisation of the daily liquidity process.
JEL Classifications: C22, C24, C58, G19.
Keywords: Liquidity, Liquidity Dry-Ups, Long-Memory, Asymmetric Persistence, Amihud Hy-
potheses
1.2. Introduction
The persistence of liquidity is well documented within the literature and is often a key assump-
tion of the theoretical models of liquidity; however, persistent liquidity is also at odds with the
frequently observed liquidity “dry-up” phenomenon. That is, when liquidity rapidly declines or
“dries-up”, often in times of crises. This dual observation suggests that while liquidity is generally
persistent, its persistence is conditional on the state of the market. In this paper, we reconcile the
two competing phenomena of persistent and “evaporating” liquidity by modelling the conditional-
ity of liquidity persistence. We find that liquidity persistence is asymmetric with respect to past
returns.
This study begins by confirming the baseline assumption that liquidity is persistent. We show
that daily market-level and stock-level liquidity are highly persistent and display long-memory
properties. Second, we demonstrate the conditionality of liquidity persistence by incorporating
a threshold component into the standard heterogeneous autoregressive (HAR) model for long-
memory processes. We call our model the threshold heterogeneous autoregressive model (THAR).
The model involves interacting lagged liquidity with a threshold variable. The threshold variable
takes the value of 1 in the case of a large positive lagged market return and the value of -1 in the case
of a large negative market return. We find that the threshold-lagged liquidity interaction variables
play a key role in the dynamic liquidity process. Large negative returns cause liquidity persistence
to decrease in the short-term and then increase in the longer-term. We call this persistence structure
asymmetric liquidity persistence (ALP).
ALP contributes significantly to the in-sample and out-of-sample explanatory power of empirical
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liquidity models. On average, the in-sample partial explanatory power of ALP is higher than the
partial explanatory powers of both lagged returns and lagged volatility, despite returns and volatility
being key determinants of contemporaneous liquidity. For stock-specific liquidity, the explanatory
power of ALP is higher than that of lagged market liquidity, lagged market and stock returns, as
well as lagged market volatility. To demonstrate the out-of-sample explanatory power of ALP, we
perform a rolling out-of-sample forecast analysis. We find that our ALP model, the THAR model,
provides superior forecasts of both market and stock liquidity.
Finally, we apply our THAR model to the asset-pricing setting. In his influential paper, Amihud
(2002) theorises that if liquidity is persistent, conditional expected stock returns depend positively
on expected illiquidity and “unexpected illiquidity has a negative effect on contemporaneous unex-
pected stock returns”. We expand on the logic of Amihud’s (2002) theory to conclude that current
returns should be orthogonal to past and future illiquidity shocks. We estimate illiquidity residual-
return cross-correlations to compare our liquidity characteristion to the Amihud (2002) theoretical
prediction. We find that the THAR specification of liquidity is superior to the HAR(3) model and
the AR(1) specification used by Amihud (2002) for his monthly illiquidity series. The correlation
between returns and lagged illiquidity shocks converges to zero at a much faster rate when the
THAR specification is used.
This paper contributes to three distinct literatures. First, this paper contributes to our under-
standing of the multidimensionality of liquidity dry-ups. To date, the liquidity dry-up models have
focused on the causal link from returns to liquidity levels. For example, Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) demonstrate a funding channel by which initial negative returns lead to decreases in market
liquidity; while, Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Xiong (2001) demonstrate that arbitrageurs can shift
from providing liquidity to demanding liquidity after similar initial negative returns. Further, a
number of studies provide empirical evidence for these dry-up theories. For example, Hameed,
Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) and Nagel (2012) support the supply-side liquidity dry-up theories.
Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) support the margin liquidity spiral effect of Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009). Mancini-Griffoli and Ranaldo (2011) support both the margin and loss liq-
uidity spiral effects of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). This paper not only supports these
empirical results but also provides a new avenue through which liquidity dry-ups can perpetuate.
We show that returns not only affect future liquidity levels but also future liquidity persistence.
That is, the fundamental dynamic structure of the liquidity process changes after large positive or
negative returns. Large negative returns cause liquidity persistence to initially decrease and then
increase in the longer term. Our results explain, from an empirical standpoint, how liquidity can
be highly persistent in normal market states and much more volatile during market downturns.
This study also contributes to the liquidity premium literature. This paper extends the empirical
literature by testing the Amihud (2002) illiquidity premium hypotheses at the daily frequency and
at the individual stock level. This is of key interest as many active traders have holding periods of
less than one day and are concerned with individual stock liquidity. In his study, Amihud (2002)
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tests his theories at the annual and monthly frequencies for market liquidity, as well as portfolio level
liquidity. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) test the Amihud (2002) hypotheses at the monthly
frequency for emerging market indices. This study also expands on the work of Amihud (2002)
by developing a theoretical dynamic structure between liquidity shocks and returns. Under the
assumptions of Amihud’s (2002) model, returns should be orthogonal to past and future illiquidity
shocks; while, by his second hypothesis, contemporaneous stock returns and unexpected illiquidity
should be negatively related. This theoretical prediction provides for a new method for assessing
the validity of empirical models of liquidity.
Finally, this paper contributes to the studies of the autoregressive liquidity process. In the
literature, it is very common for the persistence of liquidity to be underestimated, resulting in
mis-specified short-memory models of liquidity. For example: Amihud (2002) and Pa´stor and
Stambaugh (2003) use an AR(1) model to generate illiquidity innovations; and, Acharya and Ped-
ersen (2005) use an AR(2) model to construct illiquidity innovations. This oversight is highlighted
in the aforementioned study of Bekaert et al. (2007). Bekaert et al. (2007) perform a Wald test on
the liquidity residuals of their benchmark VAR(1) model. The Wald test is constructed with the
null hypothesis that the first three autocorrelations are zero. They reject the null hypothesis for 11
out of the 18 emerging markets in their sample and strongly reject the null hypothesis for the joint
sample. On the other hand, Wang (2013) shows that daily market illiquidity is a long-memory pro-
cess. Using, Lo’s 1991 modified range over standard deviation test, Wang (2013) strongly rejects
the null hypothesis of no long-memory in market illiquidity for all twelve Asian equity markets
in his sample. In addition, this paper confirms that daily stock level liquidity is a long-memory
process, providing further justification for the use of long-memory models in liquidity.
In addition, this paper is also the first to show the conditionality of liquidity persistence. This
result mirrors findings in return series (Nam, Washer, and Chu (2005); Evans and McMillan (2009))
and volatility series (McAleer and Medeiros (2008); Wang and Yang (2017)). Our analysis demon-
strates the superior in-sample and out-of-sample performance of our conditional liquidity persis-
tence model in comparison to the unconditional long-memory HAR(3) model and the short-memory
AR(1) model.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.3 describes the data and provides
summary statistics. Section 1.4 describes our empirical model of the illiquidity process. Section
1.5 presents the empirical results of our illiquidity model. In Section 1.6 we apply our findings to
the liquidity premium theory of Amihud (2002). Section 1.7 provides some concluding remarks.
1.3. Data and Summary Statistics
The market sample is composed of six major market indices: the S&P/ASX 200 Index (ASX),
the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (DOW), the FTSE 100 Index (FTSE), the NASDAQ
100 Index (NASD), the Nikkei 225 Index (NIKK) and the S&P 500 Index (SP500). The stock
sample consists of the Dow 30 constituents at April 2012. The sample period is determined by the
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availability of daily dollar volume data. The sample period for the market indices is from the 14th
of November 2001 to the 31st of December 2011. The sample period for the Dow 30 constituents is
from the 14th of June 2001 to the 31st of December 2011. All data is extracted from Bloomberg.
1.3.1. Illiquidity Measure
To measure illiquidity, we use a modified version of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. The
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio is defined as:
AMIHUDt = ln
( |rt|
vt
)
where rt is the return of a stock or a market index on day t and vt is the corresponding dollar
volume value. The Amihud (2002) measure reflects the amount of price movement associated
with a given amount of trading. The strength of the Amihud (2002) measure is that it is easy to
compute and does not require intra-day data. Lou and Shu (2017) report that from 2009 to 2015,
over 120 papers published in the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics and the
Review of Financial Studies use the Amihud (2002) measure in their empirical analysis. While the
Amihud (2002) measure is very popular, |rt| is not an ideal measure of intra-day price movement.1
Furthermore, Lou and Shu (2017) show that variation in the Amihud (2002) measure is mostly
driven by the dollar volume component, rather than |rt|.
In the volatility literature, realised volatility is promoted as a superior measure of intra-day
price movement. Unfortunately, realised volatility is dependent on the availability of high-frequency
returns, which are not always available for market indices. Nonetheless, most exchanges publish
intra-day high and low prices for indices and stocks. High and low prices can be used to calculate
the popular range measure of intra-day price movement:
RANGEt =
1
2
√
ln2
ln
(
PHt
PLt
)
where PHt and P
L
t are daily high and low prices, respectively. The RANGEt measure has several
advantages over the |rt| measure. First, the RANGEt measure directly captures intra-day price
movements and is thus unlikely to be zero. Second, Parkinson (1980) shows that RANGE2t is an
unbiased estimator of the true variance of returns. Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002) report
that RANGEt is a highly efficient estimator and is robust to microstructure noise. In addition,
Patton (2011) shows that the mean squared error (MSE) of RANGE2t is approximately one-fifth of
the MSE of r2t . Patton (2011) also shows that RANGE
2
t and realised variance using six intra-day
observations are just as accurate, as proxies for the true conditional variance of returns. As several
leading studies of volatility dynamics favour the use of the logarithmic transformation of estimated
volatility we define our intra-day price movement measure as the logarithmic transformation of
1For example, see Andersen and Bollerslev (1998).
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RANGEt:
2
σt = ln (RANGEt)
The logarithmic transformation reduces the frequency of extremely large values and results in a
distribution that is closer to normal.
Motivated by the volatility literature, we arrive at our modified Amihud (2002) measure of
illiquidity by replacing |rt| with σt:
ILLIQt = ln
(
σt
vt
)
. (1.1)
For scaling purposes, vt is measured in millions of US dollars for the stock sample, 100 billions of
Yen for NIKK and billions of the domestic currency for the remaining market indices.
1.3.2. Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for the raw illiquidity observation, σtvt , and the log
illiquidity transformation, ILLIQt. From Table 1.1, it is apparent that there is considerable cross-
sectional variation in liquidity level. This is because the indices cover different amounts of stocks,
meaning that the cross-sectional dollar volume values are not directly comparable. For example,
the dollar volume value of SP500 is many times larger than that of the DOW index, making the
illiquidity level of the SP500 much smaller than that of the DOW index. By the same token,
individual stocks have much lower dollar volume values than the indices, resulting in much higher
values for the modified Amihud (2002) measure.
The raw illiquidity observations are highly positively skewed and leptokurtic, especially for ASX
and FTSE. In contrast, the logarithmic transformation of the modified Amihud (2002) measure is
approximately normally distributed with skewness closer to zero and kurtosis closer to 3. This is
consistent with findings on the logarithmic transformation of volatility (Andersen et al. (2001a,b);
Deo et al. (2006); Andersen et al. (2007); Martens et al. (2009); Wang and Yang (2009); Wang
(2011)) and findings on the logarithmic transformation of liquidity depth measures (Rhee and
Wang (2009); Wang (2013)).
The second last column of Table 1.1 shows the Hurst (1951) exponent for each series. In each
case, the Hurst exponent is close to 1, indicating very strong long-term dependence. The last column
of Table 1.1 shows Lo’s (1991) modified range over standard deviation (MRS) statistic for the illiq-
uidity series. Lo’s (1991) critical values for a two-sided test of no long-memory with 99% confidence
are [0.721,2.098]. Hence, for all market indices, we can strongly reject the null hypothesis of no
2For example, see Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens (2001a); Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys
(2001b); Deo, Hurvich, and Lu (2006); Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007); and, Martens, Van Dijk, and
De Pooter (2009).
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Table 1.1
Daily Illiquidity Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for the daily raw illiquidity series, σtvt , and the daily log illiquidity
series, ILLIQt = ln
(
σt
vt
)
, where σt = ln
(
1
2
√
ln2
ln
(
PHt
PLt
))
; PHt and P
L
t are the high and low prices for day
t respectively; and, vt is the corresponding dollar volume value. Hurst is the Hurst (1951) exponent. The
number of lags needed to calculate the modified range over standard deviation (MRS) statistic is determined
as in Lo (1991). Mean values are reported for the stock sample.
Panel A: Raw Illiquidity Series (σtvt )
Mean St Dev Skew Kurt ACF(1) Hurst MRS
ASX 0.193 0.133 2.729 15.328 0.574 0.892 2.404
DOW 0.109 0.075 1.839 7.505 0.686 0.938 3.174
FTSE 0.184 0.153 2.485 15.195 0.708 0.921 3.530
NASD 0.095 0.054 1.700 7.769 0.641 0.924 2.948
NIKK 0.099 0.080 1.887 7.083 0.717 0.970 2.996
SP500 0.024 0.019 2.290 10.491 0.737 0.940 2.760
Stocks 4.455 3.595 2.095 10.598 0.714 0.957 3.010
Panel B: Log Illiquidity Series (ILLIQt)
Mean St Dev Skew Kurt ACF(1) Hurst MRS
ASX -1.820 0.576 0.268 3.200 0.530 0.907 2.678
DOW -2.412 0.622 0.151 2.691 0.678 0.951 3.669
FTSE -1.979 0.759 0.099 2.337 0.795 0.963 3.410
NASD -2.494 0.538 -0.129 3.146 0.649 0.940 3.325
NIKK -2.578 0.722 0.162 2.680 0.762 0.972 2.767
SP500 -3.954 0.665 0.203 2.790 0.722 0.958 3.356
Stocks 1.006 0.654 0.240 2.837 0.750 0.991 2.831
long-memory. Further, for all stocks, we reject the null hypothesis of no long-memory at the 95%
level of confidence (not shown). Thus, long-run illiquidity persistence is prevalent in both the
market and stock samples.
While we should not make cross-sectional comparisons of illiquidity level, we can compare
skewness, kurtosis, ACF(1), Hurst and MRS across indices. On that front, it should be noted that
the ASX illiquidity series appears to differ from the other series. The ASX illiquidity series has the
highest skewness and kurtosis; as well as the lowest ACF(1), Hurst and MRS values.
Table 1.2 presents the correlation statistics for the daily variables of interest. As expected, the
two inverse measures of liquidity depth, AMIHUDt and ILLIQt, are highly positively correlated.
The correlation coefficients for AMIHUDt and ILLIQt range from 0.490 for NASD to 0.672 for
FTSE. Further, AMIHUDt and ILLIQt share similar relationships with the other variables of
interest, rt, σt and vt. For every market index, both AMIHUDt and ILLIQt share a negative
relationship with rt, a positive relationship with σt and a negative relationship with vt. The cor-
relation coefficients corresponding to ILLIQt are consistently of a higher magnitude than those of
15
Table 1.2
Daily Correlations of Illiquidity, Returns, Volatility and Turnover
This table presents the correlations of the daily variables of interest in this study. The Amihud (2002) measure,
ln
(
|rt|
vt
)
, is denoted by AMIHUDt, where rt is the return of a stock or a market index on day t and vt is the
corresponding dollar volume value. Volatility, σt, is defined as σt = ln
(
1
2
√
ln2
ln
(
PHt
PLt
))
, where PHt and P
L
t are the
high and low prices on day t, respectively. The modified Amihud (2002) measure, ILLIQt, is defined as ln
(
σt
vt
)
.
The stock results are from the pooled stock sample. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by
***, **, and *, respectively.
AMIHUDt ILLIQt rt σt
ASX
ILLIQt 0.648
*** *** *** ***
rt -0.022
*** -0.071*** *** ***
σt 0.453
*** 0.612*** -0.114*** ***
vt -0.116
*** -0.340*** -0.023*** 0.409***
DOW
ILLIQt 0.654
*** *** *** ***
rt -0.013
*** -0.038*** *** ***
σt 0.519
*** 0.748*** -0.045*** ***
vt -0.123
*** -0.323*** -0.023*** 0.214***
FTSE
ILLIQt 0.672
*** *** *** ***
rt -0.010
*** -0.048*** *** ***
σt 0.536
*** 0.716*** -0.105*** ***
vt -0.312
*** -0.576*** -0.035*** 0.005***
NASD
ILLIQt 0.490
*** *** *** ***
rt -0.008
*** -0.061*** *** ***
σt 0.360
*** 0.675*** -0.074*** ***
vt -0.107
*** -0.321*** -0.037*** 0.368***
NIKK
ILLIQt 0.547
*** *** *** ***
rt -0.035
*** -0.093*** *** ***
σt 0.370
*** 0.591*** -0.174*** ***
vt -0.318
*** -0.610*** -0.018*** 0.127***
SP500
ILLIQt 0.658
*** *** *** ***
rt -0.026
*** -0.054*** *** ***
σt 0.533
*** 0.776*** -0.074*** ***
vt -0.180
*** -0.384*** -0.025*** 0.101***
Stocks
ILLIQt 0.817
*** *** *** ***
rt 0.000
*** -0.010*** *** ***
σt 0.332
*** 0.346*** -0.039*** ***
vt -0.426
*** -0.552*** -0.007*** 0.064***
16
AMIHUDt. This is consistent with the notion that the ILLIQt measure is better at capturing
intra-day price variation than AMIHUDt.
There are several regularities in Table 1.2 that have previously been explored in the literature.
As expected, returns are negatively correlated with both illiquidity measures: higher returns are
associated with higher liquidity and lower returns are associated with lower liquidity. Volatility is
positively and significantly correlated with both illiquidity measures. This relationship is repeatedly
shown in empirical studies such as those by Weber and Rosenow (2006), Gillemot, Farmer, and
Lillo (2006) and Mike and Farmer (2008). Table 1.2 also confirms the negative relation between
contemporaneous realised returns and unconditional volatility, described by Christie (1982) as “part
of market folklore”.3 Dollar volume is negatively and significantly correlated to both illiquidity
measures. This is unsurprising as the illiquidity measures are, by construction, decreasing functions
of dollar volume. The correlation coefficient between dollar volume and volatility is positive and
significant at the 99% level of confidence for the stock sample and for all markets. This positive
relationship is consistent with the findings of Levine and Zervos (1998), Domowitz, Glen, and
Madhavan (2001) and Covitz and Downing (2007). On the other hand, the relationship between
returns and dollar volume is less certain. While the correlation coefficients relating dollar volume
to returns are negative, they are only statistically significant for the stock sample, NASD and
FTSE. This weak negative relation is consistent with Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001a);
Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001b) but inconsistent with the positive correlation
found by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002). Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) find a negative
relation between contemporary returns and dollar volume for low-liquidity months and a positive
relation for all other months in their sample period.
1.3.3. Seasonality Adjustments
Seasonality in liquidity is well documented. For example, Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam
(2005) demonstrate that liquidity tightness is enhanced on Mondays and Tuesdays. This study
does not seek to explain seasonal variations in liquidity. Hence, it is necessary to adjust all data
for seasonality.
All data is adjusted using the methodology of Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992). This season-
ality adjustment process maintains the mean and variance of the data, after removing all variation
that is explained by the seasonal variables. The seasonal variables consist of: day-of-the-week in-
dicator variables; month-of-the-year indicator variables; before and after non-trading day indicator
variables; yearly linear and quadratic trend variables; and, a dummy variable for 2005 and onwards.
The adjustments for seasonality also alleviate any concerns of non-stationarity that could be present
in the non-adjusted series, seen in Figure 1.1. All results henceforth refer to the seasonally adjusted
data set.
3The classic papers that first document this relationship include Black (1976), French, Schwert, and Stambaugh
(1987) and Campbell and Hentschel (1992).
17
Panel A: Volatility
Panel B: Dollar Volume
*100 billion Yen for NIKK
Panel C: Illiquidity
Fig. 1.1. Volatility, Dollar Volume and Illiquidity. This figure plots the daily variables of interest prior
to the seasonal adjustment presented in Section 1.3.3. Volatility, σt, is defined as
1
2
√
ln2
ln
(
PHt
PLt
)
, where PHt
and PLt are the high and low prices on day t, respectively. The modified Amihud (2002) measure, ILLIQt,
is defined as ln
(
σt
vt
)
where vt is dollar volume at time t.
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1.4. Modelling Illiquidity Dynamics
1.4.1. Long-memory in Illiquidity
To model the illiquidity dynamics of our market indices and stocks, we require a long-memory
model. There are two classes of long-memory models: (1) the fractional integration (FI) models;
and, (2) the heterogeneous autoregressive (HAR) models. The FI models provide a formal frame-
work for modelling long-memory but lack clear economic interpretation (Corsi (2009)). On the
other hand, the HAR class of models are quasi long-memory models with clear economic inference.
The HAR class of models were developed by Corsi (2009) and are now widely used in the volatility
literature. Furthermore, Wang (2013) demonstrates that the HAR approach can be used to capture
long-memory in illiquidity.
As in Wang (2013), our model resides in the HAR class of models. The HAR(3) model for
illiquidity is described as:
ILLIQDt = α0 +
M∑
k=D
αkILLIQ
k
t−1 + t (1.2)
where k = D,W,M , corresponding to “day”, “week” and “month”, respectively. The HAR model
is adjusted to avoid overlapping lags. Hence, we define:
ILLIQ
D
t−1 ≡ ILLIQDt−1; ILLIQWt−1 ≡
1
4
5∑
i=2
ILLIQDt−i; ILLIQ
M
t−1 ≡
1
17
22∑
i=6
ILLIQDt−i.
This modification of the HAR model provides an easy interpretation of the dependence of illiquidity
on the illiquidity of a past period. It was first used by Patton and Sheppard (2013) and subsequently
in Se´vi (2014).
Figure 1.2 Panel A displays the autocorrelation function of the daily market illiquidity series.
Each autocorrelation function exhibits a very slow decay, typical of long-memory processes. Figure
1.2 Panel B shows the autocorrelation function of the estimated residuals, t, from the HAR(3)
model in Equation 1.2, on the same scale as Panel A. It is apparent that the HAR(3) model
captures almost all of the autocorrelation in daily illiquidity.
1.4.2. Illiquidity, Returns and Volatility
Liquidity is affected by market returns and volatility. Firstly, market returns affect investor
confidence, sentiment and their ability to obtain funding to supply liquidity (Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009)). Hameed et al. (2010) present strong evidence of a causal effect from stock
returns to liquidity. Volatility, on the other hand, reflects risks from various sources, including
asset fundamentals, information precision and noise trading. Higher risks increase the cost of and
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Panel A: Autocorrelation functions of daily illiquidity (ILLIQt)
Panel B: Autocorrelation functions of the HAR(3)-Liq residuals (t)
Fig. 1.2. Long-Memory in Daily Illiquidity. Panel A plots the autocorrelation functions of the modified
Amihud (2002) measure, ILLIQt. The modified Amihud (2002) measure is defined as ln
(
σt
vt
)
where vt is
dollar volume at time t and σt is the volatility at time t. Volatility, σt, is defined as
1
2
√
ln2
ln
(
PHt
PLt
)
, where
PHt and P
L
t are the high and low prices on day t, respectively.
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the required return for supplying liquidity. Further, volatility leads to higher bid-ask spreads
and lower liquidity.4 Thus, we introduce heterogeneous return and volatility lags into the HAR
framework to separately identify their liquidity impacts at different time horizons. This is similar
to the heterogeneous leverage effect on volatility modelled by Corsi and Reno´ (2012). Thus we
define the following HAR return and volatility variables in an analogous fashion to ILLIQ
k
t−1:
rDt−1 ≡ rDt−1; rWt−1 ≡
1
4
5∑
i=2
rDt−i; r
M
t−1 ≡
1
17
22∑
i=6
rDt−i
σDt−1 ≡ σDt−1; σWt−1 ≡
1
4
5∑
i=2
σDt−i; σ
M
t−1 ≡
1
17
22∑
i=6
σDt−i
The inclusion of these HAR variables allows us to uncover a rich dynamic structure in daily illiq-
uidity.
1.4.3. Asymmetric Illiquidity Persistence
In studies of volatility dynamics, the dependence of volatility on past volatility, volatility per-
sistence, is widely regarded as constant; however, McAleer and Medeiros (2008) and Wang and
Yang (2017) show that the dependence of today’s volatility on past volatility levels depends on the
market state variables corresponding to the past volatility levels. In particular, positive returns
are associated with greater volatility persistence and negative returns are associated with greater
anti-persistence.
Given the strong contemporaneous relationship between liquidity and volatility and the liquidity
dry-up literature that documents the effect of returns on liquidity levels, we believe that the state
of the market, especially market returns, is likely to affect the persistence of illiquidity over time.
Specifically, we want to explore whether and how the dependence of ILLIQDt on ILLIQ
k
t−1 is
affected by the corresponding HAR return values, rkt−1.
Let A{k,−} and A{k,+} be positive constants and σ2r,k = var
(
rkt−1
)
. Further, let µk be the mean
of r¯kt−1. We define the following threshold dummy variable to capture large returns over different
time horizons:
Dkt−1 =

−1 r¯kt−1 < −A{k,−}σr,k + µk,
0 −A{k,−}σr,k + µk ≤ r¯kt−1 ≤ µk +A{k,+}σr,k,
+1 r¯kt−1 > µk +A{k,+}σr,k.
We estimate the impact of Dkt−1 on illiquidity persistence using the following third-order threshold
4For example, see Wang (1999) and Wang and Yau (2000).
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heterogeneous autoregressive (THAR(3)) model:5
ILLIQDt = α0 +
M∑
k=D
[(
αk + βkD
k
t−1
)
ILLIQ
k
t−1 + θkr¯
k
t−1 + λkσ¯
k
t−1
]
+ t. (1.3)
The conditional illiquidity persistence at time horizon k is measured by ρkt ≡ αk + βkDkt−1, where
αk and βk are the unconditional and conditional components, respectively. When lagged returns
are large and negative (r¯kt−1 < −A{k,−}σr,k + µk), ρkt = αk − βk; when lagged returns are around
zero (−A{k,−}σr,k + µk ≤ r¯kt−1 ≤ µk + A{k,+}σr,k), ρkt = αk ; and, when lagged returns are large
and positive (r¯kt−1 > µk + A{k,+}σr,k), ρkt = αk + βk. Given illiquidity’s long-memory properties,
we expect αk > 0, for all k, as in Wang (2013). Further, given the liquidity dry-up literature and
particularly, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) which stipulates that liquidity dry-ups occur after
recent initial losses, we expect short-run positive asymmetric persistence, βD > 0, and a reversal in
the long-run, βM < 0. That is, after recent large negative (positive) returns illiquidity persistence
decreases (increases) and we expect to find the opposite directional effect in the longer term as
illiquidity reverts to more typical level of persistence. That is to say, we expect:
ρDt |(DDt−1 = −1) ≤ρDt |(DDt−1 = 0) ≤ ρDt |(DDt−1 = 1)
ρMt |(DMt−1 = −1) ≥ρMt |(DMt−1 = 0) ≥ ρMt |(DMt−1 = 1).
For the stock sample, we consider the impacts of stock-specific and market factors on stock
liquidity. This is motivated by the findings of liquidity commonality by Chordia, Roll, and Sub-
rahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Huberman and Halka (2001). We introduce
heterogeneous market illiquidity, returns and volatility lags into the model:
ILLIQDi,t =α0 +
M∑
k=D
[(
αi,k + βi,kD
k
i,t−1
)
ILLIQ
k
i,t−1 + θi,kr¯
k
i,t−1 + λi,kσ¯
k
i,t−1
]
+
M∑
k=D
[
αm,kILLIQ
k
m,t−1 + θm,kr¯
k
m,t−1 + λm,kσ¯
k
m,t−1
]
+ t (1.4)
where i denotes the stock and m denotes the market, represented by the S&P 500 index. Note,
that for the stock sample, it is also possible to condition illiquidity persistence on market returns.
5The model in Equation 1.3 belongs to the threshold autoregressive (TAR) models of Hansen (1997). We call it
the threshold heterogeneous autoregressive (THAR) model, as it captures the asymmetries in both the level and the
persistence of daily illiquidity.
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Thus, we can define the additional threshold variable:
Dkm,t−1 =

−1 r¯km,t−1 < −A{k,−}σr,k,m + µk,m,
0 −A{k,−}σr,k,m + µk,m ≤ r¯km,t−1 ≤ µk,m +A{k,+}σr,k,m,
+1 r¯km,t−1 > µk,m +A{k,+}σr,k,m,
where σr,k,m is the sample standard deviation and µk,m the mean of r¯
k
m,t−1, respectively. Following,
Equation 1.4 can be respecified with the new threshold parameter:
ILLIQDi,t =α0 +
M∑
k=D
[(
αi,k + βm,kD
k
m,t−1
)
ILLIQ
k
i,t−1 + θi,kr¯
k
i,t−1 + λi,kσ¯
k
i,t−1
]
+
M∑
k=D
[
αm,kILLIQ
k
m,t−1 + θm,kr¯
k
m,t−1 + λm,kσ¯
k
m,t−1
]
+ t. (1.5)
Analogous to the market sample, for the stock sample, we expect:
ρDi,t|(DDj,t−1 = −1) ≤ρDi,t|(DDj,t−1 = 0) ≤ ρDi,t|(DDj,t−1 = 1)
ρMi,t |(DMj,t−1 = −1) ≥ρMi,t |(DMj,t−1 = 0) ≥ ρMi,t |(DMj,t−1 = 1).
where j = i,m.
1.5. Estimation and Empirical Findings
1.5.1. Model Estimation
For a given set of threshold parameters ({A{k,−},A{k,+}}), we estimate the model using ordinary
least squares, with Newey-West robust standard errors. For the stock sample, we report the average
coefficients across the stocks and calculate standard errors that take into account potential cross-
stock correlations. Following Hameed et al. (2010), the standard error of a cross-sectional average
parameter, β, is given by:
StDev
(
β
)
= StDev
(
1
30
30∑
i=30
βi
)
=
1
30
√√√√ 30∑
i=30
30∑
j=30
ρi,jσiσj
where σi is the standard error of the parameter estimated for stock i and ρi,j is the correlation
between the regression residuals for stocks i and j. The threshold parameters A{k,+} and A{k,−} are
chosen to minimise the sum of squared residuals (SSR). The range of A{k,+} and A{k,−} is [0.1, 3]
with a grid interval of 0.1.6
6To reduce computation time, the grid search is conducted in two stages. The optimisation is first conducted
with a grid interval of 0.3, to find the first-stage optimal threshold parameters: A
(1)
{k,+} and A
(1)
{k,−}. Then, a
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1.5.2. Market Index Results
Table 1.3 presents the estimation results for Equation 1.3, the extended THAR(3) model. The
first observation is that illiquidity exhibits an unmistakable long-run dependence: the unconditional
liquidity persistence coefficients, αk, are positive and statistically significant for all markets and
all k. This is consistent with Table 1.1, which shows that both the raw illiquidity and log illiq-
uidity observations for all markets display long-memory properties. Typically, illiquidity is most
dependent on lagged monthly illiquidity, followed by lagged weekly and lagged daily illiquidity:
αˆM > αˆW > αˆD. Interestingly, the Asian market indices, ASX and NIKK, display a contrasting
dependence structure whereby lagged weekly illiquidity is most important in determining daily illiq-
uidity, followed by lagged monthly and lagged daily illiquidity: αˆW > αˆM > αˆD. This is congruent
with Wang (2013). Wang (2013) studies 12 Asian equity markets and finds that lagged weekly
illiquidity is the most important autoregressive variable in determining daily illiquidity.
Table 1.3 also reveals a high degree of ALP across the sample. The coefficients of the condi-
tional persistence variables, βk, are statistically significant for all markets and k. The asymmetric
persistence is not constant over k. In general, we observe positive ALP in the short-run and a
reversal in the long-run: βˆD > 0 and βˆM < 0; with the exception of DOW. For weekly conditional
persistence, βW , we observe positive asymmetric persistence (βˆW > 0), except for the ASX which
reverses to negative ALP at a faster rate than the other indices. The ASX’s more rapid reversal in
illiquidity persistence is also much more pronounced than the other markets: βˆASX,W = −0.115 is
of a substantially larger magnitude than all other βˆk coefficients. Hence, the ASX differs in terms
of distribution (Table 1.1) and in terms of heterogeneous conditional illiquidity persistence. To that
end, the ASX also displays the lowest adjusted R-squared in Table 1.3.
Panel B of Table 1.3 reveals a strictly negative effect of lagged returns on daily illiquidity. The
estimated lagged return coefficients, θˆk, are uniformly negative and significant at the 5% level,
except θˆM = −0.056, for DOW, which is statistically insignificant. Thus, lagged positive returns
increase current liquidity. This is consistent with theoretical models and the empirical results of
Hameed et al. (2010), which show that negative market returns increase market illiquidity. The
dynamic effect between liquidity and lagged returns is fairly consistent across the sample. For all
indices except DOW, |θˆM | > |θˆW | > |θˆD|.
In contrast to the positive contemporaneous relationship between illiquidity and volatility, Table
1.3 shows a negative relationship between lagged daily price volatility and daily illiquidity: all
estimates of the lagged daily volatility coefficient, λD, are negative, with four out of the six being
significantly different from zero at the 90% level of confidence. Table 1.3 Panel B also reveals
that lagged long-run volatility increases daily illiquidity: all significant estimates of λW and λM
are greater than zero. This mirrors Fung and Patterson (1999), whom find a dynamic reversal
second traversing grid search is conducted with an interval of 0.1 over ranges
[
A
(1)
{k,+} − 0.3, A(1){k,+} + 0.3
]
and[
A
(1)
{k,−} − 0.3, A(1){k,−} + 0.3
]
, to find A{k,+} and A{k,−}, respectively.
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Table 1.3
Daily Market Illiquidity Dynamics
This table reports the estimation results for the following threshold regression:
ILLIQDt = α0 +
M∑
k=D
[(
αk + βkD
k
t−1
)
ILLIQ
k
t−1 + θkr¯
k
t−1 + λkσ¯
k
t−1
]
+ t (1.3)
where ILLIQt is the modified Amihud (2002) measure defined as ln
(
σt
vt
)
where vt is dollar volume at time t and
σt is defined as σt = ln
(
1
2
√
ln2
ln
(
PHt
PLt
))
, where PHt and P
L
t are the high and low prices on day t, respectively. The
market index return at time t is denoted by rt. The independent variables are heterogeneous autoregressive lags
corresponding to the ILLIQt, rt and σt variables and superscript k = D,W,M , corresponding to “day”, “week” and
“month”, respectively. For k = D,W and M , the threshold parameter is defined as:
Dkt−1 =

−1 r¯kt−1 < −A{k,−}σr,k + µk,
0 −A{k,−}σr,k + µk ≤ r¯kt−1 ≤ µk +A{k,+}σr,k,
+1 r¯kt−1 > µk +A{k,+}σr,k,
where σr,k is the sample standard deviation and µk is the mean of r¯
k
t−1, respectively. The threshold parameters A{k,+}
and A{k,−} are chosen to minimise the sum of squared residuals (SSR). The range of A{k,+} and A{k,−} is [0.1, 3] with
a grid interval of 0.1. The t-statistics are reported in italics. Newey-West robust standard errors are used throughout.
The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Panel A: Illiquidity Dynamics
αD αW αM βD βW βM A{D,−} A{D,+} A{W,−} A{W,+} A{M,−} A{M,+}
ASX 0.134*** 0.336*** 0.236*** 0.063*** -0.115*** -0.061*** 2.3 0.2 2.9 1.5 1.5 1.1
3.00 *** 4.95 *** 3.33 *** 3.23 *** -2.74 *** -3.01 ***
DOW 0.133*** 0.199*** 0.552*** 0.044*** 0.064*** 0.031*** 0.1 0.6 2.7 0.6 0.3 2.9
2.58 *** 2.16 *** 4.48 *** 4.02 *** 3.39 *** 1.79 ***
FTSE 0.183*** 0.297*** 0.413*** 0.066*** 0.055*** -0.035*** 0.2 0.7 0.4 1.0 2.5 0.6
4.87 *** 3.48 *** 4.54 *** 3.59 *** 2.83 *** -1.63 ***
NASD 0.154*** 0.338*** 0.425*** 0.036*** 0.026*** -0.033*** 3.0 0.2 0.6 0.3 2.9 0.9
3.46 *** 4.51 *** 6.10 *** 3.50 *** 2.53 *** -2.84 ***
NIKK 0.150*** 0.396*** 0.181*** 0.073*** 0.036*** -0.060*** 2.0 0.3 1.0 0.4 3.0 0.6
2.99 *** 4.12 *** 2.91 *** 3.18 *** 1.76 *** -3.02 ***
SP500 0.065*** 0.320*** 0.573*** 0.059*** 0.030*** -0.056*** 2.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 2.6 1.6
2.17 *** 2.87 *** 4.69 *** 4.40 *** 3.32 *** -2.66 ***
Panel B: Impacts of Return and Volatility on Illiquidity
θD θW θM λD λW λM α0 R¯
2
ASX -0.042*** -0.155*** -0.247*** -0.058*** 0.018*** 0.167*** -0.513*** 0.316
-3.27 *** -5.75 *** -3.60 *** -1.93 *** 0.34 *** 2.39 *** -4.05 ***
DOW -0.031*** -0.083*** -0.056*** -0.131*** 0.247*** -0.022*** -0.354*** 0.395
-3.19 *** -3.61 *** -0.90 *** -3.24 *** 3.37 *** -0.27 *** -2.88 ***
FTSE -0.027*** -0.085*** -0.249*** -0.116*** 0.096*** 0.135*** -0.344*** 0.390
-2.59 *** -2.90 *** -3.68 *** -2.41 *** 0.93 *** 1.36 *** -3.57 ***
NASD -0.026*** -0.054*** -0.129*** -0.129*** 0.006*** 0.106*** -0.229*** 0.460
-4.68 *** -3.29 *** -4.79 *** -3.36 *** 0.09 *** 1.89 *** -2.75 ***
NIKK -0.033*** -0.082*** -0.247*** -0.092*** -0.120*** 0.452*** -0.708*** 0.362
-2.78 *** -2.20 *** -3.57 *** -1.34 *** -1.20 *** 4.46 *** -5.48 ***
SP500 -0.026*** -0.054*** -0.215*** -0.055*** 0.083*** -0.005*** -0.204*** 0.443
-2.39 *** -2.33 *** -3.19 *** -1.35 *** 0.95 *** -0.05 *** -0.85 ***
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Panel A: Daily Conditional Market Illiquidity Persistence (ρDt )
Panel B: Weekly Conditional Market Illiquidity Persistence (ρWt )
Panel C: Monthly Conditional Market Illiquidity Persistence (ρMt )
Fig. 1.3. Conditional Market Illiquidity Persistence. This figure plots the conditional illiquidity persistence
(ρkt ≡ αk + βkDkt−1) values for each market index and value of k, where k = D,W,M . The green bars
correspond to the ρkt values where r¯
k
t−1 > µk + A{k,+}σr,k and D
k
t−1 = 1; the blue bars correspond to the
ρkt values where −A{k,−}σr,k + µk ≤ r¯kt−1 ≤ µk + A{k,+}σr,k and Dkt−1 = 0; and, the red bars correspond
to the ρkt values where r¯
k
t−1 < −A{k,−}σr,k + µk and Dkt−1 = −1. The αk and βk values are taken from the
estimation of Equation 1.3, presented in Table 1.3.
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Table 1.4
Conditional Market Illiquidity Persistence and Frequency of Extreme Days
This table displays the conditional illiquidity persistence (ρkt ≡ αk + βkDkt−1) values for each market index
and value of k, where k = D,W,M . The αk and βk values are taken from the estimation of Equation 1.3,
presented in Table 1.3. The table also gives the frequency of each Dkt−1 value, denoted in italics and given
as a percentage. The far right column shows the percentage change in ρkt from D
k
t−1 = −1 to Dkt−1 = 1.
Panel A: Daily Conditional Illiquidity Persistence (ρDt )
(a) Large Negative
Return (DDt−1 = −1)
Return Around Mean
(DDt−1 = 0)
(b) Large Positive
Return (DDt−1 = 1)
% ∆ from (a) to (b)
ASX ρˆDt 0.070 0.134 0.197 179.9%
Frequency 1.9% 57.2% 40.9%
DOW ρˆDt 0.089 0.133 0.177 97.9%
Frequency 40.8% 40.1% 19.1%
FTSE ρˆDt 0.116 0.183 0.249 114.2%
Frequency 37.4% 45.6% 17.0%
NASD ρˆDt 0.117 0.154 0.190 61.8%
Frequency 0.8% 59.1% 40.1%
NIKK ρˆDt 0.077 0.150 0.223 190.6%
Frequency 2.3% 63.1% 34.6%
SP500 ρˆDt 0.006 0.065 0.124 1954.9%
Frequency 1.2% 75.9% 22.8%
Panel B: Weekly Conditional Illiquidity Persistence (ρWt )
(a) Large Negative
Return (DWt−1 = −1)
Return Around Mean
(DWt−1 = 0)
(b) Large Positive
Return (DWt−1 = 1)
% ∆ from (a) to (b)
ASX ρˆWt 0.451 0.336 0.222 -50.9%
Frequency 1.1% 94.7% 4.2%
DOW ρˆWt 0.135 0.199 0.263 93.8%
Frequency 1.2% 75.9% 22.9%
FTSE ρˆWt 0.242 0.297 0.353 45.8%
Frequency 28.2% 61.0% 10.8%
NASD ρˆWt 0.312 0.338 0.363 16.5%
Frequency 23.5% 38.5% 38.0%
NIKK ρˆWt 0.360 0.396 0.432 20.1%
Frequency 12.5% 54.9% 32.6%
SP500 ρˆWt 0.290 0.320 0.349 20.5%
Frequency 22.5% 54.2% 23.3%
Panel C: Monthly Conditional Illiquidity Persistence (ρMt )
(a) Large Negative
Return (DMt−1 = −1)
Return Around Mean
(DMt−1 = 0)
(b) Large Positive
Return (DMt−1 = 1)
% ∆ from (a) to (b)
ASX ρˆMt 0.297 0.236 0.174 -41.4%
Frequency 7.8% 82.7% 9.5%
DOW ρˆMt 0.522 0.552 0.583 11.8%
Frequency 30.5% 69.3% 0.2%
FTSE ρˆMt 0.448 0.413 0.378 -15.6%
Frequency 1.8% 73.4% 24.8%
NASD ρˆMt 0.458 0.425 0.392 -14.4%
Frequency 1.3% 83.7% 15.0%
NIKK ρˆMt 0.241 0.181 0.120 -50.0%
Frequency 0.7% 74.1% 25.2%
SP500 ρˆMt 0.629 0.573 0.518 -17.7%
Frequency 1.6% 96.4% 2.0%
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relationship between lagged volatility and market depth.
Figure 1.3 provides a graphical representation of the market illiquidity persistence results in
Table 1.3 Panel A. Panel A of Figure 1.3 shows that for all market indices, we observe positive and
significant daily ALP:
ρˆDt |(DDt−1 = −1) ≤ ρˆDt |(DDt−1 = 0) ≤ ρˆDt |(DDt−1 = 1).
SP500 displays the lowest daily illiquidity persistence and the largest degree of asymmetric persis-
tence: daily illiquidity persistence increases by 1954.9%, when comparing observations following a
large negative return day (1.2% of observations) to a large positive return day (22.8% of observa-
tions). When comparing a ‘‘normal” return day (75.9% of observations), to a large negative return
day (1.2% of observations), daily conditional illiquidity persistence decreases by 90.7%. This de-
scribes how the highly persistent dynamic structure of illiquidity can breakdown in times of market
downturn. Panel B shows that the ASX is the only market index to exhibit negative ALP at the
weekly lag. ASX also has the second highest degree of weekly asymmetric illiquidity persistence,
with a -50.9% change in persistence following a large negative return week (1.1% of observations)
to a large positive return week (4.2% of observations). The equivalent figure for DOW is 93.8%.
Figure 1.3 Panel C shows that for all indices except DOW, we observe negative ALP in the long-run:
ρˆMt |(DMt−1 = −1) ≥ ρˆMt |(DMt−1 = 0) ≥ ρˆMt |(DMt−1 = 1).
The DOW index displays modest positive ALP at the monthly lag. Table 1.4 complements Figure
1.3 in that it details the frequency with which large negative or large positive returns are observed.
1.5.3. Stock Results
Table 1.5 presents the mean estimated regression coefficients for equations 1.4 and 1.5. Panels A
and B of Table 1.5 display the stock-specific dependencies of stock illiquidity. The results presented
in Table 1.5 panels A and B mirror the market illiquidity dynamics presented in Table 1.3. Firstly,
like market illiquidity, stock illiquidity exhibits very strong unconditional illiquidity persistence.
All αk,i variables are positive and highly significant. Further, all θi,k coefficients are negative and
statistically different from zero, indicating, that negative returns lead to decreased levels of liquidity,
as in Hameed et al. (2010). Analogous to Table 1.3, monthly returns have the greatest influence
over liquidity levels: | ¯ˆθi,M | > || ¯ˆθi,W | > || ¯ˆθi,D|. Similar to Table 1.3, the estimated λi,k coefficients
indicate a unique dynamic relationship between volatility and illiquidity. The results indicate that
stock volatility has an initial positive effect on liquidity and a negative impact on liquidity in the
long-run. That is, λi,D < 0 and λi,M > 0.
Table 1.5 Panel A also indicates that stock illiquidity, like market illiquidity, displays ALP;
however, in this instance, illiquidity persistence is sensitive to past stock and market returns. For
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Table 1.5
Daily Stock Illiquidity Dynamics
This table reports the stock regression results for the equation:
ILLIQDi,t =α0 +
M∑
k=D
[(
αi,k + βj,kD
k
j,t−1
)
ILLIQ
k
i,t−1 + θi,kr¯
k
i,t−1 + λi,kσ¯
k
i,t−1
]
+
M∑
k=D
[
αm,kILLIQ
k
m,t−1 + θm,kr¯
k
m,t−1 + λm,kσ¯
k
m,t−1
]
+ t
where ILLIQi,t is the modified Amihud (2002) measure defined as ln
(
σi,t
vi,t
)
where vi,t is dollar volume at
time t for stock i and σi,t is defined as σi,t = ln
(
1
2
√
ln2
ln
(
PHi,t
PLi,t
))
, where PHi,t and P
L
i,t are the high and
low prices on day t for stock i, respectively. The subscript m denotes the market. The S&P 500 index
is used to proxy the market. Stock returns at time t are denoted by ri,t and market returns are denoted
by rm,t, respectively. The independent variables are heterogeneous autoregressive lags corresponding to the
ILLIQi,t, ri,t, σi,t, ILLIQm,t, rm,t and σm,t variables and superscript k = D,W,M , corresponding to “day”,
“week” and “month”, respectively. For k = D,W and M , the threshold parameters are defined as:
Dkj,t−1 =

−1 r¯kj,t−1 < −A{k,−}σr,k,j + µk,j ,
0 −A{k,−}σr,k,j + µk,j ≤ r¯kj,t−1 ≤ µk,j +A{k,+}σr,k,j ,
+1 r¯kj,t−1 > µk,j +A{k,+}σr,k,j ,
where σr,k,j is the sample standard deviation of and µk,j is the mean of r¯
k
j,t−1, where j = i,m, respectively.
The average coefficients are reported with their associated Hameed et al. (2010) t-statistics in italics. The
mean A{k,−}, A{k,+} and R2 values are reported. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated
by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Panel A: Illiquidity Dynamics
Equation 1.4 Equation 1.5
α0 0.829
*** 0.823***
6.07 *** 6.08 ***
αi,D 0.191
*** 0.193***
14.59 *** 14.47 ***
αi,W 0.254
*** 0.255***
13.14 *** 13.28 ***
αi,M 0.222
*** 0.222***
9.79 *** 9.83 ***
βi,D 0.057
*** ***
3.49 *** ***
βi,W 0.047
*** ***
2.88 *** ***
βi,M 0.004
*** ***
0.22 *** ***
βm,D
*** 0.038***
*** 2.59 ***
βm,W
*** 0.052***
*** 3.74 ***
βm,M
*** -0.048***
*** -3.03 ***
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Table 1.5
(continued)
Panel B: Impact of Return and Volatility on Illiquidity
Equation 1.4 Equation 1.5
θi,D -0.020
*** -0.014***
-4.03 *** -3.32 ***
θi,W -0.041
*** -0.028***
-3.89 *** -3.36 ***
θi,M -0.049
*** -0.044***
-1.97 *** -2.19 ***
λi,D -0.138
*** -0.141***
-8.62 *** -8.82 ***
λi,W -0.025
*** -0.024***
-0.91 *** -0.88 ***
λi,M 0.139
*** 0.141***
3.47 *** 3.51 ***
Panel C: Market Variables
Equation 1.4 Equation 1.5
αm,D -0.009
*** -0.009***
-0.67 *** -0.69 ***
αm,W -0.126
*** -0.128***
-3.44 *** -3.48 ***
αm,M 0.266
*** 0.266***
5.92 *** 5.92 ***
θm,D -0.021
*** -0.025***
-4.29 *** -4.06 ***
θm,W -0.074
*** -0.086***
-6.30 *** -5.98 ***
θm,M -0.049
*** -0.026***
-1.63 *** -0.73 ***
λm,D 0.023
*** 0.024***
1.47 *** 1.48 ***
λm,W 0.169
*** 0.167***
4.49 *** 4.45 ***
λm,M -0.093
*** -0.093***
-1.85 *** -1.84 ***
Panel D: Other
Equation 1.4 Equation 1.5
A{D,−} 1.417*** 1.427***
A{D,+} 1.617*** 1.327***
A{W,−} 1.797*** 1.790***
A{W,+} 1.313*** 1.410***
A{M,−} 1.353*** 1.573***
A{M,+} 1.613*** 1.737***
R¯2 0.331*** 0.331***
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Equation 1.4 we observe positive short-run ALP with
¯ˆ
βi,D and
¯ˆ
βi,W being positive and significantly
different from zero. Thus, large lagged daily and weekly returns have the effect of decreasing
daily illiquidity persistence. Similarly, for Equation 1.5, we find that
¯ˆ
βm,D and
¯ˆ
βm,W are positive
and significant. Further, like the market sample, we observe a reversal in ALP in the longer run:
¯ˆ
βm,M < 0. This means that stock liquidity persistence decreases after large negative market returns.
This is congruent with the liquidity “dry-up” theories, such as that of Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009). Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) illustrate how negative market returns can cause stock
liquidity to drastically decrease as speculators are forced to reduce their positions in reaction to
worsening funding constraints. Moreover, examining the mean estimated θm,k coefficients, we
observe that market returns have a stronger negative impact on stock liquidity than stock-specific
returns: at the daily frequency |θm,D| > |θi,D|; and, at the weekly frequency |θm,W | > |θi,W |. This
supports the notion that liquidity dry-ups are caused by market-wide declines and propagated by
traders invested in multiple assets.
Other results in Table 1.5 Panel C show that stock illiquidity is negatively correlated to lagged
weekly market illiquidity (αˆm,W < 0) and positively related to lagged monthly market illiquidity
(αˆm,M > 0). This provides evidence of a lead-lag relationship between stock liquidity and market
liquidity. As, the Dow 30 stocks are large stocks, this result is consistent with the large to small
lead-lag liquidity relationship found by Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2011). Finally, both
mean estimated λm,W values are positive and statistically significant, indicating that daily stock
illiquidity is positively related to lagged weekly market volatility.
1.5.4. Explanatory Power
This section explores the relative explanatory powers of unconditional liquidity dependence,
ALP, returns and volatility to the daily illiquidity process. This is achieved by performing a partial
R-squared analysis whereby each category of lagged variables is grouped across k. For example,
PRi,ILLIQ represents that partial R-squared statistics for ILLIQ
k
i,t−1, for k = D,W,M ; while,
PRi,ALP represents that partial R-squared statistics for the D
k
i,t−1 ·ILLIQ
k
i,t−1 interaction variables.
Table 1.6, shows the partial R-squared statistics for equations 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5. Unconditional
persistence is by far the greatest contributor to detrended daily illiquidity. At the market level, the
ASX has the lowest unconditional illiquidity dependence with PRASX,ILLIQ = 6.03%; while NASD
has the highest unconditional illiquidity dependence with PRNASD,ILLIQ = 28.15%. The average
market PRILLIQ value is 13.01%. Unconditional persistence is also the largest contributor to stock
illiquidity. The mean partial R-squared statistic for the ILLIQ
k
i,t−1 variables and Equation 1.5 is
11.97%. This highlights the importance of long-memory in illiquidity.
Perhaps the most striking result from Table 1.6 is that the explanatory power of ALP is of
a similar order of magnitude to the explanatory powers of the well-established contemporaneous
determinants of illiquidity: returns and volatility. At the market level, the mean PRALP value
is 1.41%; while, the mean PRr and PRσ values are 0.98% and 0.79%, respectively. In Panel B,
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Table 1.6
Partial R-Squared Statistics
This table reports the partial R-squared statistics for the THAR analyses of illiquidity. For the market
indices, the partial R-squared statistics relating to Equation 1.3 are reported. For example, PRi,ILLIQ
represents that partial R-squared statistics for ILLIQ
k
i,t−1, for k = D,W,M ; while, PRi,ALP represents
that partial R-squared statistics for the Dki,t−1 · ILLIQ
k
i,t−1 interaction variables. For the stock sample, the
average partial R-squared statistics for equations 1.4 and 1.5 are reported.
Panel A: Market Index Sample (Equation 1.3)
PRILLIQ PRALP PRr PRσ
ASX 6.03% 1.08% 1.78% 0.43%
DOW 7.29% 1.56% 0.53% 1.12%
FTSE 13.11% 1.25% 0.59% 0.55%
NASD 28.15% 1.45% 1.43% 0.96%
NIKK 12.90% 1.40% 0.91% 1.50%
SP500 10.58% 1.70% 0.64% 0.19%
Panel B: Stock Sample (Equations 1.4 and 1.5)
Equation PRi,ILLIQ PRi,ALP PRm,ALP PRi,r PRi,σ PRm,ILLIQ PRm,r PRm,σ
AA 4 19.69% 0.62% 0.29% 0.97% 0.25% 0.19% 0.42%
5 19.31% 0.70% 0.13% 1.17% 0.25% 0.21% 0.39%
AXP 4 13.21% 0.70% 0.79% 0.79% 0.19% 0.22% 0.42%
5 13.79% 0.80% 0.32% 0.86% 0.21% 0.57% 0.46%
BA 4 11.33% 1.14% 1.53% 0.86% 1.62% 0.86% 0.53%
5 11.27% 1.08% 0.84% 1.15% 1.57% 1.04% 0.53%
BAC 4 19.41% 0.95% 0.18% 0.39% 0.50% 0.34% 1.06%
5 12.58% 0.60% 0.43% 0.39% 0.49% 0.42% 1.10%
CAT 4 14.19% 0.43% 0.13% 0.49% 0.65% 0.47% 0.39%
5 13.77% 0.45% 0.07% 0.48% 0.58% 0.24% 0.39%
Stocks 4 12.19% 0.67% 0.57% 1.20% 0.58% 0.43% 0.52%
5 11.97% 0.68% 0.37% 1.26% 0.59% 0.55% 0.53%
Equation 1.5, the mean PRm,ALP value is 0.68%, while the mean values of PRi,r and PRi,σ are
0.37% and 1.26%, respectively. This emphasises the need to account for the conditional nature of
illiquidity persistence in illiquidity modelling.
1.5.5. Forecast Accuracy
The previous sub-section demonstrated the ex post explanatory power of ALP and the ex-
tended THAR(3) model. This sub-section shows the ex ante explanatory power of ALP and the
extended THAR(3) model. The forecast performance of the extended THAR(3) model is compared
to performances of the HAR(3) model and the AR(1) model. Accordingly, in this sub-section an
out-of-sample forecast period from the 3rd of January 2012 to the 31st of December 2012 is con-
sidered.
Similar to the main analysis, it is necessary to control for seasonality during the forecast period.
Accordingly, the modified Amihud (2002) values during the forecast period are detrended using the
estimated coefficients derived from the Gallant et al. (1992) methodology and the 2001 to 2011
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Table 1.7
Forecast Accuracy of the AR(1), HAR(3) and extended THAR(3) Models
This table presents the forecast accuracies of the AR(1), HAR(3) and extended THAR(3) models for the
forecast period, the 3rd of January 2012 to the 31st of December 2012. The HAR(3) model is presented in
Equation 1.2. The extended THAR(3) model for the market sample refers to Equation 1.3. The extended
THAR(3) model for the stock sample refers to Equation 1.5. The threshold parameters for the extended
THAR(3) models are taken from the respective estimations of the THAR(3) models using the pre-forecast
period. Mean absolute forecast error and mean squared forecast error are denoted by MAFE and MSFE,
respectively. For the stock sample, the number of times each model performed best is reported. There are
29 stocks in the forecast analysis, due to the delisting of Kraft Foods Inc in 2012.
MAFE MSFE
AR(1) HAR(3) THAR(3) AR(1) HAR(3) THAR(3)
ASX 0.706 0.645 0.632 0.401 0.337 0.300
DOW 0.718 0.652 0.625 0.470 0.395 0.348
FTSE 1.000 0.908 0.882 0.587 0.441 0.389
NASD 0.465 0.420 0.399 0.316 0.280 0.254
NIKK 1.077 0.992 0.988 0.549 0.402 0.384
SP500 1.016 0.875 0.850 1.349 1.004 0.917
Stocks 0 10 19 0 9 20
main sample period. This ensures a robust analysis of ex ante forecast performance.
For each daily illiquidity observation in the forecast period, we estimate a one-day-ahead fore-
cast using all available observations prior to the forecast day. For the market illiquidity THAR(3)
forecasts, the threshold parameters (A{k,−} and A{k,+}) are taken from the estimation of Equation
1.3 for the main sample period, 2001 to 2011, shown in Table 1.3. The stock illiquidity threshold
parameters are taken from the estimation of Equation 1.5 for the same main sample period. Ac-
cordingly, “extended THAR(3) model” will refer to Equation 1.3 for the market index sample and
Equation 1.5 for the stock sample for the remainder of the study. Thus, the threshold parameters
are chosen ex ante of the forecast period. The delisting of Kraft Foods Inc in 2012 means that it
is excluded from the forecast analysis.
To assess the forecast accuracies of the three models, two popular inverse measures of forecast
accuracy are used: mean absolute forecast error (MAFE); and, mean squared forecast error (MSFE):
MAFEj =
1
Nj
Nj∑
n=1
|ILLIQDj,n − ILLIQ
∧D
j,n|
MSFEj =
1
Nj
Nj∑
n=1
(
ILLIQDj,n − ILLIQ
∧D
j,n
)2
where j = i,m, Nj is the number of trading days in 2012, ILLIQ
D
j,n is the true level of illiquidity
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and ILLIQ
∧D
j,n is the forecasted level of illiquidity at day n, for stock i or market index m.
Table 1.7 presents the MAFE and MSFE values for the market illiquidity observations. The
THAR(3) model outperforms the short-memory AR(1) model and HAR(3) model for all market
indices. Further, Table 1.7 also demonstrates that the THAR(3) model has smaller MAFE and
MSFE values for the majority of stocks. Thus, incorporating conditional persistence into illiquidity
modelling significantly enhances ex ante estimation.
1.5.6. Robustness
One concern could be that ALP is not robust to the specification of our THAR(3) model. To
address this concern, we split our lagged HAR(3) illiquidity variables into 10 bins, for each value of
k. The heterogeneous lags, ILLIQ
k
t−1, are split into these bins according to their contemporaneous
lagged mean return value, rkt−1. The bins are constructed to cover the range of observed rkt−1 values.
The bins are as such:
rDt−1 ∈{(−∞,−3.2], (−3.2,−2.4], (−2.4,−1.6], (−1.6,−0.8], (−0.8, 0],
(0, 0.8], (0.8, 1.6], (1.6, 2.4], (2.4, 3.2], (3.2,∞)},
rWt−1 ∈{(−∞,−1.6], (−1.6,−1.2], (−1.2,−0.8], (−0.8,−0.4], (−0.4, 0],
(0, 0.4], (0.4, 0.8], (0.8, 1.2], (1.2, 1.6], (1.6,∞)},
rMt−1 ∈{(−∞,−0.8], (−0.8,−0.6], (−0.6,−0.4], (−0.4,−0.2], (−0.2, 0],
(0, 0.2], (0.2, 0.4], (0.4, 0.6], (0.6, 0.8], (0.8,∞)}.
To examine ALP, independent of our THAR(3) specification, we regress daily illiquidity on our
lagged illiquidity bins and our heterogeneous lag return and volatility variables. The regression
formula can be represented as such:
ILLIQDt = α0 + β−4,D1{r¯Dt−1 ≤ −3.2}ILLIQDt−1 + β−4,W1{r¯Wt−1 ≤ −1.6}ILLIQWt−1
+ β−4,M1{r¯Mt−1 ≤ −0.8}ILLIQMt−1 +
3∑
δ=−3
[
βδ,D1{0.8δ < r¯Dt−1 ≤ 0.8(δ + 1)}ILLIQDt−1
+ βδ,W1{0.4δ < r¯Wt−1 ≤ 0.4(δ + 1)}ILLIQWt−1
+ βδ,M1{0.2δ < r¯Mt−1 ≤ 0.2(δ + 1)}ILLIQMt−1
]
+ β4,D1{r¯Dt−1 > 3.2}ILLIQDt−1 + β4,W1{r¯Wt−1 > 1.6}ILLIQWt−1
+ β4,M1{r¯Mt−1 > 0.8}ILLIQMt−1 +
M∑
k=D
[
θkr¯
k
t−1 + λkσ¯
k
t−1
]
+ t. (1.6)
The estimation results of Equation 1.6 and the market illiquidity sample are shown in Figure 1.4.
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Panel A: Daily Asymmetric Illiquidity Persistence
Fig. 1.4. Asymmetric Illiquidity Persistence. This figure shows the persistence of illiquidity as a function
of lagged market returns. The figure is based on estimation of Equation 1.6:
ILLIQDt = α0 + β−4,D1{r¯Dt−1 ≤ −3.2}ILLIQ
D
t−1 + β−4,W1{r¯Wt−1 ≤ −1.6}ILLIQ
W
t−1
+ β−4,M1{r¯Mt−1 ≤ −0.8}ILLIQ
M
t−1 +
3∑
δ=−3
[
βδ,D1{0.8δ < r¯Dt−1 ≤ 0.8(δ + 1)}ILLIQ
D
t−1
+ βδ,W1{0.4δ < r¯Wt−1 ≤ 0.4(δ + 1)}ILLIQ
W
t−1 + βδ,M1{0.2δ < r¯Mt−1 ≤ 0.2(δ + 1)}ILLIQ
M
t−1
]
+ β4,D1{r¯Dt−1 > 3.2}ILLIQ
D
t−1 + β4,W1{r¯Wt−1 > 1.6}ILLIQ
W
t−1
+ β4,M1{r¯Mt−1 > 0.8}ILLIQ
M
t−1 +
M∑
k=D
[
θkr¯
k
t−1 + λkσ¯
k
t−1
]
+ t (1.6)
where ILLIQt is the modified Amihud (2002) measure defined as ln
(
σt
vt
)
where vt is dollar volume at
time t and σt is defined as ln
(
1
2
√
ln2
ln
(
PHt
PLt
))
, where PHt and P
L
t are the high and low prices on day t,
respectively. Market returns are denoted by rt. The independent variables are heterogeneous autoregressive
lags corresponding to the ILLIQt, rt and σt variables and superscript k = D,W,M , corresponding to “day”,
“week” and “month”, respectively. Equation 1.6 is estimated for each market index within the sample. The
coefficients, βδ,k for δ ∈ {−4,−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, are displayed as a scatter plot, with trend line, over a
combined histogram of r¯kt−1, for all market indices. Panel A corresponds to k = D; Panel B to k = W and
Panel C to k = M . Only coefficients that are significant at the 10% level are shown, based on Newey-West
robust standard errors.
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Panel B: Weekly Asymmetric Illiquidity Persistence
Panel C: Monthly Asymmetric Illiquidity Persistence
Fig. 1.4. (continued)
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Panel A of Figure 1.4 plots the significant βδ,D estimated coefficients for δ ∈ {−4,−3,−2,−1, 0, 1,
2, 3, 4} from Equation 1.6. Panel A shows that all six markets display very strong positive ALP
across the lagged daily return distributions. This is consistent with the conditional persistence
values, captured by the THAR(3) model:
ρˆDt−1|(DDt−1 = −1) ≤ ρˆDt−1|(DDt−1 = 0) ≤ ρˆDt−1|(DDt−1 = 1).
Panel B plots the significant βδ,W estimated coefficients for δ ∈ {−4,−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. In
this instance, the persistence of every illiquidity series is a positive function of past weekly returns,
except that of the ASX, which exhibits a distinct negative weekly ALP. This reaffirms the results
in Table 1.3 and Panel B of Figure 1.3, which document the ASX as the first market in the sample
to revert to negative ALP, following a large positive return:
ρˆWm,t−1|(DWm,t−1 = −1) ≤ ρˆWm,t−1|(DWm,t−1 = 0) ≤ ρˆWm,t−1|(DWm,t−1 = 1) ∀m 6= ASX,
ρˆWASX,t−1|(DWASX,t−1 = −1) ≥ ρˆWASX,t−1|(DWASX,t−1 = 0) ≥ ρˆWASX,t−1|(DWASX,t−1 = 1).
Panel C demonstrates that at the monthly frequency, illiquidity persistence is mostly a negative
function of past returns. This is again consistent with our estimation of the extended THAR(3)
model given by Equation 1.3. Thus, it is apparent that illiquidity persistence is independent of
our model specification and that our THAR model is able to capture ALP in a parsimonious and
robust manner.
1.6. Amihud (2002) Hypotheses
In his influential paper, Amihud (2002) outlines two hypotheses regarding the time-series effects
of illiquidity on stock returns. Amihud (2002) arrives at his hypotheses by assuming that illiquidity
is persistent. This is confirmed in Table 1.1, where it is shown that daily illiquidity is not only
persistence, but a long-memory process. Section 1.5 extends the analysis by demonstrating that the
persistence of illiquidity is not constant, but conditional on past returns, which we call asymmetric
liquidity persistence (ALP). Table 1.6 shows that ALP is a key determinant of daily illiquidity. Now,
this section demonstrates the superior performance of the THAR(3) model, which accommodates
ALP, in the context of the Amihud (2002) hypotheses.
Amihud (2002) begins his conjecture by identifying illiquidity as a transaction cost. He further
assumes that investors value assets in terms of their net returns, rather than their raw returns. In
the Amihud (2002) model, investors are assumed to predict the level of illiquidity for time t based
on the information available at time t−1. Investors then use this information to set prices such that
they can receive their desired expected return at time t. The expected return should compensate
investors for the level of illiquidity experienced until time t. Therefore, expected stock returns are
a positive function of expected illiquidity. Amihud’s (2002) first hypothesis is:
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H1: Ex ante stock returns are an increasing function of expected illiquidity.7
Amihud (2002) next assumes that illiquidity is persistent, such that unexpected illiquidity increases
the expectations of illiquidity in the next time period. Thus, if prices are efficient,
H2: Unexpected illiquidity has a negative effect on contemporaneous unexpected stock returns.
This is Amihud’s (2002) second hypothesis. This is analogous to Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005)
third proposition: “returns are low when illiquidity increases”.
1.6.1. Illiquidity Innovations
In his paper, Amihud (2002) constructs his illiquidity innovations using an AR(1) specification.
Hence, we begin by defining:
ILLIQDt = φ0 + φ1ILLIQ
D
t−1 + ILLIQ
D,U
AR(1),t. (1.7)
The residual from the AR(1) estimation of the illiquidity process is denoted by, ILLIQD,UAR(1),t, where
“U” signifies the “unexpected” component of illiquidity. Given that illiquidity has long-memory,
the short-memory AR(1) model should be insufficient for capturing the persistence of ILLIQDt ,
such that the residuals, ILLIQD,UAR(1),t, are autocorrelated. On the other hand, the quasi-long-
memory THAR(3) model should capture almost all of the persistence of daily illiquidity. To test
this, we define ILLIQD,UTHAR(3),t as the residual from Equation 1.3 for the market illiquidity series
and Equation 1.5 for the stock illiquidity series. For completeness, we also define ILLIQD,UHAR(3),t
as the residual series from a HAR(3) estimation, Equation 1.2.
Table 1.8 reports persistence statistics for the residual illiquidity series derived from the AR(1),
HAR(3) and THAR(3) models. For all market ILLIQD,UAR(1),t series, the MRS statistic is greater
than the 95% level of confidence critical value of 1.862. We reject the null hypotheses that the
ILLIQD,UAR(1),t series do not have long-memory at the 95% confidence level. Thus, the AR(1)
specification does not model the true dependence structure of illiquidity. In contrast, all mar-
ket ILLIQD,UTHAR(3),t series have an MRS statistic that is less than one. This indicates that the
extended THAR(3) model successfully captures the dependence structure of illiquidity such that
the residuals do not display any significant autocorrelation. Hence, the AR(1) specification of
illiquidity is insufficient for modelling the persistence of illiquidity, while the extended THAR(3)
specification is not.
7Acharya and Pedersen (2005) point out that if illiquidity is persistent, ex ante stock returns will also be an
increasing function of current illiquidity. This forms the second proposition of their study.
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Table 1.8
Persistence in “Unexpected” Illiquidity
This table reports the persistence in the residuals of the AR(1), HAR(3) and extended THAR(3) models
of illiquidity. The AR(1) specification is given by Equation 1.7. The HAR(3) specification is given by
Equation 1.2. The THAR(3) model refers to Equation 1.3 for the market illiquidity series and Equation 1.5
for the stock illiquidity series. ACF(1) is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. Hurst is the Hurst (1951)
exponent. MRS is Lo’s (1991) MRS statistic. For consistency, for each index and stock, the number of lags
needed to constructed the MRS statistic, is taken from the ILLIQDj,t series where j = i,m. The number
of lags is then determined using the methodology of Lo (1991). Mean statistics are reported for the stock
sample.
ILLIQD,UAR(1),t ILLIQ
D,U
HAR(3),t ILLIQ
D,U
THAR(3),t
ACF(1) Hurst MRS ACF(1) Hurst MRS ACF(1) Hurst MRS
ASX -0.183 0.829 2.675 -0.012 0.530 -1.101 -0.016 0.531 -0.902
DOW -0.238 0.839 2.729 0.001 0.519 0.772 -0.011 0.505 0.709
FTSE -0.259 0.812 2.380 0.038 0.584 -0.093 0.028 0.583 -0.171
NASD -0.218 0.810 2.188 -0.003 0.508 -0.926 -0.005 0.506 -0.806
NIKK -0.220 0.826 2.811 0.059 0.678 -0.886 0.056 0.655 -0.857
SP500 -0.299 0.826 2.443 0.005 0.500 0.528 -0.007 0.493 0.611
Stocks -0.172 0.809 2.464 0.044 0.613 -0.982 0.042 0.571 -0.915
1.6.2. Modelling and Testing the Amihud (2002) Hypotheses
To test the Amihud (2002) hypotheses, we adapt his empirical model to the daily frequency.
Hence, we estimate:
rt = α0 + γrt−1 + δσt−1 + ζ1ILLIQDt−1 + ζ2ILLIQ
D,U
AR(1),t + t. (1.8)
Under Hypothesis H1, we should expect ζ1 > 0. Further, under Hypothesis H2, we should expect
ζ2 < 0. The additional variables, rt−1 and σt−1, are used as control variables. Equation 1.8 is
estimated for each market and stock within the sample.
Table 1.9 contains the estimated regression results for Equation 1.8. With respect to Hypothesis
H1, the results are mixed. For the sample of market illiquidity, there is only one ζ1 coefficient that
is positive and significantly different from zero. That is, the estimated ζ1 coefficient for NASD is
0.226 and significant at the 99% confidence level. For the sample of stock illiquidity, the mean
estimated ζ1 coefficient is not significantly greater than zero. The insignificant results with respect
to Hypothesis H1 are in line with two recent papers that re-examine the Amihud (2002) hypotheses.
Drienko, Smith, and von Reibnitz (2018) and Harris and Amato (2018) demonstrate that Amihud’s
(2002) first hypothesis does not hold for more recent sample periods.
The support for Amihud’s (2002) second hypothesis is more compelling. Every estimated ζ2
coefficient in Table 1.9 is negative and statistically significant. All estimated ζ2 coefficients for
the market sample are significantly different from zero at the 99% level of confidence. The mean
estimated ζ2 value for the stock sample is significantly different from zero at the 90% level of
confidence. Thus, Amihud’s (2002) second hypothesis holds at the daily frequency when using the
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Table 1.9
Test of the Amihud (2002) Hypotheses Using AR(1) Illiquidity Innovations
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
rt = α0 + γrt−1 + δσt−1 + ζ1ILLIQDt−1 + ζ2ILLIQ
D,U
AR(1),t + t (1.8)
where rt is the return of a stock or a market index on day t. The volatility measure, σt, is defined as
σt = ln
(
1
2
√
ln2
ln
(
PHt
PLt
))
where PHt and P
L
t are the high and low prices for a stock or market on day t,
respectively. The illiquidity variable, ILLIQDt , is defined as ILLIQ
D
t = ln
(
σt
vt
)
where vt is the dollar
volume of a stock or market on day t. The illiquidity innovation, ILLIQD,UAR(1),t, is the residual from the
estimation of the AR(1) model defined by Equation 1.7. The t-statistics are reported in italics. The mean
coefficients are reported for the stock sample, with their associated Hameed et al. (2010) t-statistics in
italics. Newey-West robust standard errors are used throughout. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels
are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
αo γ δ ζ1 ζ2 R
2
ASX 0.014*** -0.065*** 0.023*** -0.005*** -0.136*** 0.010
0.21 *** -3.16 *** 0.69 *** -0.12 *** -2.84 ***
DOW -0.009*** -0.118*** 0.040*** -0.013*** -0.133*** 0.017
-0.09 *** -5.85 *** 0.89 *** -0.31 *** -3.07 ***
FTSE 0.055*** -0.092*** 0.030*** 0.021*** -0.138*** 0.016
0.93 *** -4.74 *** 0.66 *** 0.79 *** -4.24 ***
NASD 0.572*** -0.109*** -0.172*** 0.226*** -0.451*** 0.028
3.51 *** -5.30 *** -2.32 *** 3.60 *** -4.89 ***
NIKK 0.024*** -0.045*** 0.040*** 0.007*** -0.267*** 0.022
0.28 *** -2.30 *** 0.75 *** 0.22 *** -5.55 ***
SP500 0.035*** -0.123*** 0.043*** 0.004*** -0.188*** 0.023
0.17 *** -6.39 *** 0.84 *** 0.08 *** -3.69 ***
Stocks -0.015*** -0.059*** -0.004*** 0.032*** -0.089*** 0.008
-0.37 *** -3.01 *** -0.09 *** 0.87 *** -2.03 ***
AR(1) illiquidity innovation specification.
Given the long-memory properties of illiquidity, it is unlikely that the AR(1) illiquidity specifica-
tion can adequately decompose illiquidity into its expected and unexpected components. Therefore,
it is necessary to test the Amihud (2002) hypotheses with respect to the illiquidity innovations given
by the THAR(3) model. Hence, we extend the analysis by considering the equation:
rt = α0 + γrt−1 + δσt−1 + ζ1ILLIQ
D,E
THAR(3),t + ζ2ILLIQ
D,U
THAR(3),t + t. (1.9)
where ILLIQD,ETHAR(3),t is the expected illiquidity level and ILLIQ
D,U
THAR(3),t is the unexpected
illiquidity level on day t given from the estimation of the extended THAR(3) model. Analogous to
Equation 1.8, for the Amihud (2002) hypotheses to hold, we expect: ζ1 > 0; and, ζ2 < 0.
Table 1.10 presents the estimated regression results for Equation 1.9. Table 1.10 reveals that
there is limited evidence in favour of Amihud’s (2002) first hypothesis. The estimated ζ1 coefficients
for the market sample are not statistically significant, while the mean estimated coefficient for the
40
Table 1.10
Test of the Amihud (2002) Hypotheses Using THAR(3) Illiquidity Innovations
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
rt = α0 + γrt−1 + δσt−1 + ζ1ILLIQ
D,E
THAR(3),t + ζ2ILLIQ
D,U
THAR(3),t + t (1.9)
where rt is the return of a stock or a market index on day t. The volatility measure, σt, is defined as
σt = ln
(
1
2
√
ln2
ln
(
PHt
PLt
))
where PHt and P
L
t are the high and low prices for a stock or market on day t,
respectively. The expected illiquidity level, ILLIQD,ETHAR(3),t, is given from the estimation of the THAR(3)
model defined by Equation 1.3 for the market sample and Equation 1.5 for the stock sample. The illiquidity
innovation, ILLIQD,UTHAR(3),t, is the residual from the estimation of the THAR(3) model defined by Equation
1.3 for the market sample and Equation 1.5 for the stock sample. The t-statistics are reported in italics. The
mean coefficients are reported for the stock sample, with their associated Hameed et al. (2010) t-statistics in
italics. Newey-West robust standard errors are used throughout. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels
are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
αo γ δ ζ1 ζ2 R
2
ASX -0.119*** -0.062*** 0.039*** -0.082*** -0.127*** 0.009
-0.80 *** -2.94 *** 1.26 *** -1.02 *** -3.01 ***
DOW -0.061*** -0.113*** 0.035*** -0.034*** -0.142*** 0.017
-0.35 *** -5.53 *** 1.12 *** -0.50 *** -3.60 ***
FTSE 0.086*** -0.086*** 0.008*** 0.040*** -0.140*** 0.016
0.97 *** -4.46 *** 0.21 *** 1.00 *** -4.41 ***
NASD 0.381*** -0.094*** -0.025*** 0.147*** -0.619*** 0.034
1.23 *** -4.51 *** -0.45 *** 1.28 *** -6.67 ***
NIKK -0.025*** -0.033*** 0.046*** -0.013*** -0.252*** 0.020
-0.15 *** -1.69 *** 1.00 *** -0.21 *** -5.09 ***
SP500 -0.131*** -0.116*** 0.054*** -0.039*** -0.202*** 0.022
-0.47 *** -6.06 *** 1.68 *** -0.57 *** -4.06 ***
Stocks -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.013*** 0.080*** -0.132*** 0.009
-0.86 *** -2.91 *** -0.28 *** 1.16 *** -2.57 ***
stock sample is also not significantly different from zero. Again, this result mirrors the findings of
Drienko et al. (2018) and Harris and Amato (2018).
In contrast to the expected illiquidity component, the unexpected component of illiquidity
demands a statistically significant negative coefficient. In Table 1.10, all estimated ζ2 values for
the market sample are negative and statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence. The
mean estimated ζ2 value for the stock sample is also negative and significant at the 95% level of
confidence. Thus, Amihud’s (2002) second hypothesis holds for both the AR(1) and THAR(3)
illiquidity specifications.
1.6.3. Dynamics of the Amihud (2002) Hypotheses
The conjecture of Amihud (2002) can be extended to derive expectations regarding the cross-
correlation function of returns and illiquidity shocks. Amihud (2002) assumes that investors form
their expectations of future illiquidity based on all available information in the current time period.
That is, if an investor is at time t, their expectation of the level of illiquidity at time t+1, ILLIQD,Et+1 ,
41
should be based on all available information at time t. Accordingly, unexpected illiquidity at time
t + 1, ILLIQD,Ut+1 , should be orthogonal to ILLIQ
D,E
t+1 and ILLIQ
D,E
t+1 should be representative of
all illiquidity shocks that occurred prior to t+ 1. Thus, if prices are efficient, we should expect all
past illiquidity shocks to have no impact on current returns. That is,
corr
(
ILLIQD,Ut+l , rt
)
= 0 ∀l < 0. (1.10)
Furthermore, given Amihud’s (2002) second hypothesis and the results observed in tables 1.9 and
1.10, we should expect a negative relationship between unexpected illiquidity and contemporaneous
returns. That is,
corr
(
ILLIQD,Ut , rt
)
< 0. (1.11)
Additionally, unforeseeable future illiquidity shocks should not be priced. That is,
corr
(
ILLIQD,Ut+l , rt
)
= 0 ∀l > 0. (1.12)
Figure 1.5 plots the cross-correlation functions of the returns and illiquidity innovations of the
market indices in the sample. Panel A plots the cross-correlation functions for the AR(1) illiquidity
innovations, ILLIQUAR(1),t. Panel B plots the cross-correlation functions for the HAR(3) illiquid-
ity innovations, ILLIQUHAR(3),t. Panel C plots the cross correlation functions for the THAR(3)
illiquidity innovations, ILLIQUTHAR(1),t. In each panel, we observe negative correlations between
illiquidity residuals and contemporaneous returns. This is consistent with Amihud’s (2002) second
hypothesis and Inequality 1.11. Also consistent with Amihud’s (2002) conjecture, future illiquid-
ity shocks appear to be unrelated to contemporaneous returns. For l > 0, the cross-correlation
functions are close to zero. Thus, the cross-correlation functions conform to Equation 1.12.
The variation across the panels of Figure 1.5 occurs in the l < 0 region. Panel A indicates that
Equation 1.10 does not hold for the AR(1) model. In Panel A, the cross-correlation functions fail
to converge to zero as l decreases towards -50. Thus, returns are negatively correlated to AR(1)
illiquidity residuals from 50 days ago. This highlights a profound weakness of the AR(1) illiquidity
specification. As shown in Table 1.8, the AR(1) illiquidity residuals exhibit long-memory. This
causes returns to be negatively correlated to past illiquidity residuals. As suggested by the Ami-
hud (2002) hypotheses, past unexpected illiquidity should be unrelated to current returns. Thus,
Figure 1.5 demonstrates that the AR(1) specification does not adequately decompose illiquidity
into its expected and unexpected components. The HAR(3) model improves on the AR(1) model.
As evident in Panel B, the return-illiquidity residual cross-correlation functions converge to zero at
approximately l = −20. The extended THAR(3) model has the best illiquidity innovation specifi-
cation. Panel C of Figure 1.5 has the sharpest downward spike, with the cross-correlation functions
converging to zero at approximately l = −5.
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Panel A: Return and AR(1) Illiquidity Innovation Cross-Correlation Functions
Panel B: Return and HAR(3) Illiquidity Innovation Cross-Correlation Functions
Panel C: Return and THAR(3) Illiquidity Innovation Cross-Correlation Functions
Fig. 1.5. Return-Illiquidity Residual Cross-Correlation Functions.
Panel A plots the cross-correlation functions for the daily return series and the AR(1) illiquidity innovations,
corr
(
rt, ILLIQ
U
AR(1),t+l
)
, for l = −50,−49, ..., 50. The AR(1) illiquidity innovations, ILLIQD,UAR(1),t, are
the residuals from the model defined by Equation 1.7. Panel B plots the equivalent functions for the
HAR(3) illiquidity innovations, ILLIQUHAR(3),t. The HAR(3) illiquidity innovations, ILLIQ
D,U
HAR(3),t, are
the residuals from the model defined by Equation 1.2. Panel C plots the equivalent functions functions for the
THAR(3) illiquidity innovations, ILLIQUTHAR(1),t. The THAR(3) illiquidity innovations, ILLIQ
D,U
THAR(3),t,
are the residuals from the model defined by Equation 1.3.
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Panel A: Market Indices
Panel B: Dow 30 Stocks
Fig. 1.6. Mean Return-Illiquidity Residual Cross-Correlation Functions.
Panel A plots the mean cross-correlation functions for the daily return series, rt, and the market illiquidity innovations, ILLIQ
U
t+l, derived from
the AR(1), HAR(3) and THAR(3) models. Panel B plots the mean cross-correlation functions for the daily return series and the stock illiquidity
innovations derived from the AR(1), HAR(3) and THAR(3) models. The AR(1) illiquidity innovations, ILLIQD,UAR(1),t, are the residuals from the
model defined by Equation 1.7. The HAR(3) illiquidity innovations, ILLIQD,UHAR(3),t, are the residuals from the model defined by Equation 1.2. The
THAR(3) market illiquidity innovations, ILLIQD,UTHAR(3),t, are the residuals from the model defined by Equation 1.3. The THAR(3) stock illiquidity
innovations are the residuals from the model defined by Equation 1.5.
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Figure 1.6 plots the mean return-illiquidity residual cross-correlation functions for each illiq-
uidity specification. Panel A plots the mean return-illiquidity innovation cross-correlation func-
tions for the market indices in the sample. Panel B plots the mean return-illiquidity innovation
cross-correlation functions for the stock sample. Similar to Figure 1.5, the mean return-illiquidity
cross-correlation functions conform to Inequality 1.11 and Equation 1.12. Also in line with Fig-
ure 1.5, as l approaches −100 from above, the mean THAR(3) function converges to zero much
faster than the HAR(3) and AR(1) specifications. Thus, according to expectations derived from
the Amihud (2002) hypotheses, the THAR(3) model appears to provide for a superior illiquidity
characterisation, for both market and stock illiquidity.
1.7. Conclusion
One well-known property of liquidity is that it is persistent. That is, current liquidity is strongly
related to past levels of liquidity. Despite the persistence of liquidity, liquidity also has the tendency
to rapidly deteriorate in market downturns. This paper reconciles these two contrasting phenomena
by demonstrating that while liquidity is generally persistent, liquidity persistence is also sensitive
to the state of the market.
This study begins by demonstrating that both daily market and stock liquidity have long-
memory properties. In addition, we show that the persistence of liquidity is conditional on past
stock market returns. This conditional liquidity persistence has very specific characteristics. Recent
large negative returns can cause daily liquidity persistence to decrease by 90.7% (SP500); while,
large negative returns in the more distant past increase liquidity persistence. This is indicative of
a long-run equilibrium level of liquidity persistence. We term the conditional nature of liquidity
persistence, asymmetric liquidity persistence (ALP).
We demonstrate the superiority of our conditional liquidity persistence model, the threshold
heterogeneous autoregressive (THAR) model in three different contexts. First, we show that the
in-sample explanatory power of ALP is comparable to the explanatory powers of both lagged
returns and volatility. Second, we show that the THAR(3) model has greater out-of-sample fore-
casting accuracy than the short-memory AR(1) model and the unconditional persistence HAR(3)
model. Finally, we illustrate the superior liquidity characterisation of the THAR(3) model under
the theoretical predictions of Amihud (2002).
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2. Discretionary Trading Surrounding Anticipated Distraction
Events: the Case of the FIFA World Cup
2.1. Abstract
This study demonstrates how anticipated market-orthogonal events can induce discretionary trad-
ing. Following Ehrmann and Jansen (2017), this study uses FIFA World Cup matches that occur
during trading hours as an exogenous shock to the opportunity cost of monitoring markets. World
Cup football matches have an impact on contemporaneous trading and an asynchronous impact
on the rest of the trading day. In particular, when World Cup matches occur in the middle of the
trading day, there is an abnormally large amount of trading between market open and kick-off time.
Dollar trading volume between 120 to 90 minutes before kick-off is 23.4% of a standard deviation
higher than normal levels. This is due to a temporal substitution effect whereby traders submit their
orders prior to kick-off in order to avoid trading during match time. During this pre-match period
markets exhibit greater liquidity, volatility and price discovery. During matches, markets exhibit
reduced liquidity, volatility and price discovery. The extraordinary market conditions that occur
on match days follow the theoretical predictions of the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) discretionary
trading model.
JEL classification: G12, G14, G15, G41, L83.
Keywords: Limited Attention, Discretionary Trading, Intra-day Trading Patterns, FIFA World
Cup.
2.2. Introduction
This study demonstrates how anticipated market-orthogonal events can induce discretionary
trading. Following Ehrmann and Jansen (2017), this study uses FIFA World Cup matches that
occur during trading hours as an exogenous shock to the opportunity cost of monitoring markets.
The widespread appeal of the World Cup means that World Cup matches are an ideal device for
observing exogenous shocks to the opportunity cost of monitoring markets. For example, 3.2 billion
people watched at least one minute of the 2010 World Cup, while 909.6 million people watched at
least one minute of the 2010 World Cup final.8 In addition to the reduction in trading that occurs
during and in the immediate vicinity of matches, as documented by Ehrmann and Jansen (2017),
this paper demonstrates that World Cup football matches have a profound effect on the entire
trading day. In particular, when World Cup matches occur in the middle of the trading day, there
is an abnormal positive amount of trading in the pre-match trading period. In particular, trades
between 120 to 90 minutes before kick-off are 21.3% of a standard deviation higher than normal
82010 FIFA World Cup South Africa: Television Audience Report. http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/
affederation/tv/01/47/32/73/2010fifaworldcupsouthafricatvaudiencereport.pdf.
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levels.
The pre-match period is also characterised by exceptional market conditions. Price impact costs
are reduced by 14.2% of a standard deviation between 150 to 120 minutes before kick-off time.
For the period 120 to 90 minutes before kick-off, volatility is increased by 21.5% of a standard
deviation. These market conditions cannot be explained by the documented seasonal or intra-day
trends of market activity. Further, the pre-match market conditions cannot be explained by the
contemporaneous distraction effect of World Cup football matches, as described by Ehrmann and
Jansen (2017).
The abnormal trading that occurs during the pre-match period is consistent with the Admati
and Pfleiderer (1988) notion of intra-day discretionary trading. In the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
model, discretionary liquidity traders concentrate their trades into one period of increased liquidity
to reduce their transaction costs. This paper argues that discretionary traders not only consider
their transaction costs but also the opportunity cost of monitoring the market. The opportunity
cost of monitoring the market includes the cost of missing culturally significant events such as World
Cup football matches. In some cases, the opportunity cost of monitoring the market can be great
enough to induce traders to exit the market. For the case of World Cup football matches that occur
during trading hours, discretionary traders with an interest in football are incentivised to fulfil their
trading demand prior to kick-off time to ensure that they are able to dedicate their attention to
monitoring the upcoming football match. Furthermore, according to the pooling Nash equilibria of
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), it is also optimal for discretionary traders not interested in football
to trade in the pre-match period. This is because the pre-match period allows for the greatest
number of market participants to pool their trades, football fans and non-football fans alike. This
observation demonstrates how relatively minor market-orthogonal events can significantly affect
financial markets.
This paper contributes to three distinct areas of the literature. First, this paper contributes to
the growing literature that examines the impacts of limited investor attention on financial markets.
This literature shows that individual investors are more likely to purchase stocks that grab their
attention (Barber and Odean (2008); Seasholes and Wu (2007)), under-react to earnings announce-
ments when they are distracted (Dellavigna and Pollet (2009); Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009))
and trade less when they are distracted (Ehrmann and Jansen (2017)).
This study documents a new channel through which limited investor attention impacts on fi-
nancial markets. Investor attention can influence discretionary trading behaviour. Accordingly,
market-orthogonal events can have an asynchronous discretionary trading effect, as well as a con-
temporaneous distraction effect. This paper shows that the discretionary trading effect has im-
portant implications for the price impact costs of traders, market volatility and price discovery.
Moreover, the incentives for discretionary traders to pool their trades together mean that even
minor distraction events can have a significant impact on markets.
Second, this paper contributes to the growing literature that examines the impacts of sporting
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events on financial markets. The literature shows that there are two distinct channels through
which sporting events impact financial markets. The first channel is through investor sentiment.
The sports sentiment literature argues that sporting outcomes impact investor moods, which in
turn affects investors’ levels of optimism and pessimism. These shifts in optimism influence the
buying and selling behaviour of investors. The sports sentiment effect has been documented by
Ashton, Gerrard, and Hudson (2003), Edmans et al. (2007), Mishra and Smyth (2010) and Chang,
Chen, Chou, and Lin (2012). In addition to the sports sentiment effect, Pantzalis and Park (2014)
show that local sports sentiment is a determinant of local stock comovement. Kaplanski and Levy
(2010) propose a trading strategy for exploiting the sports sentiment effects of FIFA World Cups.
Their follow up paper, Kaplanski and Levy (2014), suggests that sophisticated investors did indeed
exploit sentiment effects during the 2014 World Cup.
In addition to influencing investors’ mood, sporting events can also increase the opportunity cost
of monitoring the market. There are few studies in this area. This could be because most sporting
events take place in the evening and outside of trading hours. Nonetheless, Wang and Markellos
(2015) demonstrate that most countries experience a decline in trading activity during the Olympic
Games. Ehrmann and Jansen (2017) recognise that during FIFA World Cup tournaments, there
are occasions in which national football teams play matches within their domestic stock exchange
trading hours. In particular, Ehrmann and Jansen (2017) point out that the 2010 FIFA World
Cup featured 21 matches in which one of the competing nations’ national stock exchanges was
simultaneously open for trading. Ehrmann and Jansen (2017) argue that limited investor attention
coupled with the distraction of FIFA World Cup matches caused trades to drop by an average of
38.0% and trading volume by 35.8%, during 2010 World Cup matches. This paper indicates that
this was not exactly the case. For anticipated market-orthogonal events, there is a distraction effect
and a discretionary trading effect. In the case of World Cup matches that occur during trading
hours, discretionary traders substitute trading during match time for trading before kick-off time.
Thus, this paper reveals a behavioural reaction to limited attention that has not previously been
documented in the literature.
Third, this paper contributes to the empirical market microstructure literature that tests the
predictions of the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) model of discretionary trading. The Admati and
Pfleiderer (1988) model predicts that during increased discretionary trading, volatility is increased,
price discovery is increased and price impact is reduced. Further, when there is decreased discre-
tionary trading, volatility is reduced, price discovery is reduced and price impact costs are increased.
The empirical evidence regarding the theoretical predictions of the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
model is mixed. For example, Foster and Viswanathan (1993) find evidence against Admati and
Pfleiderer (1988), while the empirical results of Brailsford (1996), Scalia (1998) and Chae (2005)
support Admati and Pfleiderer (1988).
This paper differs from the previous empirical tests of the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) model by
identifying an explicit discretionary trading preference. In the existing literature, the
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Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) predictions are tested against variation in trading volumes over in-
discriminate periods of time.9 This paper shows that the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) model pre-
dictions hold when discretionary trading is properly identified. Further, the Admati and Pfleiderer
(1988) predictions hold during both increased discretionary trading and decreased discretionary
trading. When there is increased discretionary trading during the pre-match period of match days,
markets have lower price impact costs, higher volatility and higher price discovery. When there is
decreased discretionary trading during match times, markets experience greater price impact costs,
reduced volatility and reduced price discovery.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.3 describes the data and provides
summary statistics. Section 2.4 provides evidence of the intra-day discretionary trading that takes
place on match days. Section 2.5 examines the implications of the intra-day discretionary trading
for liquidity, volatility and price discovery. In Section 2.6, the findings of sections 2.4 and 2.5 are
set against various robustness tests. The final section, Section 2.7, summarises the key findings of
the paper.
2.3. Data and Summary Statistics
2.3.1. Football Match Data
The FIFA World Cup is a football competition that is organised by the Fe´de´ration Internationale
de Football Association (FIFA). The tournament is held every four years. In each edition of the
tournament, 32 senior men’s national football teams compete for the World Cup Trophy and the
title of ‘World Champion’.10 The World Cup is typically hosted in one country. This means that,
as countries congregate in one time zone to participate in football matches within the host country’s
afternoon and evening hours, matches can be scheduled during the domestic trading hours of the
participating teams in a quasi-random fashion. Due to the availability intra-day data, this study
considers all World Cup football matches from 1998.
Table 2.1 gives the countries that have participated in a World Cup match during their own
domestic trading hours since 1998, conditional on intra-day stock market data availability. In total,
their are 98 football matches that occurred during trading hours from 1998 to 2014. The 98 match
observations involve 22 countries. Table 2.1 also demonstrates that the 2010 World Cup featured
the most matches during domestic trading hours. The 2010 World cup featured 29 matches during
trading hours. Further, the 2010 World Cup features the largest cross-section of countries that
participated in football matches during trading hours. The 29 matches during the 2010 World Cup
that occurred during trading hours encompass 16 participating countries.
9The one exception is the Chae (2005) study. Chae (2005) finds evidence in favour of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
but does not test all the predictions of the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) model.
10There is also a World Cup that is contested by senior women’s national football teams that is referred to as the
‘FIFA Women’s World Cup’.
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Table 2.1
World Cup Football Matches during Trading Hours
This table indicates the number of times each country was involved in a FIFA World Cup match during their
own domestic trading hours, for each World Cup since 1998 and conditional on intra-day stock market data
availability.
Country 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 1998 - 2014
Argentina 2 2 1 2 7
Belgium 1 3 4
Brazil 3 3 4 10
Chile 2 2 4
Colombia 3 3
Denmark 1 1 2
England 1 1 1 3
France 2 2 1 5
Germany 1 4 2 1 8
Greece 1 1
Ireland 2 2
Italy 2 1 3
Mexico 2 2 3 2 9
Netherlands 1 3 4
Poland 3 1 4
Portugal 2 1 3 6
Russia 2 2
South Africa 2 2
Spain 2 2 1 5
Switzerland 1 2 3
Turkey 4 4
United States 2 2 2 1 7
Total 16 25 18 29 10 98
The football match data is extracted from the official FIFA match reports available from the
FIFA website. Each match report gives the scheduled date and time of kick-off, the final match
outcome, the half-time score, the location of the match, the minute in which each goal was scored
(for example, 1 to 90 if there is no extra stoppage time nor extra time) and the amount of extra
stoppage time for each half. This information allows me to infer when each match was played and
when each goal was scored with an accuracy of one minute, conditional on matches starting on
time and half-time being exactly 15 minutes.
2.3.2. Market Data
The market data is comprised of five sub-samples. Each sub-sample corresponds to an edi-
tion of the World Cup. Since every World Cup is predominantly held in the month of June,
I extract stock market data from the months of May, June and July of each World Cup year.
This is to include a significant amount of time before and after each World Cup. Following
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Table 2.2
Stock Market Trading Hours
This table details the trading hours of each national stock market during each iteration of the FIFA World
cup from 1998 to 2014.
Country 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
Argentina 11:00-17:00 11:00-17:00 11:00-17:00 11:00-17:00
Belgium 10:00-16:30 9:00-17:20
Brazil 10:00-17:00 10:00-17:00 10:00-17:00
Chile 9:30-16:00 9:30-16:00
Colombia 8:30-15:00
Denmark 9:00-17:00 9:00-17:00
England 8:30-16:30 (1/5-19/7) 8:00-16:30 8:00-16:30
9:00-16:30 (20/7-31/7)
France 10:00-17:00 9:00-17:30 9:00-17:30
Germany 8:30-17:00 9:00-20:00 9:00-17:30 9:00-17:30
Greece 10:30-17:20
Ireland 8:00-17:30
Italy 9:00-17:25 9:00-17:25
Mexico 8:30-15:00 8:30-15:00 8:30-15:00 8:30-15:00
Netherlands 9:30-16:30 9:00-17:30
Poland 10:00-16:00 10:00-16:00
Portugal 8:00-16:30 8:00-16:30 8:00-16:30
Russia 10:00-18:00
South Africa 9:30-17:00
Spain 9:00-17:30 9:00-17:30 9:00-17:30
Switzerland 9:00-17:20 9:00-17:20
Turkey 9:30-12:00 &
14:00-16:30
United States 9:30-16:00 9:30-16:00 9:30-16:00 9:30-16:00
Ehrmann and Jansen (2017), the cross-section of each World cup sub-sample is determined by two
criteria. First, the country must have intra-day stock market data available. Second, the country’s
national stock exchange must be open for trading during at least one match in which the country’s
national football team is participating. The trading hours of each country during each World Cup
are presented in Table 2.2.
There are 22 countries in the sample: 15 European, six American and South Africa. I take the
constituent stocks of each country’s national index to construct my stock sample. I identify the
constituent stocks using Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH). For each stock, I use five-minute
intra-day data, and trade and quote data from TRTH.11 12 I conduct my analysis at the five-minute
frequency. This is to mitigate any potential measurement error with regards to the football match
data. For example, football matches often start a couple of minutes behind schedule and half-time
is not always exactly 15 minutes.
11I gratefully acknowledge the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) for making this data
available.
12For a detailed explanation of the TRTH database, see Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2017).
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Table 2.3
Market Indices
This table details the market index sample. The representative stocks for each country are sampled from
the following national indices.
Country 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
Argentina MERV MERV MERV MERV
Belgium BFX BFX
Brazil BVSP BVSP BVSP
Chile IPSA IPSA
Colombia COLCAP
Denmark KFX OMXC20
England FTSE FTSE FTSE
France FCHI FCHI FCHI
Germany GDAXI GDAXI GDAXI GDAXI
Greece ATF
Ireland ISEQ
Italy SPMIB FTMIB
Mexico MXX MXX MXX MXX
Netherlands AEX AEX
Poland WIG20 WIG20
Portugal PSI20 PSI20 PSI20
Russia IRTS
South Africa JDTOP
Spain IBEX IBEX IBEX
Switzerland SSMI SSMI
Turkey XU030
United States DJI DJI DJI DJI
Table 2.3 identifies the market indices used to arrive at each market sub-sample. The market
indices are identified by their Reuters Instrument Codes. The market index constituents are not
constant over the sub-sample time periods. To ensure that each market sub-sample has a constant
number of stocks, each market sub-sample includes all stocks that were in the corresponding market
index during the sub-sample period. For example, London Stock Exchange Group and Thomas
Cook Group were replaced by African Barrick Gold and Essar Energy in the FTSE 100 on the 21st
of June 2010. Accordingly, London Stock Exchange Group, Thomas Cook Group, African Barrick
Gold and Essar Energy are all included in the 2010 England sub-sample.
2.3.3. Trading Activity Variables
To observe trading activity, I construct 11 market variables. Market volume, V OLm,t,w, is calcu-
lated by aggregating the trading volumes of the constituent stocks of market index, m, at time t, in
World Cup sub-sample w. Market dollar volume (DV OLm,t,w), number of trades (TRADESm,t,w),
number of bids at the national best bid price (NBBOBIDSm,t,w), number of asks at the national
best ask price (NBBOASKSm,t,w), total number of bids (BIDSm,t,w) and total number of asks
(ASKSm,t,w) are constructed in a similar manner. The BIDSm,t,w and ASKSm,t,w variables are
only available for the USA and the Euronext countries in the sample. I also classify trades into
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buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The amount
of buyer-initiated dollar trading volume and seller-initiated dollar trading volume for market m at
time t in World Cup sub-sample w are given by BDV OLm,t,w and SDV OLm,t,w, respectively.
Another important form of market activity in order-driven markets is limit order revisions and
cancellations. Not all limit order revisions nor cancellations can be directly observed from trade
and quote data. For example, if there is an increase in the bid price, it is unclear if this is due to
a new bid order or a revised bid order. On the other hand, if there is a decrease in the bid price
that does not immediately follow a trade, this can be identified as a bid revision or cancellation.
Similarly, if a quote size decreases without a trade taking places, a limit order revision can be
inferred. Accordingly, it is possible to approximate for bid and ask revisions using trade and quote
data. The bid order revision proxy, BREV ISIONSm,t,w, counts the number of times the best bid
price or volume at the best bid price for stocks in market m, at time t, in World Cup sub-sample w
decrease without a trade taking place. The ask order revision proxy, AREV ISIONSm,t,w counts
the number of times the best ask price increases or volume of the best ask price decreases for stocks
in market m, at time t, in World Cup sub-sample w decrease without a trade taking place.
2.3.4. Market Condition Variables
This section outlines the methodology for constructing the price impact, volatility and price
discovery measures used in this study. I use two measures of price impact in the main analysis.
The first is the Amihud (2002) measure. The Amihud (2002) measure, AMIHUDi,t,m, is defined
as:
AMIHUDi,t,m =
|ri,t,m|
DV OLi,t,m
.
where ri,t,m and DV OLi,t,m are the continuously compounded return and dollar trading volume
for stock i, at time t in World Cup sub-sample w, respectively. The Amihud (2002) ratio is a price
impact proxy used throughout the market microstructure and asset-pricing literatures.13
For extremely illiquid periods in which no trades are recorded, AMIHUDi,t,w cannot be cal-
culated. For these periods denoted by t′, I let AMIHUDi,t′,w = max (AMIHUDi,t,w). That is,
I equate AMIHUDi,t′,w to the most illiquid observation available for stock i in World Cup sub-
sample w. Following, I calculate a market level Amihud (2002) measure, AMIHUDm,t,w, by taking
the mean of AMIHUDi,t,w across market index constituents at time t in World Cup sub-sample
w.
I consider a second price impact measure for robustness. The second price impact measure is
a modified version of the Amihud (2002) measure. The modified Amihud (2002) measure is used
13Lou and Shu (2017) report that from 2009 to 2015 over 120 papers published in the Journal of Finance, the
Journal of Financial Economics and the Review of Financial Studies use the Amihud (2002) measure in their empirical
analysis.
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in Chapter 1, Asymmetric Liquidity Persistence, to overcome some of the documented weaknesses
of the Amihud (2002) measure. For example, Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) show that absolute
returns are a poor measure of price movement; while, Lou and Shu (2017) show that most of the
time-series variation in the Amihud (2002) measure can be attributed to the denominator. The
modified Amihud (2002) measure for stock i at time t in World Cup sub-sample w is defined as:
MAMIHUDi,t,w =
σi,t,w
DV OLi,t,w
where σi,t,w is a volatility measure that utilises the five-minute high-price, P
H
i,t,w, and five-minute
low price, PLi,t,w,:
σi,t,w =
1
2
√
ln2
ln
(
PHi,t,w
PLi,t,w
)
.
Similar to the AMIHUDi,t,w measure, for periods in which there are zero trades, denoted by t
′, I
let MAMIHUDi,t′,w = max (MAMIHUDi,t,w).
The market level modified Amihud (2002) measure, MAMIHUDm,t,w, is taken as the cross-
sectional average MAMIHUDi,t,w value of the market index constituents at time t. Further, the
market level volatility measure, σm,t,w, is taken as the cross-sectional average σi,t,w value of the
market index constituents at time t.
In addition to the Amihud (2002) and modified Amihud (2002) measures, I also consider the
high-frequency liquidity measures such as the effective spread, the realised spread and five-minute
price impact. These measures are discussed and analysed in Section 5.2.4 in Chapter 5 Limitations
and Future Research.
The methodology for calculating the market-level price discovery measure largely follows from
Wang and Yang (2017). The Wang and Yang (2017) study utilises the Beveridge and Nelson
(1981) decomposition to separate five-minute returns into its permanent and transitory components.
Following Wang and Yang (2017), I begin by estimating the following equation for each stock on a
daily basis using ordinary least squares:
ri,t,d,w = A(L)i,d,wri,t,d,w + ui,t,d,w
where ri,t,d,w is the continuously compounded return of stock i at five-minute time period t on day
d in World Cup sub-sample w, A(L) is a lag operator and ui,t,d,w is the error term. The lag operator
is defined as:
A(L)i,d,w = αi,d,1,wL+ αi,d,2,wL
2 + αi,d,3,wL
3 + αi,d,4,wL
4 + αi,d,5,wL
5 + αi,d,6,wL
6.
For simplicity, I keep the number of lags constant at six. Wang and Yang (2017) allow for up to
six lags and determine the number of lags by taking the average of the Akaike (1974) and Schwarz
(1978) Bayesian information criteria. According to Wang and Yang (2017), the permanent return
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component for stock i at five-minute time period t, day d, in World Cup sub-sample w can be
estimated as:
∆mi,t,d,w ≡
(
uˆi,t,d,w
(1−Ai,d,w)
)
where Ai,d,w is:
Ai,d,w =
6∑
n=1
αˆi,d,n,w.
In the spirit of Hasbrouck (1991), the variance of ∆mi,t,d,w can be interpreted as trade informa-
tiveness. Accordingly, Wang and Yang (2017) arrive at their daily gross price discovery measure
for stock i and day d by taking the sum of (∆mi,t,d,w)
2 over each intraday sub-period t. Since I am
interested in constructing an intra-day gross price discovery measure, I take a different approach.
I estimate my market level gross price discovery measure, PDm,t,w, by taking the logarithmic
function of the cross-sectional mean of the (∆mi,t,d,w)
2 values of the market index constituents
corresponding to market m at time t in World Cup sub-sample w. I take the mean because the
number of actively traded stocks in each market index can vary over time.
2.3.5. Adjustments
I make two adjustments to the trading activity and market condition variables presented in
subsections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4. First, to ensure that each market variable has the same order of
magnitude across the markets, I standardise each individual market-level series to have a mean
of zero and standard deviation of one. This also controls for country fixed effects. Second, to
control for seasonal trends in the data and isolate the abnormal trading activity resulting from
the football matches, all data is adjusted using the methodology Gallant et al. (1992). Assuming
a normal distribution, the seasonality adjustment process maintains the exact mean and variance
of the data, after removing all variation that is explained by the seasonal variables. The seasonal
variables consist of: month-of-the-year indicator variables; day-of-the-week indicator variables; and,
five-minute time-of-the-day indicator variables.
2.3.6. Summary Statistics of the Market Condition Variables
Table 2.4 presents the summary statistics of the market condition variables: AMIHUDm,t,w,
MAMIHUDm,t,w, σm,t,w and PDm,t,w. Due to the adjustments to the data described in the
previous subsection, all market variables have a mean close to zero and a standard deviation close
to one. Further, most variables are positively skewed for every World Cup sub-sample. The
exception is the AMIHUDm,t,w measure which is negatively skews for the 2010 and 2014 World
Cup sub-samples. Interestingly, the MAMIHUDm,t,w measure displays more positive skewness
55
Table 2.4
Summary Statistics of the Market Condition Variables.
This table presents the summary statistics of the market condition variations for each World Cup sub-sample
w. The market condition variables include: AMIHUDm,t,w, the mean Amihud (2002) measure for market
m at time t and World Cup sub-sample w; MAMIHUDm,t,w, the mean modified Amihud (2002) measure;
σm,t,w, mean volatility; and, gross price discovery, denoted by PDm,t,w.
Panel A: Raw Observations
Year DEPm,t,w Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Skewness Kurtosis
1998 AMIHUDm,t,1998 -0.001 0.001 0.802 0.146 57.881
MAMIHUDm,t,1998 -0.001 -0.278 0.969 1.348 39.725
V OLATILITYm,t,1998 -0.004 -0.087 0.860 2.352 19.781
PDm,t,1998 0.001 -0.091 0.998 0.542 9.182
2002 AMIHUDm,t,2002 0.001 0.008 0.832 0.814 69.034
MAMIHUDm,t,2002 0.025 -0.026 0.945 3.045 138.991
V OLATILITYm,t,2002 0.012 -0.173 0.909 3.453 41.681
PDm,t,2002 0.001 -0.074 0.992 0.475 6.228
2006 AMIHUDm,t,2006 -0.001 0.001 0.935 0.057 16.881
MAMIHUDm,t,2006 0.021 -0.162 1.000 8.040 137.123
V OLATILITYm,t,2006 0.005 -0.099 0.932 1.680 9.425
PDm,t,2006 0.002 -0.082 0.997 0.690 7.816
2010 AMIHUDm,t,2010 0.001 0.006 0.928 -0.220 32.325
MAMIHUDm,t,2010 0.023 -0.218 0.993 7.779 150.769
V OLATILITYm,t,2010 0.001 -0.114 0.823 2.796 27.109
PDm,t,2010 0.000 -0.076 0.998 0.672 6.052
2014 AMIHUDm,t,2014 0.002 0.002 0.923 -0.501 25.105
MAMIHUDm,t,2014 0.022 -0.046 0.929 1.943 36.906
V OLATILITYm,t,2014 0.002 -0.166 0.912 1.933 15.537
PDm,t,2014 0.001 -0.059 1.000 0.305 7.506
than the AMIHUDm,t,w measure for every World Cup sub-sample and greater kurtosis in every
World Cup sub-sample except the 1998 sub-sample. Table 2.4 demonstrates that every variable can
be classified as leptokurtic, with PDm,t,w consistently having the least kurtosis across the World Cup
sub-samples. To address concerns over the impact of outliers in the market condition variables, I also
consider winsorising each variable at various thresholds and taking the logarithmic transformation
of the AMIHUDm,t,w, MAMIHUDm,t,w and σm,t,w variables. The empirical results are robust
to the logarithmic transformation and winsorisation. Hence, for simplicity, I present the results for
the variables as defined in Sub-section 2.3.4.
2.4. Discretionary Trading on Match Days
In this section, I present evidence of abnormal discretionary trading on World Cup match days.
Sub-section 2.4.1 presents graphical evidence. Sub-section 2.4.2 presents more rigorous statistical
evidence in the form of a regression analysis.
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Panel A: V OLm,t,w Panel B: DV OLm,t,w
Panel C: BDV OLm,t,w Panel D: SDV OLm,t,w
Panel E: NBBOBIDSm,t,w Panel F: NBBOASKSm,t,w
Fig. 2.1. Trading Activity On Match Days. This figure plots the mean standardised, seasonally detrended
trading activity variables on match days. The market variables are detrended using the methodology of
Gallant et al. (1992) for month-of-the-year, day-of-the-week and five-minute time-of-the-day effects. Volume
for market m in World Cup sub-sample w at time t is denoted by V OLm,t,w, dollar volume by DV OLm,t,w,
number of trades by TRADESm,t,w, buyer-initiated dollar trading volume by BDV OLm,t,w, seller-initiated
dollar trading volume by SDV OLm,t,w, number of bids at the national best bid price by NBBOBIDSm,t,w
and number of asks at the national best ask price is denoted by NBBOASKSm,t,w. The average first-half
and second-half time periods are shaded in grey. The x-axis of each plot indicates the number of minutes
from kick-off time.
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2.4.1. Visual Analysis
Figure 2.1 plots the mean V OLm,t,w, DV OLm,t,w, BDV OLm,t,w, DV OLm,t,w, NBBOBIDSm,t,w
and NBBOASKSm,t,w values on match day. Figure 2.1 is designed to allow for a simple visual
interpretation of the data. The trading activity variables are normalised at the country level and
are seasonally detrended. Therefore, if any of the variables of interest deviate from zero, it can be
interpreted as abnormal market activity.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates that World Cup football matches have a very significant impact on
the entire trading day. This is in contrast to Ehrmann and Jansen (2017) whom only consider
the contemporaneous distraction effect of football matches. Before matches, there is a pronounced
period of heightened trading between one to two hours before kick-off time. In Panel A, V OLm,t,w
reaches a peak of 0.33 standard deviations above the mean, while in Panel B, DV OLm,t,w peaks
at 0.41 standard deviations. Following this period, trading activity declines sharply towards kick-
off time. Following kick-off, there is a sustained period of reduced trading activity during match
time. This is consistent with the empirical results of Ehrmann and Jansen (2017). Match time
is punctuated by a spike in trading at half-time. Following full-time, trading activity gradually
increases towards normal levels but mostly remain below normal levels for the remainder of the
trading day.
Panels C and D plot the BDV OLm,t,w and SDV OLm,t,w variables. Both BDV OLm,t,w and
SDV OLm,t,w exhibit a similar trend over the trading day. This is consistent with the notion of
liquidity trading and inconsistent with traders simply closing out their positions before kick-off.
Panels E and F plot the number of bids and asks at the NBBO, NBBOBIDSm,t,w and
NBBOASKSm,t,w respectively. Interestingly, while NBBOBIDSm,t,w and NBBOASKSm,t,w
decline substantially during match time, they do not increase as substantially as the other vari-
ables prior to match time. This suggests that liquidity providers do not substantially increase the
depth of the limit order book during the pre-match period but instead maintain relatively normal
levels of liquidity, despite the abnormal trading volume suggested by panels A, B, C and D.
Figure 2.1 provides very strong evidence that investors refrain from trading during important
football matches. Further, the persistent spike in trading activity during the 15 minute half-time
period suggests that some traders monitor football matches during match time and revert their
attention back to the market during half-time. The positive abnormal trading levels from two to
one hours before kick-off suggest a temporal substitution effect whereby market participants choose
to avoid trading during match time and instead fulfil their trading requirements before the match
starts.
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Panel A: BREV ISIONSm,t,w
Panel B: AREV ISIONSm,t,w
Fig. 2.2. Order Revisions and Cancellations at the NBBO on Match Days. This figure plots the mean
standardised, seasonally detrended limit order revision variables on match days. The market variables are
detrended using the methodology of Gallant et al. (1992) for month-of-the-year, day-of-the-week and five-
minute time-of-the-day effects. The bid order revision proxy, BREV ISIONSm,t,w, counts the number of
times the best bid price or volume of the best bid price for stocks in market m at time t in World Cup
sub-sample w decrease without a trade taking place. The ask order revision proxy, AREV ISIONSm,t,w
counts the number of times the best ask price increases or volume of the best ask price decreases for stocks in
market m at time t in World Cup sub-sample w decrease without a trade taking place. The average first-half
and second-half time periods are shaded in grey. The x-axis of each plot indicates the number of minutes
from kick-off time.
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Following the period of heightened trading, trading activity begins to decline to abnormally
low levels. This decline begins well before kick-off time. This can be explained by the distraction
hypothesis of Ehrmann and Jansen (2017) and the discretionary trading hypothesis. Under the
distraction hypothesis, the gradual decline in trading can be explained by a gradual increase in
the number of traders being distracted. For example, in the lead up to kick-off, traders could be
distracted by national anthems or pre-match analyses. Under the discretionary trading hypotheses,
the gradual decline in trading activity can be explained by discretionary traders gradually leaving
the market after satisfying their trading demands. Some market participants might also leave their
trading desks well before kick-off time in order to commute to a viewing venue.
The reduced amount of trading following full-time can similarly be explained by distraction and
discretionary trading. The reduced trading can be attributed to a loss in productivity due to the
distraction of post-match analyses, celebrations or commiserations. The reduced level of trading
can also be attributed to discretionary traders not returning to the market after full-time.
Figure 2.2 plots the mean BREV ISIONSm,t,w and AREV ISIONSm,t,w values on match day.
The mean series follow the same trend as the V OLm,t,w and DV OLm,t,w variables presented in
Figure 2.1. This is consistent with the model of Liu (2009). According to Liu (2009), those who
place limit orders face two distinct risks: non-execution (NE) risk and free-option (FO) risk. NE
risk is the risk of a limit order not resulting in a trade. FO risk is the risk of a limit order resulting
in a trade at an unfavourable price. To mitigate these risks, traders monitor the market and cancel
or revise their limit orders accordingly. Traders revise or cancel their orders more frequently when
markets are more active because prices may move away from their limit price such that they lose
price priority (NE risk) or their limit order could be picked off as new information enters the market
(FO risk). Thus, Figure 2.2 is representative of the abnormal trading activity patterns presented
in Figure 2.1 and the limit order submission risks during match days.
2.4.2. Regression Analysis
2.4.2.1 Daily Analysis
In this subsection, I test the null hypothesis that football matches do not have an impact on
trading activity at the daily level. To do this, I estimate the following equation:
DEPm,t,w = α0 + β0GDm,t,w + m,t,w (2.1)
where DEPm,t,w is the dependent variable for market m at time t and World Cup sub-sample
w. The match day indicator variable, GDm,t,w, takes the value of one if five-minute intra-day
time period t coincides with a trading day in which country m is open for trading simultaneous
to country m participating in a football match. Thus, if β0 is significantly different from zero,
we can conclude that there is an abnormal amount of trading activity that occurs on match days.
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Table 2.5
The Daily Impact of Matches on Trading Activity
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
DEPm,t,w = α0 + β0GDm,t,w + m,t,w (2.1)
where DEPm,t,w is the dependent variable for market m at time t and World Cup sub-sample w. Each
dependent variable is formed by pooling the standardised, detrended market-level observations. The GDm,t,w
indicator variable is a match day indicator variable that takes the value of one if five-minute intra-day time
period t coincides with a trading day in which country m is open for trading simultaneous to country m
participating in a football match. Volume for market m at time t and World Cup sub-sample w is denoted
by V OLm,t,w, dollar volume by DV OLm,t,w, number of trades by TRADESm,t,w, buyer-initiated dollar
trading volume by BDV OLm,t,w and seller-initiated dollar trading volume by SDV OLm,t,w. The estimated
β0 values are reported for the full sample of countries and the individual country sub-samples. The t-statistics
are reported in italics. The standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. The 99%, 95%, and 90%
confidence levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
DEPm,t,w V OLm,t,w
*** DV OLm,t,w
*** TRADESm,t,w
*** BDV OLm,t,w
*** SDV OLm,t,w
***
Full Sample -0.119*** -0.131*** -0.249*** -0.076*** -0.136***
-1.06 *** -1.15 *** -1.35 *** -0.88 *** -1.22 ***
Argentina -0.231*** -0.445*** -0.481*** -0.142*** -0.368***
-3.85 *** -11.90 *** -5.09 *** -2.32 *** -15.92 ***
Belgium -0.038*** -0.012*** -0.054*** 0.052*** -0.155***
-0.35 *** -0.12 *** -0.29 *** 0.73 *** -1.45 ***
Brazil -0.396*** -0.439*** -0.600*** -0.305*** -0.402***
-3.89 *** -5.15 *** -4.13 *** -4.07 *** -4.72 ***
Chile 0.016*** 0.001*** 0.072*** 0.021*** 0.001***
0.35 *** 0.01 *** 0.84 *** 0.37 *** 0.01 ***
Colombia -0.014*** -0.251*** -0.646*** -0.050*** -0.101***
-0.30 *** -4.35 *** -5.27 *** -1.00 *** -2.22 ***
Denmark 0.384*** 0.456*** 0.341*** 0.353*** 0.379***
1.44 *** 1.49 *** 0.89 *** 1.44 *** 1.16 ***
England -0.028*** -0.148*** -0.283*** -0.039*** -0.116***
-1.24 *** -1.36 *** -1.42 *** -1.73 *** -1.06 ***
France -0.166*** -0.096*** -0.291*** -0.144*** -0.103***
-26.61 *** -2.80 *** -2.44 *** -4.15 *** -1.58 ***
Germany -0.188*** -0.177*** -0.214*** -0.105*** -0.176***
-3.52 *** -3.70 *** -5.67 *** -2.20 *** -4.36 ***
Greece -0.357*** -0.266*** -0.422*** -0.284*** -0.181***
-5.02 *** -2.77 *** -6.28 *** -5.00 *** -2.13 ***
Ireland -0.304*** -0.291*** -0.388*** -0.197*** -0.185***
-4.87 *** -7.15 *** -1.70 *** -3.49 *** -6.71 ***
Italy -0.211*** -0.234*** -0.418*** -0.161*** -0.081***
-10.19 *** -109.70 *** -9.67 *** -3.66 *** -348.01 ***
Mexico -0.157*** -0.166*** -0.306*** -0.154*** -0.203***
-1.46 *** -1.69 *** -3.54 *** -1.44 *** -2.32 ***
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Table 2.5
(continued)
DEPm,t,w V OLm,t,w
*** DV OLm,t,w
*** TRADESm,t,w
*** BDV OLm,t,w
*** SDV OLm,t,w
***
Netherlands 0.052*** 0.031*** -0.063*** 0.207*** -0.073***
0.91 *** 0.51 *** -0.34 *** 3.48 *** -0.47 ***
Poland -0.125*** -0.130*** -0.175*** -0.061*** -0.029***
-1.69 *** -1.04 *** -1.44 *** -0.46 *** -0.31 ***
Portugal -0.030*** -0.065*** -0.167*** -0.020*** -0.038***
-1.16 *** -30.05 *** -15.76 *** -0.37 *** -2.51 ***
Russia -0.038*** -0.081*** -0.074*** -0.040*** -0.039***
-1.20 *** -1.97 *** -1.00 *** -0.97 *** -1.13 ***
South Africa -0.164*** -0.201*** -0.236*** -0.135*** -0.163***
-0.85 *** -0.77 *** -1.14 *** -0.72 *** -0.78 ***
Spain -0.031*** -0.022*** 0.037*** -0.122*** 0.027***
-0.47 *** -0.32 *** 1.15 *** -3.25 *** 0.40 ***
Switzerland 0.100*** 0.087*** 0.120*** 0.063*** 0.118***
2.16 *** 1.35 *** 6.15 *** 1.55 *** 1.59 ***
Turkey -0.069*** -0.002*** -0.067*** -0.045*** 0.002***
-0.79 *** -0.02 *** -0.76 *** -0.41 *** 0.03 ***
United States -0.058*** -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.119*** 0.010***
-0.35 *** -0.24 *** -0.16 *** -1.39 *** 0.05 ***
I estimate Equation 2.1 with respect to the full sample by pooling the country-level dependent
variables together and clustering errors at the country-year level. I also estimate Equation 2.1 with
respect to the individual country sub-samples.
Table 2.5 presents the estimation results of Equation 2.1 for the V OLm,t,w, DV OLm,t,w,
TRADESm,t,w, BDV OLm,t,w and SDV OLm,t,w dependent variables. All significant estimated
β0 coefficients presented in Table 2.5 are negative except for the Swiss sub-sample and the β0
coefficient corresponding to the Dutch BDV OLm,t,w dependent variable. The β0 coefficients are
negative and significant for all dependent variables for Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland and Italy.
For the pooled sample, the estimated β0 coefficients are not statistically different from zero. The
results indicate that we cannot categorically conclude that World Cup football matches that occur
during trading hours cause daily trading activity to decline. The following sub-section demonstrates
that the impact of World Cup football matches is more complex than a uniform decline in trading
activity across match days.
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2.4.2.2 Intra-day Analysis
In this subsection, I test the null hypothesis that football matches do not influence intra-day
trading activity levels. To do this, I estimate the following equation:
DEPm,t,w =α0 + β0GDm,t,w +
6∑
τ=1
PREK−τm,t,wβτ + β7D
F
m,t,w + β8D
H
m,t,w + β9D
S
m,t,w
+ β10D
E
m,t,w +
6∑
τ=1
POSTF+τm,t,wβ10+τ + m,t,w (2.2)
where DEPm,t,w is the dependent variable. The D
F
m,t,w indicator variable takes the value of one
if country m is playing in the first-half of a football match at time t in World Cup sub-sample w.
The DSm,t,w indicator variable is the analogous variable for the second-half of a football match. The
DHm,t,w indicator variable takes the value of one if it is half-time at time t for a match involving
country m in World Cup sub-sample w. The DEm,t,w indicator variable takes the value of one if it is
extra-time at time t for a match involving country m in World Cup sub-sample w. The remaining
indicator variables capture abnormal trading activity outside of match time on match days. The
PREK−τm,t,w indicator variables take the value of one if t is 30τ minutes before a first-half kick-off
observation or between 30τ and 30(τ−1) minutes before a first-half kick-off observation, given that
country m is participating in the match in World Cup sub-sample w. The POSTF+τm,t,w indicator
variables take the value of one if t is 30τ minutes after a full-time observation or between 30τ and
30(τ+1) minutes after a full-time observation, given that country m is participating in the match in
World Cup sub-sample w.14 Equation 2.2 is simultaneously estimated for all markets using errors
clustered at the country-year level.
Equation 2.2 represents a significant deviation from the regression approach of Ehrmann and
Jansen (2017). Ehrmann and Jansen (2017) only consider the contemporaneous impact of football
matches on markets and the impact on trading within the immediate vicinity of match time.
Instead, Equation 2.2 allows for a comprehensive analysis of trading levels up to three hours either
side of match time. Equation 2.2 is inspired by the regression model of Foster and Viswanathan
(1993). Foster and Viswanathan (1993) test for intra-day trading patterns across the entire trading
day by constructing hourly time-of-the-day indicator variables.
Table 2.6 Panel A presents the estimation results of Equation 2.2 for the V OLm,t,w, DV OLm,t,w,
TRADESm,t,w, BDV OLm,t,w and SDV OLm,t,w dependent variables. Starting with the match time
variables, DFm,t,w, D
S
m,t,w and D
E
m,t,w, we can see that football matches have a large negative impact
on trading activity during match time. For every trading activity variable in Table 2.6 Panel A,
the estimated β7, β9 and β10 values are negative and significantly different from zero with a 95%
14A previous version of this paper included indicator variables for goals scored and goals conceded for country m
at time t in World Cup sub-sample w. These indicator variables are excluded from this version as they proved to
have a largely insignificant marginal impact on trading activity.
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Table 2.6
Trading Activity On Match Days for All World Cups
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
DEPm,t,w =α0 + β0GDm,t,w +
6∑
τ=1
PREK−τm,t,wβτ + β7D
F
m,t,w + β8D
H
m,t,w + β9D
S
m,t,w
+ β10D
E
m,t,w +
6∑
τ=1
POSTF+τm,t,wβ10+τ + m,t,w (2.2)
where DEPm,t,w is the dependent variable. Each dependent variable is formed by pooling the standardised,
detrended market-level observations across World Cup sub-samples. The match day indicator variable, GDm,t,w,
takes the value of one if five-minute intra-day time period t coincides with a trading day in which country m
is open for trading simultaneous to country m participating in a football match. The DFm,t,w indicator variable
takes the value of one if country m is playing in the first-half of a football match at time t in World Cup
sub-sample w. The DSm,t,w indicator variable is the analogous variable for the second-half of a football match.
The DHm,t,w indicator variable takes the value of one if it is half-time at time t for a match involving country m
in World Cup sub-sample w. The DEm,t,w indicator variable takes the value of one if it is extra-time at time t for
a match involving country m in World Cup sub-sample w. The remaining indicator variables capture abnormal
trading activity outside of match time on match days. The PREK−τm,t,w indicator variables take the value of
one if t is 30τ minutes before a first-half kick-off observation or between 30τ and 30(τ − 1) minutes before a
first-half kick-off observation, given that country m is participating in the match in World Cup sub-sample w.
The POSTF+τm,t,w indicator variables take the value of one if t is 30τ minutes after a full-time observation or
between 30τ and 30(τ + 1) minutes after a full-time observation, given that country m is participating in the
match in World Cup sub-sample w. Volume for market m at time t during World Cup sub-sample w is denoted
by V OLm,t,w, dollar volume by DV OLm,t,w, number of trades by TRADESm,t,w, buyer-initiated dollar trading
volume by BDV OLm,t,w, seller-initiated dollar trading volume by SDV OLm,t,w, number of bids at the national
best bid price by NBBOBIDSm,t,w, number of asks at the national best ask price by NBBOASKSm,t,w, total
number of bids by BIDSm,t,w and total number of asks is denoted by ASKSm,t,w. The t-statistics are reported
in italics. The standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels
are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. R2W is a weighted coefficient of determination that only utilises
observations for which at least one non-constant independent variable is nonzero.
Panel A: Trades
DEPm,t,w V OLm,t,w
*** DV OLm,t,w
*** TRADESm,t,w
*** BDV OLm,t,w
*** SDV OLm,t,w
***
GDm,t,w -0.079
*** -0.100*** -0.113*** -0.072*** -0.081***
-2.34 *** -2.86 *** -2.10 *** -2.39 *** -2.27 ***
PREK−6m,t,w 0.031
*** 0.011*** 0.105*** 0.027*** 0.024***
0.46 *** 0.18 *** 1.37 *** 0.41 *** 0.39 ***
PREK−5m,t,w 0.078
*** 0.082*** 0.127*** 0.063*** 0.085***
1.61 *** 1.56 *** 2.06 *** 0.89 *** 2.31 ***
PREK−4m,t,w 0.184
*** 0.234*** 0.213*** 0.251*** 0.149***
2.07 *** 2.42 *** 1.80 *** 2.25 *** 1.94 ***
PREK−3m,t,w 0.085
*** 0.115*** 0.054*** 0.099*** 0.060***
1.17 *** 1.49 *** 0.64 *** 1.43 *** 0.81 ***
PREK−2m,t,w -0.025
*** -0.013*** -0.095*** -0.022*** -0.008***
-0.42 *** -0.23 *** -0.97 *** -0.36 *** -0.17 ***
64
Table 2.6
(continued)
DEPm,t,w V OLm,t,w
*** DV OLm,t,w
*** TRADESm,t,w
*** BDV OLm,t,w
*** SDV OLm,t,w
***
PREK−1m,t,w -0.151
*** -0.163*** -0.316*** -0.152*** -0.130***
-2.19 *** -2.32 *** -2.95 *** -2.48 *** -2.06 ***
DFm,t,w -0.280
*** -0.308*** -0.593*** -0.259*** -0.255***
-4.75 *** -4.28 *** -6.24 *** -3.82 *** -4.28 ***
DHm,t,w -0.101
*** -0.119*** -0.258*** -0.068*** -0.109***
-1.37 *** -1.64 *** -2.34 *** -0.77 *** -1.71 ***
DSm,t,w -0.168
*** -0.197*** -0.497*** -0.196*** -0.188***
-2.39 *** -2.96 *** -5.77 *** -2.96 *** -3.26 ***
DEm,t,w -0.739
*** -0.919*** -1.494*** -0.846*** -0.618***
-19.51 *** -11.30 *** -16.85 *** -28.41 *** -10.73 ***
POSTF+1m,t,w -0.117
*** -0.095*** -0.206*** -0.065*** -0.089***
-1.93 *** -1.51 *** -2.30 *** -1.28 *** -1.67 ***
POSTF+2m,t,w 0.060
*** 0.047*** 0.110*** 0.040*** 0.046***
0.77 *** 0.86 *** 1.32 *** 0.81 *** 0.80 ***
POSTF+3m,t,w -0.023
*** 0.033*** -0.014*** 0.017*** 0.019***
-0.31 *** 0.44 *** -0.12 *** 0.29 *** 0.25 ***
POSTF+4m,t,w 0.058
*** 0.081*** 0.140*** 0.078*** 0.068***
0.56 *** 0.73 *** 0.89 *** 0.79 *** 0.81 ***
POSTF+5m,t,w 0.076
*** 0.053*** 0.093*** -0.056*** 0.057***
0.57 *** 0.60 *** 0.74 *** -0.79 *** 0.67 ***
POSTF+6m,t,w -0.115
*** -0.142*** -0.137*** -0.154*** -0.050***
-1.66 *** -1.65 *** -1.07 *** -2.03 *** -0.58 ***
Observations 291821*** 291821*** 291920*** 291824*** 291815***
R2W (%) 2.42
*** 3.24*** 6.79*** 2.77*** 2.36***
Panel B: Bids and Asks
DEPm,t,w NBBOBIDSm,t,w NBBOASKSm,t,w BIDSm,t,w ASKSm,t,w
GDm,t,w -0.147
*** -0.141*** 0.014*** -0.037***
-2.87 *** -2.60 *** 0.31 *** -0.88 ***
PREK−6m,t,w -0.050
*** 0.025*** 0.158*** 0.056***
-0.77 *** 0.33 *** 1.65 *** 0.79 ***
PREK−5m,t,w 0.113
*** 0.135*** 0.073*** 0.104***
1.63 *** 2.39 *** 0.86 *** 1.25 ***
PREK−4m,t,w 0.172
*** 0.122*** 0.068*** 0.100***
2.08 *** 1.55 *** 0.74 *** 1.09 ***
PREK−3m,t,w 0.022
*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.091***
0.28 *** 0.17 *** 0.14 *** 1.12 ***
PREK−2m,t,w -0.137
*** -0.160*** -0.021*** -0.029***
-1.14 *** -1.52 *** -0.34 *** -0.41 ***
PREK−1m,t,w -0.227
*** -0.263*** -0.109*** -0.061***
-1.75 *** -2.26 *** -1.50 *** -0.86 ***
DFm,t,w -0.396
*** -0.537*** -0.303*** -0.246***
-3.21 *** -4.82 *** -4.72 *** -3.94 ***
DHm,t,w -0.203
*** -0.339*** -0.182*** -0.158***
-1.56 *** -3.38 *** -2.11 *** -2.35 ***
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(continued)
DEPm,t,w NBBOBIDSm,t,w NBBOASKSm,t,w BIDSm,t,w ASKSm,t,w
DSm,t,w -0.354
*** -0.496*** -0.223*** -0.182***
-3.73 *** -5.50 *** -2.70 *** -2.45 ***
DEm,t,w -1.423
*** -1.560*** -0.620*** -0.573***
-27.94 *** -12.36 *** -9.02 *** -8.48 ***
POSTF+1m,t,w -0.117
*** -0.113*** -0.050*** -0.011***
-1.33 *** -1.17 *** -0.58 *** -0.12 ***
POSTF+2m,t,w 0.038
*** -0.029*** 0.071*** 0.153***
0.48 *** -0.37 *** 0.48 *** 1.10 ***
POSTF+3m,t,w -0.025
*** -0.051*** -0.149*** 0.016***
-0.20 *** -0.40 *** -1.98 *** 0.17 ***
POSTF+4m,t,w 0.063
*** 0.104*** -0.080*** -0.079***
0.40 *** 0.65 *** -0.69 *** -1.06 ***
POSTF+5m,t,w 0.222
*** 0.117*** -0.182*** -0.152***
1.11 *** 0.93 *** -1.86 *** -1.44 ***
POSTF+6m,t,w 0.095
*** 0.072*** -0.034*** -0.006***
0.58 *** 0.60 *** -0.46 *** -0.09 ***
Observations 291922*** 291928*** 268694*** 263144***
R2W (%) 3.40
*** 5.56*** 1.90*** 1.68***
level of confidence.15 The magnitudes of the estimated β7 and β9 coefficients are very significant.
The β7 estimated coefficients in Table 2.6 Panel A range from −0.255 for SDV OLm,t,w to −0.593
for TRADESm,t,w. This means that on average, SDV OLm,t,w decreases by 25.5% of the standard
deviation and TRADESm,t,w decreases by 59.3% of the standard deviation during the first half of
a football match. The extra-time indicator variable, DEm,t,w, has the greatest impact on trading
activity. This is unsurprising as extra-time can only occur for those matches within the “elimination-
stage” of a World Cup. These matches are perceived to be of greater importance because the loser
is immediately eliminated from the World Cup and because these matches occur towards the end of
the tournament when only a few countries are yet to be eliminated. The estimated β10 coefficients
associated with the DEm,t,w variable range from -0.618 for SDV OLm,t,wto -1.494 for TRADESm,t,w.
Thus, trades drop by 1.494 standard deviations during extra-time of a World Cup match.
Table 2.6 Panel A also shows that trading in the immediate vicinity of match time is significantly
reduced. The estimated β6 coefficients are negative and statistically different from zero for all
trading activity variables. Further, the estimated β11 coefficients are negative and statistically
significant from zero for the V OLm,t,w, TRADESm,t,w and SDV OLm,t,w dependent variables.
The β6 and β11 estimation results are consistent with Ehrmann and Jansen (2017). Further, all
significant coefficients relating to the POSTF+τm,t,w variables in Table 2.6 Panel A are negative. Thus,
trading activity is generally reduced in the post-match period.
The pre-match period contrasts significantly to the post-match period. In Table 2.6 Panel A,
15Ehrmann and Jansen (2017) only consider the number of trades and trading volume in their study. Thus, the
estimated β7 and β9 coefficients for V OLm,t,w and TRADESm,t,w confirm the main result of Ehrmann and Jansen
(2017).
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all estimated βτ coefficients for τ ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6} are positive while all estimated βτ coefficients for
τ ∈ {1, 2} are negative. Thus, in the third and second last hour before kick-off, trading activity is
increased while in the last hour before kick-off trading activity is reduced.
Table 2.6 Panel A also confirms the statistical significance of the positive abnormal level of
discretionary trading in the second last hour before kick-off. The highest level of trading occurs
between 120 to 90 minutes before kick-off. For all trading activity variables in Table 2.6 Panel A,
the estimated β4 coefficients have the greatest magnitude. From 120 to 90 minutes until kick-off, the
number of trades is 21.3% of a standard deviation higher than normal; while, dollar trading volume
is 23.4% of a standard deviation higher than normal. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that
football matches do not impact trading activity during match time and outside of match time.
Panel B of Table 2.6 gives the Equation 2.2 estimation results for the bid and ask variables:
NBBOBIDSm,t,w, NBBOASKSm,t,w, BIDSm,t,w and ASKSm,t,w. With respect to the match-
time variables, DFm,t,w, D
S
m,t,w and D
E
m,t,w, all estimated coefficients are negative and significant
at the 95% level of confidence. Moreover, in line with the trading activity variables in Panel A,
the extra-time indicator variable, DEm,t,w, demands the most negative coefficient. In the pre-match
period, there is also some evidence of a greater number of bids and asks in the limit order book.
In particular, all estimated βτ coefficients for τ ∈ {3, 4, 5} are positive. Nonetheless, the increase
in bids and asks is during the pre-match period of the trading day relatively insignificant. Finally,
all estimated coefficients for the period after full-time are negative. This suggests that there are
fewer limit orders submissions following World Cup matches.
It should also be noted that the explanatory power of Equation 2.2 is quite low. This is
because the match day observations only constitute a small proportion of the total sample. Since
the explanatory power of Equation 2.2 is not of key interest, R-squared statistics are not shown.
Instead, Table 2.6 gives a weighted R2 coefficient that only utilises observations for which at least
one non-constant independent variable is nonzero.
2.5. Market Conditions on Match Days
This section examines market conditions during World Cup match days. Sub-section 2.5.1 de-
scribes the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) predictions for market conditions with respect to discre-
tionary trading. Sub-section 2.5.2 plots the market condition variables on match days. Sub-section
2.5.3 formally tests for abnormal market conditions on match days in a regression setting.
2.5.1. The Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) Testable Hypotheses
In their influential paper, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) provide a theoretical explanation for
observed trading patterns. Specifically, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) seek to explain why trading
and return volatility are amplified at particular times during the trading day and why trading
volume is correlated to return variability. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) demonstrate that these
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observed trading patterns can be explained by two groups of optimising agents: discretionary
liquidity traders (DLTs) and endogenously informed traders. In their baseline model, Admati and
Pfleiderer (1988) extend on the Kyle (1985) model by describing two types of liquidity traders:
non-discretionary liquidity traders (NDLTs) and DLTs. NDLTs are uninformed and are randomly
assigned a net demand that must be satisfied in each period. On the other hand, DLTs decide
when to trade. In the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) model, there are T periods. In period T ′,
each DLT’s net demand is determined. This net demand needs to be satisfied before T ′′, where
T ′ < T ′′ < T . In the baseline model, each DLT can only trade once. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
demonstrate that in this setting, there will always exist equilibria in which all DLTs trade in the
same period. They trade in a single period, when market depth is at its greatest and transaction
costs at their lowest. The influx of discretionary liquidity trading also encourages informed traders
to increase their demand in this period. The increase in informed trading in this period has the
effect of increasing price variance, as price moves to reflect the new information contained in the
informed order flow. This gives the first testable hypothesis of the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
model:
H1 When there is increased discretionary trading:
a. Price impact costs are reduced ;
b. Volatility is increased ; and,
c. Price discovery is increased.
Conversely, during periods in which informed traders only trade with NDLTs, adverse selection
costs are higher and price variance is lower. This gives the second testable hypothesis of the
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) model:
H2 When there is decreased discretionary trading:
a. Price impact costs are increased ;
b. Volatility is reduced ; and,
c. Price discovery is reduced.
Under Hypothesis H1, the period of increased discretionary trading in the second last hour before
the kick-off of a football match should be accompanied by reduced price impact costs, increased
volatility and increased price discovery. Under Hypothesis H2, the periods in which a football match
is being played and there is reduced discretionary trading should be accompanied by increased price
impact costs, reduced volatility and reduced price discovery.
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Panel A: AMIHUDm,t,w Panel B: MAMIHUDm,t,w
Panel C: σm,t,w Panel D: PDm,t,w
Fig. 2.3. Market Conditions On Match Days. This figure plots the mean standardised, seasonally detrended market condition variables on match
days. The market variables are detrended using the methodology of Gallant et al. (1992) for month-of-the-year, day-of-the-week and five-minute
time-of-the-day effects. The mean Amihud (2002) measure for market m at time t and World Cup sub-sample w is denoted by AMIHUDm,t,w, the
mean modified Amihud (2002) measure by MAMIHUDm,t,w, mean volatility by σm,t,w and gross price discovery by PDm,t,w. The average first-half
and second-half time periods are shaded in grey. The x-axis of each plot indicates the number of minutes from kick-off time.
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2.5.2. Visual Analysis
Figure 2.3 plots the mean market condition variables on match days. Panels A and B plot the
price impact measures, AMIHUDm,t,w and MAMIHUDm,t,w. Panel A demonstrates that the
AMIHUDm,t,w measure does not display any distinct intra-day trend on match days. In contrast,
Panel B shows that the MAMIHUDm,t,w measure displays a compelling intra-day trend on match
days. In line with Hypothesis H1.a, the MAMIHUDm,t,w measure mostly remains below zero
during the pre-match period. Further, in line with H2.a, the MAMIHUDm,t,w measure is mostly
increased during match time. The mean MAMIHUDm,t,w value reaches a peak of 0.53 standard
deviations above normal levels. Following match time, the MAMIHUDm,t,w measure approaches
normal levels.
The σm,t,w and PDm,t,w market variables display a different intra-day pattern to the
MAMIHUDm,t,w measure. Panel C plots the mean σm,t,w series around match time. Panel C
shows that volatility displays a U-shaped pattern around match time with a distinct spike dur-
ing half-time. Consistent with the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) predictions, there is increased
volatility during the concentrated trading period, between two to one hours before kick-off, and
there is decreased volatility during matches. Hence, there is evidence in favour of both Hypothesis
H1.b and Hypothesis H2.b. Figure 2.3 Panel D plots the mean PDm,t,w values on match days.
Panel D shows that there is increased gross price discovery in the pre-match period of increased
discretionary trading and a reduction in gross price discovery during match time. Further, Panel
D shows a pronounced spike in price discovery during the half-time period. Hence, Figure 2.3 also
provides evidence in favour of hypotheses H1.c and H2.c. Thus, the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
predictions describe the volatility and gross price discovery conditions that occur on match days.
2.5.3. Regression Analysis
This section employs Equation 2.2 to test for abnormal market conditions during days in which
a World Cup match occurs during trading hours. Table 2.7 presents the estimation results of
Equation 2.2 with respect to the dependent variables: AMIHUDm,t,w, MAMIHUDm,t,w, σm,t,w
and PDm,t,w.
The first dependent variables presented in Table 2.7 are the price impact measures: the
AMIHUDm,t,w and MAMIHUDm,t,w measures. Under Hypotheses H1.a, price impact should
be lower in the pre-match period of greater discretionary trading. Consistent with Figure 2.3, the
estimation results only find significant evidence of reduced price impact costs during the pre-match
period for the MAMIHUDm,t,w measure. For the MAMIHUDm,t,w measure, all significant βτ
estimated coefficients where τ ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} are negative. Thus, in line with Hypothesis H1.a,
there is some evidence that price impact costs are reduced in the pre-matchperiod of increased
discretionary trading. The pre-match estimated βτ coefficients are not significantly different from
zero for the AMIHUDm,t,w measure.
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Table 2.7
Market Conditions On Match Days for All World Cups
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
DEPm,t,w =α0 + β0GDm,t,w +
6∑
τ=1
PREK−τm,t,wβτ + β7D
F
m,t,w + β8D
H
m,t,w + β9D
S
m,t,w
+ β10D
E
m,t,w +
6∑
τ=1
POSTF+τm,t,wβ10+τ + m,t,w (2.2)
where DEPm,t,w is the dependent variable. Each dependent variable is formed by pooling the standardised,
detrended market-level observations across World Cup sub-samples. The match day indicator variable,
GDm,t,w, takes the value of one if five-minute intra-day time period t coincides with a trading day in which
country m is open for trading simultaneous to country m participating in a football match. The DFm,t,w
indicator variable takes the value of one if country m is playing in the first-half of a football match at time
t in World Cup sub-sample w. The DSm,t,w indicator variable is the analogous variable for the second-half
of a football match. The DHm,t,w indicator variable takes the value of one if it is half-time at time t for a
match involving country m in World Cup sub-sample w. The DEm,t,w indicator variable takes the value of
one if it is extra-time at time t for a match involving country m in World Cup sub-sample w. The remaining
indicator variables capture abnormal trading activity outside of match time on match days. The PREK−τm,t,w
indicator variables take the value of one if t is 30τ minutes before a first-half kick-off observation or between
30τ and 30(τ − 1) minutes before a first-half kick-off observation, given that country m is participating in
the match in World Cup sub-sample w. The POSTF+τm,t,w indicator variables take the value of one if t is 30τ
minutes after a full-time observation or between 30τ and 30(τ + 1) minutes after a full-time observation,
given that country m is participating in the match in World Cup sub-sample w. The mean Amihud (2002)
measure for market m at time t and World Cup sub-sample w is denoted by AMIHUDm,t,w, the mean
modified Amihud (2002) measure by MAMIHUDm,t,w, the mean volatility by σm,t,w and the mean gross
price discovery by PDm,t,w. The t-statistics are reported in italics. The standard errors are clustered at the
country level. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. R2W
is a weighted coefficient of determination that only utilises observations for which at least one non-constant
independent variable is nonzero.
DEPm,t,w AMIHUDm,t,w MAMIHUDm,t,w σm,t,w PDm,t,w
GDm,t,w -0.004
*** 0.020*** -0.086*** -0.060***
-0.22 *** 0.43 *** -1.80 *** -0.90 ***
PREK−6m,t,w 0.074
*** -0.134*** 0.063*** 0.006***
1.00 *** -1.88 *** 0.97 *** 0.05 ***
PREK−5m,t,w 0.005
*** -0.142*** 0.124*** 0.117***
0.11 *** -2.09 *** 1.89 *** 0.96 ***
PREK−4m,t,w 0.072
*** -0.053*** 0.215*** 0.185***
1.62 *** -1.01 *** 2.94 *** 1.94 ***
PREK−3m,t,w 0.005
*** -0.106*** 0.105*** 0.041***
0.13 *** -2.48 *** 1.61 *** 0.49 ***
PREK−2m,t,w 0.007
*** -0.058*** 0.037*** -0.107***
0.25 *** -1.17 *** 0.44 *** -0.94 ***
PREK−1m,t,w 0.025
*** 0.056*** -0.087*** -0.347***
0.63 *** 0.81 *** -0.95 *** -1.49 ***
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Table 2.7
(continued)
DEPm,t,w AMIHUDm,t,w MAMIHUDm,t,w σm,t,w PDm,t,w
DFm,t,w 0.017
*** 0.187*** -0.327*** -0.417***
0.55 *** 2.19 *** -3.90 *** -3.53 ***
DHm,t,w 0.007
*** 0.072*** -0.011*** -0.079***
0.15 *** 0.48 *** -0.11 *** -0.73 ***
DSm,t,w 0.057
*** 0.091*** -0.281*** -0.335***
2.23 *** 1.19 *** -4.05 *** -3.23 ***
DEm,t,w -0.226
*** 1.118*** -0.906*** 0.051***
-1.50 *** 4.05 *** -15.10 *** 0.04 ***
POSTF+1m,t,w -0.025
*** 0.057*** -0.101*** -0.033***
-0.70 *** 0.76 *** -1.22 *** -0.31 ***
POSTF+2,wm,t -0.014
*** -0.037*** 0.029*** 0.098***
-0.20 *** -0.50 *** 0.40 *** 0.88 ***
POSTF+3m,t,w 0.003
*** -0.029*** 0.030*** 0.038***
0.10 *** -0.32 *** 0.28 *** 0.31 ***
POSTF+4m,t,w -0.008
*** 0.132*** 0.148*** 0.227***
-0.26 *** 1.17 *** 1.07 *** 1.52 ***
POSTF+5m,t,w 0.010
*** 0.122*** 0.167*** 0.113***
0.29 *** 1.10 *** 1.11 *** 0.59 ***
POSTF+6m,t,w -0.026
*** -0.132*** 0.061*** 0.009***
-0.31 *** -1.07 *** 0.55 *** 0.07 ***
Observations 243310*** 248395*** 291870*** 243426***
R2W (%) 0.12
*** 1.22*** 3.09*** 1.92***
As predicted by Hypothesis H2.a, price impact costs increase during match time. For both price
impact measures, all significant coefficients relating to match time are positive. The estimated β7
and β10 coefficients are both significant at the 95% confidence level for the MAMIHUDm,t,w
dependent variable. The β10 coefficient indicates that the MAMIHUDm,t,w measure is on average
1.118 standard deviations higher during extra-time periods of a football match. Thus, the regression
results provide strong support for Hypothesis H2.a and the notion that discretionary traders resist
trading during match time to avoid high price impact costs.
The last two columns of Table 2.7 present the σm,t,w and PDm,t,w estimation results. Under
Hypothesis H1, σm,t,w and PDm,t,w should be increased during the period of concentrated trades.
Table 2.7 shows that the increase in volatility before match-time presented in Figure 2.3 Panel
C is significant, particularly from 150 to 90 minutes before kick-off time. This coincides with the
abnormal trading levels observed in Table 2.6. From 120 to 90 minutes before kick-off time, volatility
is increased by 21.5% of a standard deviation. Table 2.6 also demonstrates that the increase in
price discovery before match time observed in Figure 2.3 Panel D is statistically significant at the
90% level of confidence for the period of heightened discretionary trading, 120 to 90 minutes before
kick-off time.
During match time, volatility is reduced and there is less gross price discovery. All estimated β7,
β9 and β10 coefficients presented in the last two columns of Table 2.7 are negative and statistically
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significant at the 99% level of confidence, except the estimated β10 coefficient for PDm,t,w. Volatility
is lowest during the extra-time period of football matches. The σm,t,w variable is reduced by 0.91
standard deviations during extra-time Thus, the results for σm,t,w and PDm,t,w are consistent
with hypotheses H1 and H2, as well as the assertion that increased discretionary trading induces
increased trading by informed market participants.
2.6. Robustness
This section extends the analysis to demonstrate the robustness of the previous findings. Sub-
section 2.6.1 examines trading activity on match days for a sample of small market capitalisation
stocks. Sub-section 2.6.2 distinguishes between elimination-stage and non-elimination-stage football
matches.
2.6.1. Small Market Capitalisation Sample
The main analysis focused on the constituents of the most important national market indices
of the sample countries. These stocks have large market capitalisations. This sub-section analyses
the trading activity and market conditions of small market capitalisation or “small cap” stocks. In
this sub-section, the stock sample used in the main analysis, will be referred to as the “large cap”
sample.
I select a small cap stock sample in an analogous manner to the large cap sample. For each
country and World Cup iteration, a representative sample of small cap stocks is sampled from the
constituents of a national small cap index. Table 2.8 outlines the national small cap indices. There
are occasions where an analogous small cap index could not be found. Table 2.8 indicates these
instances by “N/A”. For example, in 2010 Argentina and Portugal do not have small cap market
indices and are excluded from the small cap analysis. Further, to reduce computation time, 100
constituents of the S&P 600 Small Cap index are randomly drawn to represent small stocks from
the United States of America.
I construct trading activity and market condition variables for the small cap sample using the
same methodology implemented in the main analysis. The superscript ‘s’ is used to differentiate
the small cap market variables from the large cap variables that appear in the main analysis.
Figure 2.4 plots the mean small cap trading activity variables on match days. Figure 2.4 is
analogous to Figure 2.1 in the main analysis. During match time, the small cap sample behaves
in a similar fashion to the large cap sample. During the first and second half periods, small cap
trading activity is markedly reduced. This is consistent with the notion that many traders of both
large cap and small cap stocks do not to trade during World Cup football matches. Furthermore, as
in the large cap sample, there is a spike in small cap trading activity during the 15-minute half-time
period.
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Table 2.8
Countries and Small Cap Market Indices
This table gives the small cap market indices that are used to construct the small cap stock sample. There
are a number of instances whereby a small cap market index is not available. These instances are indicated
by “N/A”.
Country 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
Argentina N/A N/A N/A N/A
Belgium N/A N/A
Brazil N/A N/A SMLL
Chile IGPAS IGPAS
Colombia N/A
Denmark N/A OMXCSCPI
England N/A FTSC FTSC
France N/A N/A CACS
Germany SDAXI SDAXI SDAXI
Greece N/A
Ireland ISCI
Italy FTITSC FTITSC
Mexico N/A N/A MXXSM MXXSM
Netherlands N/A ASCX
Poland N/A N/A
Portugal N/A N/A N/A
Russia N/A
South Africa JSMLC
Spain N/A IBEXS IBEXS
Switzerland SSCC SSCC
Turkey N/A
Ukraine N/A
United States N/A SML SML SML
Figure 2.4 demonstrates that pre-match small cap trading differs from large cap pre-match
trading. Figure 2.4 does not feature a great amount of discretionary trading prior to kick-off. This
could be representative of the characteristics of small cap stocks. Small cap stocks attract investors
with longer investment horizons (Stoll and Whaley (1983)). Stoll and Whaley (1983) demonstrate
that due to the high transaction costs of small cap stocks, positive net small cap returns are best
achieved through long investment horizons. In their sample, the minimum investment horizon to
achieve a positive abnormal net return on a portfolio of small cap stocks is four months. This
means that for small cap stocks, the 110 minute window of decreased liquidity during match time
is unlikely to prompt a pre-match increase in discretionary trading caused by small cap investors
with immediacy demands. Thus, the discrepancy between the two samples can be explained by a
lack of demand for immediacy for small cap stocks that attract more long-term investors.
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Panel A: V OLsm,t,w Panel B: DV OL
s
m,t,w
Panel C: BUY Ssm,t,w Panel D: SELLS
s
m,t,w
Panel E: NBBOBIDSsm,t,w Panel F: NBBOASKS
s
m,t,w
Fig. 2.4. Small Cap Trading Activity On Match Days. This figure plots the mean standardised, seasonally
detrended small cap trading activity variables on match days. The market variables are detrended using the
methodology of Gallant et al. (1992) for month-of-the-year, day-of-the-week and five-minute time-of-the-day
effects. Small Cap volume for market m at time t is denoted by V OLsm,t,w, dollar volume by DV OL
s
m,t,w,
number of trades by TRADESsm,t,w, buyer-initiated dollar trading volume by BDV OL
s
m,t,w, seller-initiated
dollar trading volume by SDV OLsm,t,w, number of bids at the national best bid price by NBBOBIDSm,t,w
and number of asks at the national best ask price is denoted by NBBOASKSm,t,w. The average first-half
and second-half time periods are shaded in grey. The x-axis of each plot indicates the number of minutes
from kick-off time.
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To determine whether World Cup football matches have a statistically significant effect on
small cap trading activity, I estimate Equation 2.2 with respect to the small cap trading activity
variables.16 Table 2.9 Panel A presents the estimation results of Equation 2.2 for V OLsm,t,w,
DV OLsm,t,w, TRADES
s
m,t,w, BDV OL
s
m,t,w and SDV OL
s
m,t,w. Table 2.9 Panel A demonstrates
that trading levels during match time are significantly lower than normal. For all trading variables,
the estimated β7 and β9 coefficients are negative and statistically significant. The coefficients
corresponding to the pre-match period confirm that the pre-match discretionary trading is less
pronounced for the small cap sample. Nonetheless, all significant βτ coefficients for τ ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}
are positive in Table 2.9 Panel A. Thus, Table 2.9 Panel A demonstrates that the small cap sample
behaves in a similar fashion to the large cap sample with the exception of having a less significant
amount of discretionary trading in the pre-match period between market open and kick-off time.17
Figure 2.5 plots the mean AMIHUDsm,t,w, MAMIHUD
s
m,t,w, σ
s
m,t,w and PD
s
m,t,w variables on
match days. While the mean AMIHUDsm,t,w and MAMIHUD
s
m,t,w variables do not show any
distinct intra-day pattern on match days, the σsm,t,w and PD
s
m,t,w variables share a common trend
with their large cap analogues. Prior to match time, σsm,t,w and PD
s
m,t,w are generally increased
relative to the rest of the trading day. During match time σsm,t,w decreases to a minimum of -0.48,
while PDsm,t,w decreases to -0.71. Thus, Figure 2.5 conforms to the H1.b, H1.c, H2.b and H2.c
hypotheses
Table 2.9 Panel B presents the estimation results of Equation 2.2 with respect to the small
cap market condition variables: AMIHUDsm,t,w, MAMIHUD
s
m,t,w, σ
s
m,t,w and PD
s
m,t,w. In line
with the relatively limited increase to trading in the pre-match period of match days for small cap
stocks, Table 2.9 Panel B demonstrates that small cap market conditions prior to football matches
are mostly insignificantly different from normal levels. During match time, the small cap market
conditions follow a similar trend to the large cap market condition variables. Table 2.9 Panel B
shows that all the estimated β7 and β9 values are of the sign that is predicted by the Admati and
Pfleiderer (1988) model. The results for the σsm,t,w dependent variable indicate that volatility is
reduced by 32.5% of a standard deviation during the first-half of a football match and 28.3% of
a standard deviation during the second half of a football match. Further, the results for PDsm,t,w
indicate that price discover is reduced by 37.9% of a standard deviation for small cap stocks during
the first-half of a football match. Despite this, the results during match time are weaker than those
of the large cap sample. Thus, while the abnormal amount of discretionary trading that occurs in
the pre-match period is less pronounced for the small cap sample, the small cap analysis nonetheless
confirms the validity and robustness of the main results of interest.
16It should be noted that the countries with small cap data available did not feature in any extra-time observations
that occurred during trading hours. Hence the DEm,t,w variable is irrelevant for the small cap sample.
17For brevity, I do not present the Equation 2.2 estimation results for the NBBOBIDSsm,t,w, NBBOASKS
s
m,t,w,
BIDSsm,t,w nor ASKS
s
m,t,w variables; however, they are available on request.
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Panel A: AMIHUDsm,t,w Panel B: MAMIHUD
s
m,t,w
Panel C: σsm,t,w Panel D: PD
s
m,t,w
Fig. 2.5. Small Cap Market Conditions On Match Days. This figure plots the mean standardised, seasonally detrended market condition variables
on match days for the small cap sample of stocks. The market variables are detrended using the methodology of Gallant et al. (1992) for month-of-
the-year, day-of-the-week and time-of-the-day effects. The mean Amihud (2002) measure for market m at time t and World Cup sub-sample w is
denoted by AMIHUDsm,t,w, the mean modified Amihud (2002) measure by MAMIHUD
s
m,t,w, mean volatility by σ
s
m,t,w and gross price discovery
by PDsm,t,w. The average first-half and second-half time periods are shaded in grey. The x-axis of each plot indicates the number of minutes from
kick-off time.
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Table 2.9
Small Cap Trading Activity and Market Conditions On Match Days
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
DEPm,t,w =α0 + β0GDm,t,w +
6∑
τ=1
PREK−τm,t,wβτ + β7D
F
m,t,w + β8D
H
m,t,w + β9D
S
m,t,w
+ β10D
E
m,t,w +
6∑
τ=1
POSTF+τm,t,wβ10+τ + m,t,w (2.2)
where DEPm,t,w is the dependent variable for market m at time t and World Cup sub-sample w. Each
dependent variable is formed by pooling the standardised, detrended market-level observations. The GDm,t,w
indicator variable is a match day indicator variable that takes the value of one if five-minute intra-day time
period t coincides with a trading day in which country m is open for trading simultaneous to country m
participating in a football match. The DFm,t,w indicator variable takes the value of one if country m is playing
in the first-half of a football match at time t in World Cup sub-sample w. The DSm,t,w indicator variable is
the analogous variable for the second-half of a football match. The DHm,t,w indicator variable takes the value
of one if it is half-time at time t for a match involving country m in World Cup sub-sample w. The DEm,t,w
indicator variable takes the value of one if it is extra-time at time t for a match involving country m in World
Cup sub-sample w. The remaining indicator variables capture abnormal trading activity outside of match
time on match days. The PREK−τm,t,w indicator variables take the value of one if t is 30τ minutes before a
first-half kick-off observation or between 30τ and 30(τ − 1) minutes before a first-half kick-off observation,
given that country m is participating in the match in World Cup sub-sample w. The POSTF+τm,t,w indicator
variables take the value of one if t is 30τ minutes after a full-time observation or between 30τ and 30(τ + 1)
minutes after a full-time observation, given that country m is participating in the match in World Cup sub-
sample w. Small cap volume for market m at time t and World Cup sub-sample w is denoted by V OLsm,t,w,
dollar volume by DV OLsm,t,w, number of trades by TRADES
s
m,t,w, buyer-initiated dollar trading volume by
BDV OLsm,t,w, seller-initiated dollar trading volume by SDV OL
s
m,t,w, the mean Amihud (2002) measure by
AMIHUDsm,t,w, the mean modified Amihud (2002) measure by MAMIHUD
s
m,t,w, the mean volatility by
σsm,t,w and the mean gross price discovery by PD
s
m,t,w. The t-statistics are reported in italics. The standard
errors are clustered at the country level. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by ***, **,
and *, respectively. R2W is a weighted coefficient of determination that only utilises observations for which
at least one non-constant independent variable is nonzero.
Panel A: Trading Activity
DEPm,t,w V OL
s
m,t,w
*** DV OLsm,t,w
*** TRADESsm,t,w
*** BDV OLsm,t,w
*** SDV OLsm,t,w
***
GDm,t,w -0.048
*** -0.082*** -0.104*** -0.032*** -0.080***
-1.06 *** -1.61 *** -1.13 *** -0.68 *** -1.69 ***
PREK−6m,t,w 0.077
*** 0.111*** 0.158*** 0.138*** 0.023***
1.17 *** 1.84 *** 1.90 *** 1.67 *** 0.44 ***
PREK−5m,t,w 0.017
*** 0.042*** 0.144*** 0.015*** 0.060***
0.34 *** 0.91 *** 1.73 *** 0.26 *** 1.28 ***
PREK−4m,t,w -0.018
*** 0.118*** 0.171*** 0.109*** 0.112***
-0.37 *** 1.24 *** 1.84 *** 1.13 *** 1.65 ***
PREK−3m,t,w -0.027
*** 0.055*** 0.093*** 0.033*** 0.035***
-0.38 *** 0.89 *** 0.96 *** 0.58 *** 0.58 ***
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Table 2.9
(continued)
DEPm,t,w V OL
s
m,t,w
*** DV OLsm,t,w
*** TRADESsm,t,w
*** BDV OLsm,t,w
*** SDV OLsm,t,w
***
PREK−2m,t,w -0.075
*** -0.003*** -0.060*** -0.007*** -0.035***
-1.34 *** -0.05 *** -0.51 *** -0.12 *** -0.63 ***
PREK−1m,t,w -0.001
*** 0.017*** -0.123*** 0.042*** -0.005***
-0.02 *** 0.25 *** -1.01 *** 0.46 *** -0.05 ***
DFm,t,w -0.203
*** -0.209*** -0.492*** -0.162*** -0.195***
-2.63 *** -2.44 *** -3.49 *** -3.01 *** -1.77 ***
DHm,t,w -0.133
*** -0.078*** -0.275*** -0.028*** -0.134***
-1.86 *** -0.77 *** -1.73 *** -0.27 *** -1.61 ***
DSm,t,w -0.254
*** -0.199*** -0.470*** -0.172*** -0.183***
-4.00 *** -2.25 *** -3.45 *** -2.81 *** -1.89 ***
POSTF+1m,t,w -0.065
*** -0.104*** -0.183*** -0.073*** -0.098***
-0.89 *** -1.90 *** -1.62 *** -1.33 *** -1.48 ***
POSTF+2m,t,w 0.320
*** 0.088*** 0.170*** 0.043*** 0.139***
1.81 *** 0.96 *** 1.17 *** 0.49 *** 1.95 ***
POSTF+3m,t,w 0.001
*** 0.025*** 0.045*** 0.033*** 0.005***
0.01 *** 0.34 *** 0.33 *** 0.36 *** 0.08 ***
POSTF+4m,t,w 0.122
*** 0.019*** 0.148*** 0.017*** 0.002***
1.29 *** 0.26 *** 0.79 *** 0.28 *** 0.03 ***
POSTF+5m,t,w -0.049
*** 0.017*** 0.034*** 0.009*** -0.002***
-0.52 *** 0.14 *** 0.24 *** 0.10 *** -0.01 ***
POSTF+6m,t,w -0.164
*** -0.083*** -0.160*** 0.025*** -0.208***
-3.06 *** -0.65 *** -0.76 *** 0.15 *** -1.89 ***
Observations 133044*** 133053*** 133090*** 133052*** 133048***
R2W (%) 1.82
*** 1.81*** 5.19*** 1.12*** 1.69***
Panel B: Market Conditions
DEPm,t,w AMIHUD
s
m,t,w MAMIHUD
s
m,t,w σm,t,w PD
s
m,t,w
GDm,t,w -0.031
*** -0.020*** -0.035*** -0.033***
-2.13 *** -0.48 *** -0.57 *** -0.41 ***
PREK−6m,t,w -0.015
*** 0.132*** 0.006*** -0.144***
-0.38 *** 2.23 *** 0.13 *** -1.50 ***
PREK−5m,t,w 0.033
*** -0.025*** 0.113*** -0.005***
0.93 *** -0.22 *** 1.05 *** -0.06 ***
PREK−4m,t,w -0.045
*** -0.004*** 0.108*** 0.049***
-1.17 *** -0.06 *** 1.22 *** 0.50 ***
PREK−3m,t,w 0.033
*** 0.129*** 0.097*** -0.078***
1.04 *** 1.85 *** 0.93 *** -0.72 ***
PREK−2m,t,w -0.116
*** 0.005*** -0.017*** 0.074***
-1.43 *** 0.06 *** -0.17 *** 0.70 ***
PREK−1m,t,w 0.021
*** 0.007*** -0.080*** -0.026***
0.57 *** 0.08 *** -1.00 *** -0.21 ***
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(continued)
DEPm,t,w AMIHUD
s
m,t,w MAMIHUD
s
m,t,w σm,t,w PD
s
m,t,w
DFm,t,w 0.039
*** 0.115*** -0.325*** -0.379***
1.63 *** 1.79 *** -3.65 *** -1.93 ***
DHm,t,w 0.045
*** 0.230*** -0.177*** -0.064***
1.00 *** 1.48 *** -1.76 *** -0.34 ***
DSm,t,w -0.002
*** 0.017*** -0.283*** -0.255***
-0.09 *** 0.19 *** -3.58 *** -1.51 ***
POSTF+1m,t,w 0.092
*** -0.013*** -0.176*** -0.079***
1.62 *** -0.08 *** -1.69 *** -0.68 ***
POSTF+2m,t,w -0.014
*** 0.076*** 0.135*** 0.116***
-0.42 *** 0.79 *** 1.02 *** 0.52 ***
POSTF+3m,t,w 0.059
*** 0.096*** 0.117*** 0.045***
1.81 *** 1.30 *** 0.81 *** 0.24 ***
POSTF+4m,t,w 0.015
*** 0.060*** 0.145*** 0.134***
0.31 *** 0.69 *** 0.84 *** 0.84 ***
POSTF+5m,t,w 0.047
*** 0.058*** 0.132*** 0.069***
1.00 *** 0.53 *** 1.06 *** 0.53 ***
POSTF+6m,t,w 0.073
*** 0.082*** -0.045*** 0.072***
1.51 *** 1.14 *** -0.25 *** 0.68 ***
Observations 123612*** 126012*** 133081*** 110504***
R2W (%) 0.46
*** 0.29*** 2.43*** 1.89***
2.6.2. Elimination-Stage Matches
This section distinguishes between ‘‘elimination-stage’’ and ‘‘group-stage’’ World Cup matches.
An elimination-stage match is a match in which the losing country is immediately out of the running
to win the World Cup. For this reason, elimination-stage matches are perceived to be of greater
importance than group-stage matches. Of the 98 country-match observations in Table 2.1, 21 are
elimination-stage matches.
As elimination-stage matches are perceived to be of greater importance than group-stage matches,
the cost of monitoring the market for traders should be greater during elimination-stage matches.
Therefore, it should be expected that fewer traders remain in the market during elimination-stage
matches, resulting in a further reduction in trading activity during match time, relative to group-
stage matches. Further, as fewer discretionary will be willing to trade during elimination-stage
matches, it should be expected that the discretionary trading effect is greater for elimination-stage
matches.
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Panel A: V OLm,t,w Panel B: DV OLm,t,w
Panel C: BUY Sm,t,w Panel D: SELLSm,t,w
Panel E: NBBOBIDSm,t,w Panel F: NBBOASKSm,t,w
Fig. 2.6. Trading Activity On Group-Stage and Elimination-Stage Match Days. This figure
plots the mean standardised, seasonally detrended trading activity variables on elimination-stage
and group-stage match days. The market variables are detrended using the methodology of Gallant
et al. (1992) for month-of-the-year, day-of-the-week and five-minute time-of-the-day effects. Volume
for market m at time t is denoted by V OLm,t,w, dollar volume by DV OLm,t,w, number of trades
by TRADESm,t,w, buyer-initiated dollar trading volume by BDV OLm,t,w, seller-initiated dollar
trading volume by SDV OLm,t,w, number of bids at the national best bid price byNBBOBIDSm,t,w
and number of asks at the national best ask price is denoted by NBBOASKSm,t,w. The average
first-half and second-half time periods are shaded in grey. The x-axis of each plot indicates the
number of minutes from kick-off time.
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Figure 2.6 plots the mean V OLm,t,w, DV OLm,t,w, TRADESm,t,w, BDV OLm,t,w, SDV OLm,t,w,
NBBOBIDSm,t,w and NBBOASKSm,t,w values on elimination-stage and group-stage match-
days. Several observations can be made from Figure 2.6. First, the increase in trading in the second
last hour before kick-off time appears to be strongest for elimination-stage. Second, while trading
activity decreases substantially during group-stage matches, trading activity falls even further dur-
ing elimination-stage matches. Thus, Figure 2.6, provides strong evidence that football matches are
the cause of the abnormal trading activity that occurs on match days and that elimination-stage
matches are associated with greater monitoring costs for traders than group-stage matches.
2.7. Conclusion
This paper documents a unique consequence of limited attention in financial markets. This
paper finds evidence of discretionary trading whereby market participants trade before World Cup
football matches in order to avoid trading during matches. This effect results in an abnormal
amount of trading in anticipation of World Cup football matches, particularly from 120 to 90
minutes until kick-off time. The discretionary trading effect combined with the contemporaneous
distraction effect of World Cup football matches result in exceptional market conditions during
match days. The resulting market trends do not conform to the intra-day market trends previ-
ously documented in the literature. The empirical analysis indicates that the pre-match period of
high discretionary trading is accompanied by reduced price impact costs, increased volatility and
increased price discovery. During match time markets exhibit increased price impact costs, reduced
volatility and reduced price discovery. The extraordinary market conditions observed during these
unique trading days adhere to the theoretical predictions of the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) model
of discretionary trading.
This paper has a number of important implications. First, this paper demonstrates that the
impact of distraction events on markets is more complex and significant than has previously been
documented. When culturally significant market-orthogonal events can be anticipated, there is a
contemporaneous and asynchronous reaction by market participants. Second, the dual response of
market participants to anticipated distraction events creates a unique landscape of market condi-
tions that is suited to dynamic trading strategies. Uninformed traders can benefit from the reduced
price impact costs that occur in anticipation of distraction events; while, informed traders can gain
greater profits from price inefficiencies in this period. Uninformed traders should avoid trading dur-
ing distraction events as they will incur greater transaction costs; while, predatory informed traders
could benefit from the reduced monitoring that occurs during distraction periods. Third, in con-
trast to the traditional Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) discretionary trader, this paper demonstrates
that shocks to the opportunity cost of monitoring the market can also drive discretionary trading.
In conjunction with the pooling Nash equilibria of the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) model, this
means that even minor distraction events have the potential to significantly distort markets.
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3. Sports Sentiment and Stock Returns: An Intra-day Study
3.1. Abstract
In their influential paper, Edmans et al. (2007) demonstrate that sporting results can predict
overnight stock returns. The authors attribute this to a sports sentiment effect. I demonstrate that
the Edmans et al. (2007) daily sentiment effect is still present in a more recent sample of stock
market data. In addition, I utilise all FIFA World Cup matches that have occurred during trading
hours since 1998 to determine that there is an analogous intra-day sentiment effect. Winning
full-time outcomes are associated with positive abnormal stock returns for the remainder of the
trading day. Moreover, unexpected victories and victories over traditional rivals have a significant
and positive marginal impact on abnormal stock returns. Using trade and quote data, this study
also documents abnormal order imbalance and quote revision activity surrounding half-time match
outcomes. Evidence suggests that both liquidity takers and providers are influenced by investor
sentiment. Small trades exhibit the greatest sentiment effects.
JEL Classifications: G11, G12, G14, G41, L83
Keywords: Stock Returns, Investor Sentiment, FIFA World Cup
3.2. Introduction
This paper provides evidence of the intra-day impacts of investor mood on trading behaviour and
confirms previous findings of the overnight impacts of investor sentiment on abnormal stock returns.
Following previous studies, this paper takes advantage of sporting outcomes to identify exogenous
shocks to investor sentiment. Consistent with the previous literature, I find that losses in FIFA
World Cup matches are associated with a -17.1 basis point overnight abnormal stock return for the
losing country. Using a smaller sample of FIFA World Cup football matches that coincide with the
trading hours of participating countries, I test for analogous sentiment effects relating half-time and
full-time match outcomes. There is evidence of a win-effect whereby immediately after a football
match concludes, the winning country on average experiences 0.5-0.6 basis point abnormal stock
returns every five minutes between full-time and the close of trading. Further, unexpected wins
and wins over traditional football rivals have a significant positive marginal impact on intra-day
stock returns. The final portion of the paper utilises trade and quote data to directly test whether
sentiment impacts on investors’ buying and selling behaviour, as well as liquidity providers’ quote-
setting behaviour. The empirical analysis reveals that order imbalance measures are correlated to
half-time match outcomes. After a losing half-time match outcome most order imbalance measures
decrease by at least 25% of a standard deviation. The order imbalance results are stronger for small
trades. This suggests that small trades are more susceptible to sentiment effects. Finally, there is
some evidence that non-trade-driven quote revisions are similarly-impacted.
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This paper is part of a growing literature that examines the impact of investor sentiment on
financial decision-making. The greatest difficulty associated with this area of research is the nature
of investor sentiment itself. Investor sentiment is unobservable and non-quantifiable. Accordingly,
a number of approaches have been taken to overcome these difficulties. One approach has been
to identify sudden shifts in sentiment. For example, Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2000) associate
disruptions to sleeping patterns with negative sentiment shocks. Kamstra et al. (2000) use daylight
saving to identify shifts in sleeping patterns.18 Another innovative strategy for identifying shifts to
sentiment is proposed by Ashton et al. (2003). Ashton et al. (2003) propose utilising the outcomes
of international football matches as an instrument for sentiment shocks. This novel approach has
a number of advantages. First, football has a very large global following.19 Second, the fortunes of
national football teams can easily be mapped to national stock markets and market indices. Third,
the outcomes of individual football matches are largely removed from stock market fundamentals.
In a study most closely related to this one, Edmans et al. (2007) extend on the seminal findings
of Ashton et al. (2003) by providing a comprehensive and global study of sports sentiment.20
Edmans et al. (2007) find very strong evidence of a loss-effect whereby losses in sporting matches
are associated with negative abnormal daily stock returns. For example, a loss in a FIFA Football
World Cup (henceforth “World Cup”) Elimination Stage match is associated with a -49 basis
point abnormal daily return. Edmans et al. (2007) demonstrate that the sports sentiment effect
is strongest for World Cup football matches. In a concurrent study, Cai, Fan, Ko, Richione,
and Russo (2018) attribute the overnight loss-effect documented by Edmans et al. (2007) to both
physiological and psychological factors. Cai et al. (2018) argue that a proportion of the overnight
loss-effect can be attributed to the physiological impacts of sleeplessness. The sleeplessness effect
is due to investors disrupting their regular sleeping patterns to monitor football matches. In this
sense, the arguments of Cai et al. (2018) are related to those presented in Kamstra et al. (2000).
Accordingly, the physiological impacts of sleeplessness may counteract positive overnight sentiment
shocks, resulting in the asymmetric loss-effect documented by Edmans et al. (2007). One should not
expect a similar dampening of positive sentiment to occur for winning football outcomes that occur
during regular trading hours. Thus, the empirical results of this paper lend support to Cai et al.
(2018), who distinguish between physiological and psychological impacts on trading behaviour.
To date, the vast majority of studies within the sports sentiment literature have concentrated
on stock market performance at the daily frequency. This is because most sporting events are held
18Kamstra et al. (2000) demonstrate that daylight saving weekend returns are 200-500% more negative than
ordinary weekend returns. Pinegar (2002) argues that the Kamstra et al. (2000) study is compromised by outlier
observations. Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2002) question the econometric methodologies employed by Pinegar
(2002).
19For example, according to FIFA’s 2010 World Cup Television Audience Report (http://www.fifa.com/mm
/document/affederation/tv/01/47/32/73/2010fifaworldcupsouthafricatvaudiencereport.pdf) 3.2 billion people
watched at least one minute of the 2010 World Cup, while 909.6 million people watched at least one minute of the
2010 World Cup final.
20Other studies of sports sentiment include: Kaplanski and Levy (2010);Mishra and Smyth (2010);Chang et al.
(2012);Kaplanski and Levy (2014);Pantzalis and Park (2014); and, Kaplanski, Levy, Veld, and Veld-Merkoulova
(2015).
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during the evening hours, when television audiences are their largest and equity markets are closed.
Thus, the timing of sporting events restricts the ability to conduct an intra-day study of sports
sentiment. Nonetheless, in their innovative studies, Ehrmann and Jansen (2016, 2017) highlight the
unique implications of the organisational structure of the World Cup. Each World Cup generally
takes place in one “host” country.21 Further, all World Cup matches take place in the afternoon
and evening hours of the host country. This means that, on occasion, some matches take place
during the trading hours of the participating countries. As a result, the timing of football matches,
relative to stock market trading hours, is determined in a quasi-random fashion. This provides a
unique opportunity to study the intra-day effects of investor sentiment on financial markets.
At the time of writing and to the author’s knowledge, Ehrmann and Jansen (2016) is the only
study to examine intra-day sports sentiment effects. Ehrmann and Jansen (2016) provide evidence
of underpricing due to losing football match outcomes. Unfortunately, the Ehrmann and Jansen
(2016) study is restricted by a modest sample size. The Ehrmann and Jansen (2016) study only
considers one cross-listed stock and two shocks to investor sentiment (two football matches). In
contrast to Ehrmann and Jansen (2016) and in the spirit of Edmans et al. (2007), the objective
of this paper is to provide a comprehensive and global examination of intra-day sentiment effects.
This is achieved by considering all World Cup football matches that have occurred during trading
hours since 1998.22 The intra-day analysis presented in this study encompasses 19 equity markets
and 106 match outcomes. Of the 106 match outcomes, 53 are winning or losing half-time match
outcomes. The remainder are winning or losing full-time match outcomes that occurred during
trading hours.
This sample of intra-day shocks to investor sentiment allows for a unique contribution to the
sentiment literature. The conjecture of the sentiment literature is that sentiment influences in-
vestors’ levels of optimism (or pessimism). These shifts in optimism, in turn, influence investors’
likelihood of buying or selling shares. Previous studies indirectly test this argument by observing
abnormal stock returns. Previous studies do not directly test their hypothesis by observing ab-
normal order imbalances. In this study, I utilise the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to classify
trades as buyer-initiated or seller-initiated. In support of the sentiment hypothesis, the empirical
analysis presented in this paper reveals abnormal buying and selling behaviour can be predicted
by half-time match outcomes that occur during trading hours. This suggests that sentiment does
in fact influence trading behaviour. Further analysis dissects trades into dollar volume quintiles
and constructs five corresponding dollar order imbalance measures. The abnormal order imbal-
ance results are stronger for small trades. This suggests that small trades are more susceptible to
sentiment shocks.
One might also consider the possibility that liquidity providers are influenced by sentiment. If
this is the case, liquidity providers might revise their quotes upwards following a positive sentiment
21The one exception is the 2002 World cup. The 2002 World Cup was hosted by both the Korea Republic and
Japan.
22This date is chosen on the basis of data availability.
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shock and revise their quotes downwards following a negative sentiment shock. This paper presents
empirical evidence of downward bid-quote revisions and no significant revision to ask-quotes fol-
lowing negative sentiment shocks, particularly after half-time loss outcomes. This suggests that
sentiment-induced selling causes liquidity providers to revise mid-quotes downwards while simul-
taneously increasing spreads. Thus, liquidity providers appear to interpret sentiment-induced ab-
normal order flow as possibly informed and accordingly adjust spreads to compensate for adverse
selection costs. Thus, liquidity providers appear to be indirectly influenced by investor sentiment.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.3 describes the data utilised in
the study. Section 3.4 presents the empirical results. Concluding remarks are presented in Section
3.5.
3.3. Data and Summary Statistics
This study makes use of four datasets. The first dataset contains information regarding all
World Cup football matches between 1974 and 2014. The remaining datasets contain stock market
information of increasing granularity. The second dataset is comprised of daily stock market returns.
The third dataset is comprised of five-minute intra-day stock market returns. The final dataset
contains trade and quote information.
3.3.1. Football Match Data
This study utilises World Cup football match outcomes to identify shocks to investor sentiment.
This methodology has a number of advantages. Firstly, individual football matches are largely
removed from asset fundamentals. This allows for a relatively clean test of the impact of sentiment
on investor behaviour. Second, World Cup football matches are scheduled in a quasi-random fashion
relative to the domestic trading hours of the participating countries. This is because all matches
are hosted in one country (or geographical region) and scheduled to coincide with the afternoon
and evening hours of the “host” country (or region). Thus, if a participating country’s domestic
trading hours coincide with the afternoon or evening hours of the host country, the participating
country’s main exchange may be open for trading while their national football team plays in a
World Cup football match. This allows for a very unique analysis of investor sentiment at the
intra-day level. The third advantage is that World Cup football match outcomes are time-stamped
to a high degree of accuracy. This is not true of other sentiment shocks that are often observed
at the daily frequency. The fourth advantage is the wide appeal of the World Cup. The large
following of the World Cup allows for a comprehensive and global study of investor sentiment. The
most significant disadvantage of utilising World Cup football matches to identify shocks to investor
sentiment is the modest number of observations. This is because the World Cup is only held every
four years. Nonetheless, World Cup football matches have been used as an identification tool in a
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number of studies of investor sentiment.23
Following Ehrmann and Jansen (2017), the football match data is extracted from the official
World Cup Match Reports available at the FIFA online archive.24 I extract data regarding all
World Cup football matches from 1974 to 2014. During this time period, there were 11 iterations
of the World Cup. As in Edmans et al. (2007), World Cups prior to 1974 are not considered.
This is due to a lack of international daily stock market return observations prior to 1973. For
each match, I extract the full-time score, the half-time score, the match date, the match location,
the scheduled kick-off time, the amount of extra stoppage time that took place at half-time or
full-time and the amount of extra-time, if any. Using this information, I can estimate the time
at which the first-half and the entire match concluded. These estimates are not entirely accurate
as matches do not necessarily begin as scheduled. Further, matches may not recommence exactly
as scheduled after half-time. That is, half-time observations may not always extend for exactly
15 minutes. Nonetheless, I assume that matches begin as scheduled and that every half-time
observation extends for exactly 15 minutes to arrive at my half-time and full-time time-stamps.
3.3.2. Daily Stock Market Returns
The first stock market dataset used in this study is a dataset of daily stock market returns.
This dataset is constructed in a similar fashion to Edmans et al. (2007). The daily stock market
returns are extracted from Datastream. I extract daily stock returns for 41 countries. This set
of countries is determined by data availability and participation in at least one World Cup since
1974. Following Edmans et al. (2007), where possible, I utilise total return indices for each country
to arrive at stock market returns. The total return indices assume that dividends are reinvested.
Following Edmans et al. (2007), the variable of interest for each market is the daily continuously
compounded return.
The 41 countries represented in the daily stock market return analysis differ from those in the
Edmans et al. (2007). There are several reasons for this difference. First, Datastream now provides
greater market coverage. Second, more countries have participated in World Cups since the original
Edmans et al. (2007) study. Third, Edmans et al. (2007) choose to exclude the United States and
Canada from their analysis. Their justification is that football is not a prominent sport in these
countries.
The daily stock market returns data is summarised in Table 3.1. The starting date for each
country is dictated by data availability. The final observation for every stock market is the 30th
of December 2014. Table 3.1 also summarises the World Cup match outcomes over each coun-
try’s respective sample period. For example, the total market index of Argentina is TOTMKAR.
TOTMKAR data is available from the 8th of January 1990 until the end of the sample period,
23These studies include Ashton et al. (2003); Edmans et al. (2007); Kaplanski and Levy (2010, 2014); Ehrmann
and Jansen (2016) and Cai et al. (2018).
24http://www.fifa.com/fifa-tournaments/archive/worldcup/index.html.
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Table 3.1
Daily Stock Market Returns Data
This table outlines the daily stock market returns data extracted from Datastream. This table also sum-
marises the FIFA World Cup match outcomes of each country over the country’s respective sample period.
Note that Germany refers to the unified Germany and West Germany.
Country Datastream Start Date End Date Wins Draws Losses
Mnemonic
Argentina TOTMKAR 08-Jan-1990 31-Dec-2014 15 3 4
Australia TOTMKAU 09-Jan-1973 31-Dec-2014 2 1 5
Austria TOTMKOE 27-Apr-1983 30-Dec-2014 1 2 1
Belgium TOTMKBG 09-Jan-1973 31-Dec-2014 11 5 8
Brazil TOTMKBR 11-Jul-1994 30-Dec-2014 18 1 3
Canada TOTMKCN 09-Jan-1973 31-Dec-2014 0 0 2
Chile TOTMKCL 11-Jul-1989 31-Dec-2014 3 3 2
China TOTMKCH 27-Jul-1993 31-Dec-2014 0 0 2
Colombia TOTMKCB 16-Jan-1992 30-Dec-2014 4 0 2
Croatia TOTMKCT 04-Oct-2005 31-Dec-2014 0 2 3
Czech Republic TOTMKCZ 15-Mar-1994 30-Dec-2014 1 0 1
Coˆte d’Ivoire IFGECD$ 17-Oct-2008 31-Oct-2014 0 1 3
Denmark TOTMKDK 08-Jan-1982 31-Dec-2014 4 2 4
Ecuador IFFMECL 01-Aug-2008 30-Dec-2014 0 1 1
England TOTMKUK 02-Jan-1973 31-Dec-2014 11 7 7
France TOTMKFR 09-Jan-1973 31-Dec-2014 14 6 8
Germany TOTMKBD 09-Jan-1973 30-Dec-2014 32 9 7
Ghana IFFMGHL 01-Aug-2008 31-Dec-2014 1 0 3
Greece TOTMKGR 12-Jan-1988 31-Dec-2014 2 1 5
Italy TOTMKIT 09-Jan-1973 30-Dec-2014 21 10 8
Japan TOTMKJP 10-Jan-1973 30-Dec-2014 3 3 6
Mexico TOTMKMX 15-Apr-1988 31-Dec-2014 5 4 8
Morocco TOTMKMC 02-Jan-1996 31-Dec-2014 1 1 1
Netherlands TOTMKNL 09-Jan-1973 31-Dec-2014 18 7 8
Nigeria TOTMKNG 09-Sep-2009 31-Dec-2014 0 2 3
Norway TOTMKNW 21-Feb-1980 30-Dec-2014 2 3 1
Poland TOTMKPO 08-Mar-1994 30-Dec-2014 1 0 2
Portugal TOTMKPT 23-Jan-1990 31-Dec-2014 6 2 4
Republic of Ireland TOTMKIR 11-Jan-1978 31-Dec-2014 2 5 2
Republic of Korea TOTMKKO 16-Sep-1987 30-Dec-2014 3 6 8
Romania TOTMKRM 09-May-1997 31-Dec-2014 2 0 1
Russia TOTMKRS 28-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014 1 2 2
Saudi Arabia IFGDSBL 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014 0 1 2
Slovakia TOTMKSX 02-Mar-2006 31-Dec-2014 1 1 2
Slovenia TOTMKSJ 04-Jan-1999 30-Dec-2014 1 0 3
South Africa TOTMKSA 09-Jan-1973 31-Dec-2014 1 3 2
Spain TOTMKES 09-Mar-1987 31-Dec-2014 14 2 4
Sweden TOTMKSD 12-Jan-1982 30-Dec-2014 2 6 4
Switzerland TOTMKSW 02-Feb-1973 30-Dec-2014 5 1 4
Turkey TOTMKTK 12-Jan-1988 31-Dec-2014 2 1 2
United States of America TOTMKUS 03-Jan-1973 31-Dec-2014 5 2 12
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Table 3.2
Daily Stock Market Returns Summary Statistics
This table provides the summary statistics for each series of daily stock market returns.
Country Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Skewness Kurtosis
Argentina 0.087 0.012 2.341 -1.673 85.862
Australia 0.027 0.042 1.087 -2.173 59.743
Austria 0.032 0.051 1.103 -0.382 12.330
Belgium 0.024 0.039 0.969 -0.343 13.279
Brazil 0.043 0.078 1.635 0.094 12.635
Canada 0.026 0.055 0.921 -0.765 16.432
Chile 0.053 0.039 0.929 0.104 8.378
China 0.031 0.012 1.968 0.116 9.429
Colombia 0.050 0.030 1.039 -0.202 16.507
Croatia 0.010 0.021 1.188 0.268 18.430
Czech Republic 0.007 0.035 1.332 -0.373 15.178
Denmark 0.041 0.053 1.052 -0.466 10.736
Ecuador -0.012 -0.001 1.189 -0.789 75.215
England 0.028 0.052 1.088 -0.229 11.046
France 0.029 0.044 1.196 -0.250 8.229
Germany 0.021 0.056 1.074 -0.218 14.679
Ghana 0.072 0.051 0.935 -0.576 14.612
Greece 0.017 0.015 1.829 -0.071 8.870
Republic of Ireland 0.032 0.045 1.203 -0.765 14.533
Italy 0.027 0.042 1.374 -0.228 7.574
Coˆte d’Ivoire 0.025 -0.004 8.432 -0.731 719.957
Japan 0.014 0.020 1.145 -0.405 13.698
Republic of Korea 0.024 0.018 1.829 0.018 7.504
Mexico 0.079 0.060 1.346 0.090 9.879
Morocco 0.030 0.023 0.735 -0.144 14.097
Netherlands 0.022 0.049 1.103 -0.330 10.561
Nigeria 0.051 0.018 0.992 0.288 11.334
Norway 0.033 0.055 1.461 -0.660 14.080
Poland 0.009 0.041 1.731 -0.222 9.226
Portugal 0.002 0.023 1.045 -0.311 11.551
Romania 0.031 0.039 2.018 -0.462 15.680
Russia 0.076 0.053 2.665 0.184 15.938
Saudi Arabia 0.042 0.104 1.726 -0.856 15.338
Slovakia -0.004 0.015 0.935 -3.351 84.605
Slovenia 0.012 0.022 0.965 -0.431 11.764
South Africa 0.053 0.064 1.290 -0.625 11.632
Spain 0.022 0.067 1.268 -0.160 8.448
Sweden 0.044 0.071 1.403 -0.021 7.670
Switzerland 0.023 0.047 0.944 -0.702 15.763
Turkey 0.135 0.040 2.495 -0.005 7.596
United States of America 0.028 0.052 1.081 -0.864 23.162
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Table 3.3
Five-minute Intra-day Stock Market Returns Data
This table outlines the five-minute intra-day stock market returns data extracted from Thomson Reuters
Tick History.
Country Market Index Start Date End Date
Argentina MERV 02-Jan-1998 30-Dec-2014
Belgium BFX 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014
Brazil BVSP 02-Jan-1998 30-Dec-2014
Chile IPSA 02-Jan-1998 30-Dec-2014
Denmark OMXC20 02-Jan-2006 30-Dec-2014
England FTSE 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014
France FCHI 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014
Germany GDAXI 02-Jan-1998 30-Dec-2014
Ireland ISEQ 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014
Italy SPMIB 02-Jan-1998 29-May-09
FTMIB 1-Jun-09 31-Dec-2014
Mexico MXX 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014
Netherlands AEX 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014
Poland WIG20 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014
Portugal PSI20 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014
South Africa JDTOP 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014
Spain IBEX 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014
Switzerland SSMI 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014
Turkey XU030 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014
United States of America DJI 02-Jan-1998 31-Dec-2014
the 30th of December 2014. During that time, Argentina was involved in 22 World Cup football
matches. Fifteen of those matches were wins for Argentina, three were draws and four were losses.
Table 3.2 provides the summary statistics of the daily stock market return series. Of the 41
countries in the daily stock return sample, 39 have a positive mean daily return. Ecuador and
Slovakia have a negative mean daily return over their respective sample periods. The standard
deviation of daily stock market returns varies over the cross-section. The country with the lowest
standard deviation is Morocco with a standard deviation of 0.735 and the country with the largest
standard deviation is Coˆte d’Ivoire with a standard deviation of 8.432. Table 3.2 reveals that the
majority of countries have negatively skewed returns. Further, every country has a kurtosis value
greater than three, indicating a leptokurtic distribution.
3.3.3. Five-minute Intra-day Stock Market Returns
The second stock market dataset used in this study is a dataset of five-minute intra-day stock
market returns. The data is extracted from Thomson Reuters Tick History.25 The dataset is
comprised of intra-day return series from 19 countries. To arrive at the return series, I first nominate
a national stock market index for each country. Following, I take the five-minute intra-day return
25Access to Thomson Reuters Tick History was provided by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific
(SIRCA).
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Table 3.4
Five-minute Intra-day Stock Market Returns Summary Statistics
This table provides the summary statistics for each series of five-minute intra-day stock market returns.
Country Mean Median Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Argentina -0.152% 0.000% 0.135 0.270 65.555
Belgium -0.043% 0.000% 0.095 -0.382 40.443
Brazil -0.034% 0.000% 0.148 0.022 207.667
Chile -0.031% 0.000% 0.069 2.087 1101.554
Denmark -0.066% 0.000% 0.101 -0.206 365.275
England -0.027% 0.000% 0.096 -1.418 227.339
France -0.021% 0.000% 0.118 -0.118 21.052
Germany -0.018% 0.000% 0.128 -0.255 24.160
Ireland -0.045% 0.000% 0.159 -0.375 932.784
Italy -0.054% 0.000% 0.125 0.684 209.905
Mexico 0.003% 0.000% 0.094 0.061 58.057
Netherlands -0.030% 0.000% 0.111 -0.180 31.013
Poland -0.007% 0.000% 0.133 0.383 30.559
Portugal -0.063% 0.000% 0.095 0.009 39.845
South Africa 0.021% 0.000% 0.094 0.055 19.306
Spain -0.002% 0.086% 0.123 0.042 24.398
Switzerland -0.037% 0.000% 0.095 -0.092 20.440
Turkey 0.033% 0.180% 0.315 -0.575 69.442
United States of America 0.009% 0.000% 0.109 0.016 29.803
of each index as my variable of interest. For a country to be included in the five-minute intra-
day stock market returns dataset, the country’s national stock market must be open for trading
during at least one half-time or full-time match observation involving the national team associated
with the country. For each country, the sample period is from January 1998 to December 2014.26
All countries have a continuous series of stock returns for the entire sample period.27 Table 3.3
gives the market index nominated for each country and the sample period for each country in the
five-minute intra-day stock market return dataset.
Table 3.4 gives the summary statistics for the five-minute intra-day stock market returns. No-
tably, most countries have a negative mean five-minute intra-day stock market return. This is
consistent with the recent findings of Berkman, Koch, Tuttle, and Zhang (2012). Berkman et al.
(2012) use US stock market data from 1996 to 2008 to show that overnight stock returns tend to
be positive; while, intra-day stock market returns tend to be negative. Table 3.4 also demonstrates
that most markets have a median five minute intra-day return of 0. This could be attributed to pe-
riods of zero price-impact. Some markets exhibit positively skewed intra-day return distributions,
while others exhibit negatively skewed distributions. Finally, all intra-day return distributions are
highly leptokurtic. This is consistent with the daily stock return distributions.
26Intra-day stock market returns from Thomson Reuters Tick History become available from 1996. The first
iteration of the World Cup following 1996 is the 1998 iteration. Thus, the January 1998 to December 2014 sample
period is designed to capture all World Cup iterations since 1996.
27Note that in 2009, the Borsa Italiana appointed FTSE Group as the new provider of the MIB index, taking over
from Standard and Poor’s.
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Table 3.5
Summary of Match Outcomes that Occurred during Trading Hours
This table summarises the match outcomes that occurred during trading hours for each country. HW signifies
a half-time win outcome. HL signifies a half-time loss outcome. GHW signifies a Group Stage half-time
win outcome. GHL signifies a Group Stage half-time loss outcome. EHW signifies an Elimination Stage
half-time win outcome. EHL signifies an Elimination Stage half-time loss outcome. W signifies a full-time
win outcome. L signifies a full-time loss outcome. GW signifies a Group Stage full-time win outcome. GL
signifies a Group Stage full-time loss outcome. EW signifies an Elimination Stage full-time win outcome.
EL signifies an Elimination Stage full-time loss outcome.
Country HW HL GHW GHL EHW EHL W L GW GL EW EL
Argentina 2 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 1 0
Belgium 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
Brazil 4 1 1 0 3 1 5 2 3 0 2 2
Chile 2 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
England 3 0 3 0 0 0 3 1 3 0 0 1
France 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0
Germany 3 1 2 1 1 0 3 1 1 1 2 0
Ireland 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Italy 3 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Mexico 0 3 0 3 0 0 1 3 1 2 0 1
Netherlands 1 1 0 0 1 1 3 0 1 0 2 0
Poland 1 2 1 2 0 0 1 2 1 2 0 0
Portugal 3 2 3 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0
South Africa 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain 3 1 3 1 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0
Switzerland 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Turkey 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 1
United States of America 0 5 0 5 0 0 1 3 1 3 0 0
Total 31 22 24 20 7 2 32 21 24 15 8 6
Table 3.5 gives a summary of the match outcomes that occurred during the trading hours of each
country represented in the five-minute intra-day stock market return dataset. During the sample
period, there are 31 winning half-time observations and 22 losing half-time outcomes. Further,
there are 32 winning full-time outcomes and 21 losing full-time outcomes. Thus, there are a total
of 106 intra-day match outcome variables.
Each iteration of the World Cup is separated into an initial “Group Stage” and a latter “Elim-
ination Stage”. Elimination Stage matches are perceived to be of greater importance as the loser
of an Elimination Stage match is immediately eliminated from the remainder of the World Cup.
During the sample period, there are 24 Group Stage winning half-time match outcomes, 20 Group
Stage losing half-time match outcomes, 24 winning Group Stage full-time match outcomes and 15
losing Group Stage full-time match outcomes. Unfortunately, there are few match outcomes relat-
ing to Elimination Stage matches in the sample. This is because for each World Cup, the majority
of matches are Group Stage matches. During the sample period, there are seven Elimination Stage
winning half-time match outcomes, two Elimination Stage losing half-time match outcomes, eight
Elimination Stage winning full-time match outcomes and six Elimination Stage losing full-time
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Table 3.6
Market Indices
This table details the market index sample. The representative stocks for each country are sampled from
the following national indices.
Country 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
Argentina MERV MERV MERV MERV
Belgium BFX BFX
Brazil BVSP BVSP BVSP
Chile IPSA IPSA
Denmark KFX OMXC20
England FTSE FTSE FTSE
France FCHI FCHI FCHI
Germany GDAXI GDAXI GDAXI GDAXI
Ireland ISEQ
Italy SPMIB FTMIB
Mexico MXX MXX MXX MXX
Netherlands AEX AEX
Poland WIG20 WIG20
Portugal PSI20 PSI20 PSI20
South Africa JDTOP
Spain IBEX IBEX IBEX
Switzerland SSMI SSMI
Turkey XU030
United States of America DJI DJI DJI DJI
match outcomes.
3.3.4. Trade and Quote Data
The third stock market dataset used in this study is comprised of trade and quote observations.
The trade and quote data is extracted from Thomson Reuters Tick History. Similar to the intra-day
stock market returns data, the trade and quote data becomes available from 1996. At the time
of writing, there have been five iterations of the World Cup since 1996. Accordingly, the trade
and quote dataset is comprised of five sub-samples. Each sub-sample corresponds to a World Cup
iteration. Since 1996, the majority of World Cup games have occurred during the month of June.
Thus, for each World Cup, I extract trade and quote data from the months of May, June and July.
This sampling technique is designed to reduce computational difficulty and include a significant
amount of time before and after each World Cup. For each country and World Cup iteration, I
extract trade and quote data from the constituents of a nominated national market index. The
nominated market indices for each market and World Cup iteration are presented in Table 3.6.
The countries represented in the trade and quote dataset vary across the World Cup sub-
samples. This is because the individual World Cup sub-sample countries are independently deter-
mined. That is, for country m to be included in World Cup sub-sample w, the country’s national
stock market must be open for trading during at least one half-time or full-time match observation
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Table 3.7
Stock Market Trading Hours
This table details the normal trading hours of each national stock market during each iteration of the FIFA
World cup from 1998 to 2014.
Country 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
Argentina 11:00-17:00 11:00-17:00 11:00-17:00 11:00-17:00
Belgium 10:00-16:30 9:00-17:20
Brazil 10:00-17:00 10:00-17:00 10:00-17:00
Chile 9:30-16:00 9:30-16:00
Denmark 9:00-17:00 9:00-17:00
England 8:30-16:30
(1/5-19/7)
8:00-16:30 8:00-16:30
9:00-16:30
(20/7-31/7)
France 10:00-17:00 9:00-17:30 9:00-17:30
Germany 8:30-17:00 9:00-20:00 9:00-17:30 9:00-17:30
Ireland 8:00-17:30
Italy 9:00-17:25 9:00-17:25
Mexico 8:30-15:00 8:30-15:00 8:30-15:00 8:30-15:00
Netherlands 9:30-16:30 9:00-17:30
Poland 10:00-16:00 10:00-16:00
Portugal 8:00-16:30 8:00-16:30 8:00-16:30
South Africa 9:30-17:00
Spain 9:00-17:30 9:00-17:30 9:00-17:30
Switzerland 9:00-17:20 9:00-17:20
Turkey 9:30-12:00 &
14:00-16:30
United States of America 9:30-16:00 9:30-16:00 9:30-16:00 9:30-16:00
during World Cup m, conditional on the match involving the national team associated with country
m. For example, Table 3.6 indicates that in 2014, there were four countries that were open for
trading during at least one match outcome: Argentina; Chile; Mexico and the United States
of America. European countries are not represented in the 2014 sub-sample because European
exchanges were closed for trading during the afternoon and evening hours of the host country,
Brazil. In contrast to the 2014 sub-sample, the 2010 sub-sample includes 15 countries. This is
because the host country of the 2010 World Cup was South Africa. Many European and American
exchanges were open for trading during the afternoon and evening hours of South Africa. Thus,
the domestic trading hours of each country are crucial for observing the impacts of intra-day match
observations. Accordingly, Table 3.7 gives the trading hours of each country in the trade and quote
dataset, for each World Cup iteration. Similar to the five-minute intra-day sample, the trade and
quote sample comprises of data from 19 countries across all iterations of the World Cup.
3.4. Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis is divided into three parts. Each part corresponds to a different dataset
described in Section 3.3. The first portion of the empirical analysis utilises the daily stock market
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returns dataset described in Sub-section 3.3.2. The objective of this preliminary analysis is to
confirm the findings of Edmans et al. (2007) for an updated sample of stock market returns.
The results of this preliminary analysis motivate a more in-depth intra-day analysis of investor
sentiment. Accordingly, the analysis in Sub-section 3.4.2 examines the contemporaneous impact of
football match outcomes on intra-day stock returns. The final portion of the analysis makes use of
the trade and quote data described in Sub-section 3.3.4. The objective of this analysis is to directly
test for abnormal buying, selling and quoting behaviour surrounding shocks to sentiment.
3.4.1. Daily Stock Return Analysis
The objective of this sub-section is to confirm the results of Edmans et al. (2007) for a more
recent sample of daily stock market data. Accordingly, the empirical strategy of this sub-section
follows from Edmans et al. (2007). The estimation is executed over two stages. The first stage
involves regressing daily stock market returns across an array of control variables:
rm,d = αm + β
1rm,d−1 + β2rglobe,d−1 + β3rglobe,d + β4rglobe,d+1 + β5Dd + β6Qd−1 + m,d (3.1)
where rm,d is the return on market m on day d, rglobe,d is the daily US dollar return on Datastream’s
world market index on day d, Dd = {D1,d, D2,d, D3,d, D4,d} are indicator variables for Monday
through to Thursday and Qd−1 = {Qm,d−1, Qm,d−2, Qm,d−3, Qm,d−4, Qm,d−5} where Qm,d−1 is an
indicator variables that take the value of one if country m experienced a non-weekend public holiday
on day d − 1 and zero otherwise. Equation 3.1 is estimated simultaneously for all countries with
country-level fixed effects and clustered errors.
The estimated residuals of Equation 3.1 are of key interest. Following Edmans et al. (2007), the
estimated residuals are regressed on the sentiment variables derived from football match outcomes
as such:
m,d =α+ β
W
1{W}m,d + βL1{L}m,d + βGW1{GW}m,d + βGL1{GL}m,d
+ βEW1{EW}m,d + βEL1{EL}m,d + um,d (3.2)
where 1{W}m,d is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if country m wins a World Cup
football match on a day that makes d the first trading day after the match and zero otherwise and
1{L}m,d is an indicator variable analogously defined for losses. The indicator variable, 1{GW}m,d,
takes the value of one if country m wins a Group Stage World Cup football match on a day that
makes d the first trading day after the match and zero otherwise, while 1{EW}m,d is analogously
defined for Elimination Stage matches. The indicator variable, 1{GL}m,d, takes the value of one if
country m loses a Group Stage World Cup football match on a day that makes d the first trading
day after the match and zero otherwise, while 1{EL}m,d is analogously defined for Elimination
Stage matches.
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Table 3.8
Abnormal Daily Stock Market Performance after International Football Matches
This table reports the estimation results for the following equation:
m,d = α+ β
W
1{W}m,d + βL1{L}m,d + βGW1{GW}m,d + βGL1{GL}m,d + βEW1{EW}m,d + βEL1{EL}m,d + um,d (3.2)
where 1{W}m,d is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if country m wins a FIFA World Cup football match on a day that makes d
the first trading day after the match and zero otherwise and 1{L}m,d is an indicator variable analogously defined for losses. The indicator variable,
1{GW}m,d, takes the value of one if country m wins a Group Stage FIFA World Cup football match on a day that makes d the first trading day after
the match and zero otherwise, while 1{EW}m,d is analogously defined for Elimination Stage matches. The indicator variable, 1{GL}m,d, takes the
value of one if country m loses a Group Stage FIFA World Cup football match on a day that makes d the first trading day after the match and zero
otherwise, while 1{EL}m,d is analogously defined for Elimination Stage matches. The dependent variable, m,d, is defined by the following equation:
rm,d = αm + β
1rm,d−1 + β2rglobe,d−1 + β3rglobe,d + β4rglobe,d+1 + β5Dt + β6Qt−1 + m,d (3.1)
where rm,d is the return on market m on day d, rglobe,d is the daily U.S. dollar return on Datastream’s world market index on day d, Dt =
{D1,d, D2,d, D3,d, D4,d} are indicator variables for Monday through to Thursday and Qt−1 = {Qm,d−1, Qm,d−2, Qm,d−3, Qm,d−4, Qm,d−5} where Qm,d−1
is an indicator variables that take the value of one if country m experienced a non-weekend public holiday on day d − 1 and zero otherwise. The
t-statistics are reported in italics. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by
***, **, and *, respectively.
Year Range No. of βW No. of βL No. of βGW No. of βGL No. of βEW No. of βEL
Games Games Games Games Games Games
1973-2014 320 0.014*** 248 -0.171*** *** *** *** ***
0.21 -2.18
*** *** 200 -0.047*** 147 -0.164*** 120 0.116*** 101 -0.181***
-0.62 -1.85 0.89 -1.59
1973-2004 185 0.035*** 146 -0.330*** *** *** *** ***
0.32 -2.87
*** *** 108 0.008*** 84 -0.325*** 77 0.073*** 62 -0.338***
0.06 -2.44 0.51 -1.98
1973-1994 106 0.097*** 79 -0.345*** *** *** *** ***
0.90 -2.26
*** *** 57 0.081*** 43 -0.329*** 49 0.117*** 36 -0.364***
0.58 -2.15 0.78 -1.73
1995-2014 214 -0.026*** 169 -0.089*** *** *** *** ***
-0.34 -1.03
*** *** 143 -0.096*** 104 -0.095*** 71 0.116*** 65 -0.079***
-0.95 -0.99 0.76 -0.55
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Table 3.9
Abnormal Daily Stock Market Performance after International Football Matches for the Edmans et al. (2007) Sample of Countries
This table reports the estimation results for the following equation using the same sample of markets as Edmans et al. (2007):
m,d = α+ β
W
1{W}m,d + βL1{L}m,d + βGW1{GW}m,d + βGL1{GL}m,d + βEW1{EW}m,d + βEL1{EL}m,d + um,d (3.2)
where 1{W}m,d is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if country m wins a FIFA World Cup football match on a day that makes d
the first trading day after the match and zero otherwise and 1{L}m,d is an indicator variable analogously defined for losses. The indicator variable,
1{GW}m,d, takes the value of one if country m wins a Group Stage FIFA World Cup football match on a day that makes d the first trading day after
the match and zero otherwise, while 1{EW}m,d is analogously defined for Elimination Stage matches. The indicator variable, 1{GL}m,d, takes the
value of one if country m loses a Group Stage FIFA World Cup football match on a day that makes d the first trading day after the match and zero
otherwise, while 1{EL}m,d is analogously defined for Elimination Stage matches. The dependent variable, m,d, is defined by the following equation:
rm,d = αm + β
1rm,d−1 + β2rglobe,d−1 + β3rglobe,d + β4rglobe,d+1 + β5Dt + β6Qt−1 + m,d (3.1)
where rm,d is the return on market m on day d, rglobe,d is the daily U.S. dollar return on Datastream’s world market index on day d, Dt =
{D1,d, D2,d, D3,d, D4,d} are indicator variables for Monday through to Thursday and Qt−1 = {Qm,d−1, Qm,d−2, Qm,d−3, Qm,d−4, Qm,d−5} where Qm,d−1
is an indicator variables that take the value of one if country m experienced a non-weekend public holiday on day d − 1 and zero otherwise. The
t-statistics are reported in italics. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by
***, **, and *, respectively.
Year Range No. of βW No. of βL No. of βG,W No. of βG,L No. of βE,W No. of βE,L
Games Games Games Games Games Games
1973-2014 307 0.017*** 215 -0.239*** *** *** *** ***
0.24 *** -3.07 *** *** *** *** ***
*** *** 189 -0.038*** 120 -0.268*** 118 0.105*** 95 -0.201***
*** *** -0.50 *** -3.18 *** 0.79 *** -1.67 ***
1973-2004 181 0.043*** 129 -0.378*** *** *** *** ***
0.38 *** -3.17 *** *** *** *** ***
*** *** 105 0.027*** 69 -0.404*** 76 0.066*** 60 -0.348***
*** *** 0.21 *** -2.95 *** 0.45 *** -1.97 ***
1973-1994 105 0.105*** 71 -0.378*** *** *** *** ***
0.97 *** -2.31 *** *** *** *** ***
*** *** 56 0.097*** 36 -0.389*** 49 0.115*** 35 -0.367***
*** *** 0.69 *** -2.41 *** 0.76 *** -1.70 ***
1995-2014 202 -0.029*** 144 -0.169*** *** *** *** ***
-0.37 *** -1.90 *** *** *** *** ***
*** *** 133 -0.094*** 84 -0.215*** 69 0.096*** 60 -0.104***
*** *** -0.90 *** -2.17 *** 0.62 *** -0.67 ***
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Table 3.8 presents the estimation results of Equation 3.2. The results presented in Table 3.8
indicate that wins do not have a significant impact on daily abnormal stock returns. This is
consistent with Edmans et al. (2007). Nonetheless, the results for the entire sample period, 1973
to 2014, indicate that there is a strong loss-effect that can be attributed to negative sentiment.
Following a loss in a World Cup football match, markets exhibit an abnormal stock return of -17.1
basis points. This result is significant at the 95% confidence level. Further, after a loss in a World
Cup Group Stage match, markets experience a -16.4 basis point loss effect. The analogous impact
of an Elimination Stage loss is marginally insignificant.
Table 3.8 also presents the results of Equation 3.2 for a variety of time periods. The 1973 to 2004
range coincides with the original sample period of Edmans et al. (2007). Table 3.8 demonstrates
that the loss-effect is considerably stronger for the Edmans et al. (2007) sample period. For the
1973 to 2004 time period, losses are associated with a -33.0 basis point abnormal stock return. This
result is significant at the 99% confidence level. Further, the loss-effect is statistically significant at
the 95% confidence level for both Group Stage and Elimination Stage matches when the analysis
is restricted to 1973 to 2004.
Table 3.8 also considers the estimation results of Equation 3.2 for the 1973 to 1994 and 1995 to
2014 sample periods. The results presented in Table 3.8 indicate that the loss-effect is strongest for
the first 20 years of data and less so for the most recent 20 years. The estimated βL, βGL and βEL
coefficients are all negative and statistically significant from zero for the 1973 to 1994 time period.
In contrast, the estimated βL, βGL and βEL coefficients are insignificant from zero for the 1995 to
2014 time period. Thus, the results suggest that the behavioural anomaly has weakened over time.
Table 3.9 gives the Equation 3.2 estimation results for the countries present in the Edmans
et al. (2007) study. Table 3.9 demonstrates that the loss-effect results are generally stronger for
the Edmans et al. (2007) set of countries. In particular, the estimated βL coefficient for the most
recent time period, 1995 to 2014, is -0.169 and significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence
level. For the entire set of countries, the analogous figure in Table 3.8 is -0.095 and statistically
insignificant from zero. Thus, for the Edmans et al. (2007) subset of countries, the loss effect is
prevalent within the most recent 20 years of stock market data.
3.4.2. Five-minute Intra-day Stock Return Analysis
On occasion, a country’s national stock exchange may be open for trading while the country’s
national football team is participating in a World Cup football match. This motivates an inves-
tigation of the impacts of intra-day shocks to investor sentiment. This is achieved by using the
five-minute intra-day stock market returns dataset described in Sub-section 3.3.3 and a methodol-
ogy similar in design to Edmans et al. (2007). The intra-day analysis is conducted at the five-minute
frequency to avoid timing issues regarding football matches that do not run exactly to schedule.
Similar to the daily stock market returns analysis, the estimation procedure of the intra-day
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stock return analysis is comprised of two stages. The first stage utilises the methodology of Gallant
et al. (1992) to control for seasonal trends in the data. This seasonality adjustment maintains
the mean and variance of the data, after removing all variation that is explained by the seasonal
variables. The seasonal variables consist of: month-of-the-year indicator variables; day-of-the-
week indicator variables; and, five-minute time-of-the-day indicator variables. I individually and
independently implement the Gallant et al. (1992) procedure for each country.
The second stage of the empirical analysis involves estimating the following equation:
rm,t = αm + β
globerglobe,t + β
HW
1{HW}m,t + βHL1{HL}m,t + βW1{W}m,t + βL1{L}m,t + m,t
(3.3)
where rm,t is the seasonally detrended five-minute intra-day return of market m at time t and
rglobe,t is the seasonally detrended five-minute return on the S&P Global Broad Market Index at
time t.28 The indicator variable, 1{HW}m,t, takes the value of one during half-time of a football
match in which the national football team associated with market m is participating, conditional on
that team winning at half-time. The indicator variable, 1{HL}m,t, takes the value of one during
half-time of a football match in which the national football team associated with market m is
participating, conditional on that team losing at half-time. The indicator variable, 1{W}m,t, takes
the value of one between full-time of a football match and the market close of market m on match
day, conditional on the national football team associated with market m winning the match. The
indicator variable, 1{L}m,t, takes the value of one between full-time of a football match and the
market close of market m on match day, conditional on the national football team associated with
market m losing the match. According to the investor sentiment literature, we should expect the
βHW and βW coefficients to be positive, following a positive shock to sentiment. Conversely, we
should expect the βHL and βL coefficients to be negative.
Table 3.10 presents the estimation results of Equation 3.3. The signs of the estimated βHW
and βHL coefficients are in-line with the sentiment hypothesis but insignificantly different from
zero. The estimated βW coefficients provide evidence of a sentiment effect. The estimated βW
coefficients range from 0.5 to 0.6 basis points and are significantly different from zero. The mag-
nitude of this coefficient is economically significant The estimated βW coefficients correspond to
an abnormal 0.5-0.6 basis point return every five minutes between full-time and the close of trad-
ing. The average time between a winning full-time outcome and the close of trade is 143.13
minutes. Thus, the estimated βW coefficients equate to an abnormal cumulative stock return from
full-time to the close of trading of between 14.3 and 17.2 basis points. Perhaps surprisingly, the
estimated βL coefficients presented in Table 3.10 are not significantly different from zero. Thus,
in contrast to the Equation 3.2 estimation results, the Equation 3.3 estimation results provide
evidence of a win-effect and do not provide evidence of a loss-effect. These results can be recon-
ciled if one considers the dynamics of the contrasting sentiment effects. Cai et al. (2018) argue
28The rglobe,t variable is available from January 2000.
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Table 3.10
Abnormal Intra-Day Stock Market Performance during International Football Matches
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
rm,t = αm + β
globerglobe,t + β
HW
1{HW}m,t + βHL1{HL}m,t + βW1{W}m,t + βL1{L}m,t + m,t (3.3)
where rm,t is the seasonally detrended five-minute intra-day return of market m at time t and rglobe,t
is the seasonally detrended five-minute return on the S&P Global Broad Market Index at time t. The
indicator variables, 1{HW}m,t, takes the value of one during half-time of a football match in which
the national football team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that team winning
at half-time. The indicator variable, 1{HL}m,t, takes the value of one during half-time of a football
match in which the national football team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that
team losing at half-time. The indicator variable, 1{W}m,t, takes the value of one between full-time of
a football match and the market close of market m on match day, conditional on the national football
team associated with market m winning the match. The indicator variable, 1{L}m,t, takes the value
of one between full-time of a football match and the market close of market m on match day, condi-
tional on the national football team associated with market m losing the match. The t-statistics are
reported in italics. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. The 99%, 95%, and 90%
confidence levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. R2W is a weighted coefficient of determi-
nation that only utilises observations for which at least one match outcome indicator variable is nonzero.
(1) (2)
βglobe *** 0.056***
*** 1.72 ***
βHW 0.032 0.037
1.62 1.56
βHL -0.007 -0.008
-0.72 -0.69
βW 0.005* 0.006*
1.93 1.81
βL 0.002 0.001
0.52 0.15
Observations 7144776*** 6360781***
R2W (%) 0.44
*** 0.55***
that the overnight loss-effect is partially attributed to the physiological impacts of sleeplessness that
may result if investors disrupt their regular sleeping patterns to monitor football matches. Football
matches that occur during regular trading hours should not be expected to disrupt sleeping patterns.
Therefore the predominant win-effect resultant from intra-day match outcomes does not directly
contradict the results presented in Section 3.4.1 and Edmans et al. (2007).
Figure 3.1 provides a graphical representation of the intra-day returns following full-time. Fig-
ure 3.1 distinguishes between winning and losing full-time match outcomes. Panels A and B plot
the mean seasonally detrended five-minute intra-day stock returns following a winning and losing
full-time match outcome, respectively. At each time period, the returns are mostly insignificantly
different from zero. This is likely due to the lack of observations at each individual time period.
Accordingly, to enable a more straightforward interpretation, I construct cumulative returns from
panels A and B. Panel C of Figure 3.1 plots the cumulative returns derived from the mean returns
presented in Panel A. Panel D plots the cumulative returns from the mean returns presented in
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Panel A: Mean Intra-Day Returns Following a Victory Panel B: Mean Intra-Day Returns Following a Loss
Panel C: Cumulative Returns Derived from Panel A Panel D: Cumulative Returns Derived from Panel B
Fig. 3.1. Intra-day Return following Full-time. Panel A plots the mean seasonally detrended five-minute intra-day stock returns
following a winning full-time match outcome, as well as the associated 90% confidence interval. The market variables are detrended using
the methodology of Gallant et al. (1992) for month-of-the-year, day-of-the-week and five-minute time-of-the-day effects. Panel B is the
equivalent of Panel A for losing match outcomes. Panel C plots a cumulative returns derived from the mean returns presented in Panel
A. Panel D is the equivalent of Panel C for losses and Panel B.
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Panel B. The returns presented in panels C and D should be interpreted as “artificial” cumulative
returns as they are derived from mean return series rather than realised return series.29 Nonetheless,
Panel C is representative of the positive abnormal returns that occur following a full-time winning
match outcome. Panel C depicts a cumulative return of approximately 30 basis points after five
hours from full-time. In contrast and in-line with the statistical results presented in Table 3.10,
Panel D does not allude to any meaningful cumulative returns following losing full-time match
outcomes.
3.4.2.1 Group Stage and Elimination Stage Matches
Similar to the daily stock market returns analysis, it is also possible to consider the separate
impacts of Group Stage match outcomes and Elimination Stage match outcomes at the intra-day
level. Accordingly, I consider the following equation:
rm,t =αm + β
globerglobe,t + β
HW
1{HW}m,t + βHL1{HL}m,t + βGHW1{GHW}m,t
+ βGHL1{GHL}m,t + βW1{W}m,t + βL1{L}m,t + βGW1{GW}m,t + βGL1{GL}m,t
+ βEW1{EW}m,t + βEL1{EL}m,t + m,t (3.4)
where the indicator variables, 1{GHW}m,t and 1{EHW}m,t, are the equivalents of 1{HW}m,t
with respect to Group Stage matches and Elimination Stage matches, respectively. The indicator
variables, 1{GHL}m,t and 1{EHL}m,t, are the equivalents of 1{HL}m,t with respect to Group
Stage matches and Elimination Stage matches, respectively. The indicator variables, 1{GW}m,t and
1{EW}m,t, are the equivalents of 1{W}m,t with respect to Group Stage matches and Elimination
Stage matches, respectively. The indicator variables, 1{GL}m,t and 1{EL}m,t, are the equivalents
of 1{L}m,t with respect to Group Stage matches and Elimination Stage matches, respectively.
The estimated results for Equation 3.4 are presented in Table 3.11. All estimated coefficients
presented in Table 3.11 pertaining to half-time match outcomes are of the sign that is predicted by
the sentiment literature. That is, the estimated βGHW and βEHW coefficients are positive; while,
the estimated βGHL and βEHL coefficients are negative. The estimated βEHL coefficient for the
third specification presented in Table 3.11 is −0.130 with a remarkable t-statistic of −1162.77. This
is because there is only one observation of an Elimination Stage half-time win after the sample period
of intra-day stock returns is reduced to accommodate the data availability of the rglobe,t variable.
The robust t-statistic of this coefficient, given by a counter-factual analysis, is -2.50. This analysis
is discussed in Appendix 3.6 and presented in Table 3.20.
The estimated coefficients of Equation 3.4 pertaining to full-time match outcomes provide mixed
evidence of the sentiment hypothesis. That is, the estimated βGW , βGL and βEW coefficients
29It is also possible to plot mean cumulative returns following full-time. Unfortunately, this plot suffers from a small
sample problem. This is because the time interval between full-time and the close of trade is variable. Accordingly,
the mean cumulative returns series have jumps corresponding to points in time where the sample size reduces. This
inhibits a reasonable interpretation of the series.
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Table 3.11
Abnormal Intra-Day Stock Market Performance during World Cup Group Stage and Elimination Stage
Football Matches
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
rm,t = αm + β
globerglobe,t + β
HW
1{HW}m,t + βHL1{HL}m,t + βGHW1{GHW}m,t + βGHL1{GHL}m,t
+ βW1{W}m,t + βL1{L}m,t + βGW1{GW}m,t + βGL1{GL}m,t + βEW1{EW}m,t + βEL1{EL}m,t + m,t (3.4)
where rm,t is the seasonally detrended five-minute intra-day return of market m at time t and rglobe,t is the seasonally
detrended five-minute return on the S&P Global Broad Market Index at time t. The indicator variable, 1{HW}m,t,
takes the value of one during half-time of a football match in which the national football team associated with
market m is participating, conditional on that team winning at half-time. The indicator variables, 1{GHW}m,t and
1{EHW}m,t, are the equivalents of 1{HW}m,t with respect to Group Stage matches and Elimination Stage matches,
respectively. The indicator variables, 1{HL}m,t, takes the value of one during half-time of a football match in which
the national football team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that team losing at half-time.
The indicator variables, 1{GHL}m,t and 1{EHL}m,t, are the equivalents of 1{HL}m,t with respect to Group Stage
matches and Elimination Stage matches, respectively. The indicator variable, 1{W}m,t, takes the value of one between
full-time of a football match and the market close of market m on match day, conditional on the national football team
associated with market m winning the match. The indicator variables, 1{GW}m,t and 1{EW}m,t, are the equivalents
of 1{W}m,t with respect to Group Stage matches and Elimination Stage matches, respectively. The indicator variable,
1{L}m,t, takes the value of one between full-time of a football match and the market close of market m on match
day, conditional on the national football team associated with market m losing the match. The indicator variables,
1{GL}m,t and 1{EL}m,t, are the equivalents of 1{L}m,t with respect to Group Stage matches and Elimination Stage
matches, respectively. The t-statistics are reported in italics. The standard errors are clustered at the country level.
The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. R2W is a weighted coefficient
of determination that only utilises observations for which at least one match outcome indicator variable is nonzero.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
βglobe *** *** 0.056*** 0.056***
1.72 1.72
βHW *** 0.032*** *** 0.037***
1.62 1.56
βHL *** -0.007*** *** -0.008***
-0.72 -0.69
βGHW 0.021*** *** 0.020*** ***
1.47 1.13
βGHL -0.001*** *** -0.001*** ***
-0.14 -0.11
βEHW 0.071*** *** 0.089*** ***
1.15 1.49
βEHL -0.064*** *** -0.130*** ***
-1.35 -1162.77
βW 0.005*** *** 0.006*** ***
1.93 1.81
βL 0.002*** *** 0.001*** ***
0.52 0.15
βGW *** 0.002*** *** 0.003***
0.43 0.56
βGL *** -0.002*** *** -0.003***
-0.43 -0.61
βEW *** 0.015*** *** 0.018***
2.17 1.74
βEL *** 0.011*** *** 0.012***
2.24 1.71
Observations 7144776 7144776 6360781 6360781
R2W (%) 0.65 0.63 0.97 0.79
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conform to the sentiment predictions; however, the estimated βEL coefficients oppose the sentiment
predictions. The estimated βGW and βEW coefficients are positive, indicating positive abnormal
stock returns following a victory. The estimate βEW coefficients are statistically significant from
zero at the 90% confidence level. The signs of the estimated βGL coefficients are negative but
insignificantly different from zero. Contrary to the sentiment predictions, the estimated βEL coef-
ficients are positive and statistically significant. This surprising result could be due to the small
number of Elimination Stage loss observations in the sample. As discussed in Sub-section 3.3.3,
Table 3.5 demonstrates that there are only six full-time Elimination Stage loss observations in the
sample. Further analysis presented in Appendix 3.6.2 demonstrates that the estimated βEL coef-
ficients are not robust to a rigorous placebo test presented in Table 3.20. The robust t-statistics
for the estimated βEL coefficients in Table 3.20 are 1.35 and 1.10 for specifications (2) and (4) of
Equation 3.4, respectively. This suggests that the estimated βEL coefficients are driven by outlier
events.
3.4.2.2 Unexpected Match Outcomes
One could argue that if investors form conditional expectations regarding future uncertain
events, unexpected match outcomes might be a more precise tool for identifying shocks to investor
sentiment. For example, an unexpected winning full-time match outcome may result in a greater
proliferation of positive sentiment than an expected winning full-time match outcome. Accordingly,
I utilise the Elo (1978) rating system to stratify the post-1994 match outcomes in the sample into
expected and unexpected match outcomes. The Elo (1978) rating system is used to rank players
in repeated zero-sum games. The Elo (1978) rating system gained prominence in the world of
competitive chess but can equally be applied to competitive football. As international football Elo
(1978) ratings are time-varying, I extract Elo (1978) ratings for each country in the sample, prior
to each iteration of the World Cup.30 Following Edmans et al. (2007), I then use a 125 point Elo
(1978) rating differential to identify unexpected results. A match outcome is categorised as an
unexpected result if the losing team has an Elo (1978) rating that is more than 125 points greater
than that of the winning team. Table 3.12 presents the post-1994 unexpected match outcomes that
are identified by this methodology. Within the sample, there are 11 unexpected half-time match
outcomes and nine unexpected full-time match outcomes.
To test whether unexpected match outcomes have a significant marginal impact on intra-day
stock returns, I estimate the following equation:
rm,t =αm + β
globerglobe,t + β
HW
1{HW}m,t + βHL1{HL}m,t + βUHW1{UHW}m,t
+ βUHL1{UHL}m,t + βW1{W}m,t + βL1{L}m,t + βUW1{UW}m,t + βUL1{UL}m,t + m,t
(3.5)
30Elo (1978) ratings are extracted from www.eloratings.net.
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Table 3.12
Post-1994 Unexpected Match Outcomes
This table summarises the post-1994 unexpected match outcomes within the football match sample. Fol-
lowing Edmans et al. (2007), I utilise Elo (1978) ratings to identify unexpected results. To categorise
unexpected match outcomes, I collect every country’s Elo (1978) rating at the start of each FIFA World
Cup from www.eloratings.net. A match outcome is categorised as an unexpected result if the losing
team has an Elo (1978) rating that is more than 125 points greater than that of the winning team.
Unexpected Half-time Match Outcomes
Date Country within Sample Goals Opposition Country Goals
04-Jul-1998 Germany 0 Croatia 1
31-May-2002 France 0 Senegal 1
05-Jun-2002 Portugal 1 United States of America 3
05-Jun-2002 United States of America 3 Portugal 1
07-Jun-2002 Spain 0 Paraguay 1
11-Jun-2002 France 0 Denmark 1
13-Jun-2002 Mexico 1 Italy 0
19-Jun-2006 Spain 0 Tunisia 1
22-Jun-2010 France 0 South Africa 2
22-Jun-2010 South Africa 2 France 0
18-Jun-2014 Chile 2 Spain 0
Unexpected Full-time Match Outcomes
Date Country within Sample Goals Opposition Country Goals
31-May-2002 France 0 Senegal 1
05-Jun-2002 Portugal 2 United States of America 3
05-Jun-2002 United States of America 3 Portugal 2
11-Jun-2002 France 0 Denmark 2
14-Jun-2002 Portugal 0 Republic of Korea 1
18-Jun-2002 Italy 1 Republic of Korea 2
22-Jun-2006 United States of America 1 Ghana 2
22-Jun-2010 France 1 South Africa 2
22-Jun-2010 South Africa 2 France 1
where the indicator variable, 1{UHW}m,t, is the equivalent of 1{HW}m,t with respect to unex-
pected winning half-time match outcomes and the indicator variable, 1{UHL}m,t, is the equivalent
of 1{HL}m,t with respect to unexpected losing half-time match outcomes. The indicator variable,
1{UW}m,t, takes the value of one between full-time of a football match and the market close of
market m on match day, conditional on the national football team associated with market m un-
expectedly winning the match. The indicator variable, 1{UL}m,t, takes the value of one between
full-time of a football match and the market close of market m on match day, conditional on the
national football team associated with market m unexpectedly losing the match.
The estimation results of Equation 3.5 are presented in Table 3.13. The results demonstrate
that while unexpected half-time and full-time loss match outcomes have an insignificant marginal
impact on intra-day stock returns, unexpected full-time winning match outcomes have a positive and
statistically significant marginal impact. The estimated βUW coefficients presented in Table 3.13
are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level and range between 0.007 and 0.010. Thus,
an unexpected victory has a 0.7 to 1.0 basis point marginal impact on five-minute intra-day stock
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Table 3.13
Abnormal Intra-Day Stock Market Performance during Unexpected World Cup Match Out-
comes
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
rm,t =αm + β
globerglobe,t + β
HW
1{HW}m,t + βHL1{HL}m,t + βUHW1{UHW}m,t + βUHL1{UHL}m,t
+ βW1{W}m,t + βL1{L}m,t + βUW1{UW}m,t + βUL1{UL}m,t + m,t (3.5)
where rm,t is the seasonally detrended five-minute intra-day return of market m at time t and rglobe,t is
the seasonally detrended five-minute return on the S&P Global Broad Market Index at time t. The indi-
cator variable, 1{HW}m,t, takes the value of 1 during half-time of a football match in which the national
football team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that team winning at half-time.
The indicator variables, 1{HL}m,t, takes the value of one during half-time of a football match in which
the national football team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that team losing at
half-time. The indicator variable, 1{UHW}m,t, is the equivalent of 1{HW}m,t with respect to unexpected
winning half-time match outcomes and the indicator variable, 1{UHL}m,t, is the equivalent of 1{HL}m,t
with respect to unexpected losing half-time match outcomes. The indicator variable, 1{W}m,t, takes the
value of one between full-time of a football match and the market close of market m on match day, condi-
tional on the national football team associated with market m winning the match. The indicator variable,
1{L}m,t, takes the value of one between full-time of a football match and the market close of market m
on match day, conditional on the national football team associated with market m losing the match. The
indicator variable, 1{UW}m,t, takes the value of one between full-time of a football match and the mar-
ket close of market m on match day, conditional on the national football team associated with market m
unexpectedly winning the match. The indicator variable, 1{UL}m,t, takes the value of one between full-
time of a football match and the market close of market m on match day, conditional on the national
football team associated with market m unexpectedly losing the match. A win (loss) is characterised as
unexpected if the winning (losing) team had an ELO score that was at least 125 lower (higher) than the
ELO score of the losing (winning) team, at the commencement of the respective World Cup. The t-statistics
are reported in italics. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. The 99%, 95%, and 90%
confidence levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. R2W is a weighted coefficient of determi-
nation that only utilises observations for which at least one match outcome indicator variable is nonzero.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
βglobe *** *** 0.056*** 0.056***
*** *** 1.72 *** 1.72 ***
βHW 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.037***
1.50 *** 1.62 *** 1.47 *** 1.56 ***
βHL -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.014*** -0.008***
-0.75 *** -0.72 *** -0.75 *** -0.69 ***
βUHW 0.004*** *** 0.017*** ***
0.18 *** *** 0.69 *** ***
βUHL 0.011*** *** 0.015*** ***
0.69 *** *** 0.73 *** ***
βW 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006***
1.93 *** 1.93 *** 1.81 *** 1.81 ***
βL 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001***
0.52 *** 0.21 *** 0.15 *** -0.23 ***
βUW *** 0.010*** *** 0.007***
*** 11.50 *** *** 4.72 ***
βUL *** 0.004*** *** 0.006***
*** 0.74 *** *** 1.09 ***
Observations 7144776*** 7144776*** 6360781*** 6360781***
R2W (%) 0.26
*** 0.28*** 0.37*** 0.38***
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returns from full-time to the close of trading on match days. Given that the average time between
an unexpected winning full-time match outcome and market close is 182.22 minutes, the 0.007 and
0.010 estimated coefficients equate to a cumulative return of between 25.6 and 36.5 basis points.
3.4.2.3 Traditional Football Rivalries
One could argue that external historical factors influence the impact of football match outcomes
on investor sentiment. For example, within football, a “traditional” rivalry is a rivalry that is
perceived to be of great importance. Traditional rivalries are often attributed to past historical
events or the geographical proximity of the competing countries. One example is the traditional
football rivalry between Argentina and England. This rivalry is often attributed to the Falklands
War. Accordingly, it could be hypothesised that a victory over a major rival induces greater
positive sentiment than a victory over a non-traditional rival. This could mean that victories over
traditional rivals have a significant marginal impact on abnormal stock returns. To test this notion,
I construct an a priori set of traditional rivals for each country in the sample. The rivalries are
presented in Table 3.14.
From the list of traditional rivalries presented in Table 3.14, I find that there are a number of
winning full-time match outcomes over traditional rivals that occur during trading hours. There
are no losses to traditional rivals that occur during trading hours. Thus, I augment Equation 3.3
to include an additional indicator variable, 1{RW}m,t:
rm,t =αm + β
globerglobe,t + β
HW
1{HW}m,t + βHL1{HL}m,t
+ βW1{W}m,t + βL1{L}m,t + βRW1{RW}m,t + m,t (3.6)
The indicator variable, 1{RW}m,t, takes the value of one between full-time of a football match and
the market close of market m on match day, conditional on the national football team associated
with market m winning the match over a traditional rival.
Table 3.15 presents the estimation results for Equation 3.6. The results reveal that winning over
a traditional rival has a very significant marginal impact on abnormal stock returns for the rest
of the trading day. Winning over a traditional rival has a 0.9 to 1.0 basis point marginal impact
on stock returns every five-minutes for the period between full-time and the close of trading on
match day. For both specifications of Equation 3.6 presented in Table 3.15, the estimated βRW
coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. Given that the average
time between a winning full-time match outcome over a traditional rival and the close of trade
is 130.00 minutes, the estimated βRW coefficients translate to an abnormal cumulative return of
between 23.4 and 26.03 basis points. Thus, the results presented in Table 3.15 provide additional
evidence in favour of the sentiment hypotheses.
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Table 3.14
Traditional Football Rivalries
This table gives the traditional rivals of the countries in the intra-day analysis.
Country Traditional Rivals
Argentina Brazil Chile Uruguay
Belgium Netherlands
Brazil Argentina
Chile Argentina Peru
Denmark Norway Sweden
England Argentina Germany Republic of Ireland Scotland
France
Germany England Netherlands
Republic of Ireland England
Italy
Mexico United States of America
Netherlands Belgium Germany
Poland Russia
Portugal Spain
South Africa
Spain Portugal
Switzerland
Turkey Armenia Croatia Greece
United States of America
3.4.3. Trade and Quote Analysis
The preceding analyses have demonstrated the correlation between World Cup football match
outcomes and abnormal stock market returns. The behavioural finance literature argues that this
correlation is caused by shifting levels of investor optimism, which in turn influences investor buying
and selling decisions. The objective of this sub-section is to directly test this argument by observing
buying, selling and quoting activities.
3.4.3.1 Order Imbalance Analysis
To observe buying and selling behaviour, I apply the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to the
trade and quote dataset. This enables me to categorise trades as buyer-initiated or seller-initiated
trades. Following, I calculate the three order imbalance measures of Chordia et al. (2002). The
first measure is denoted by OIBNUMm,t,w for market m, five-minute intra-day time period t and
World Cup sub-sample w. The OIBNUMm,t,w measure, is the number of buyer-initiated trades
less the number of seller-initiated trades on market m at time t in World Cup sub-sample w:
OIBNUMm,t,w = BUY Sm,t,w − SELLSm,t,w. (3.7)
The other order imbalance measures are OIBSHm,t,w, the number of buyer-initiated shares pur-
chased less the number the seller-initiated shares sold andOIBDOLm,t,w, the buyer-initiated dollars
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Table 3.15
Abnormal Intra-Day Stock Market Performance during International Football Matches be-
tween Traditional Rivals
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
rm,t =αm + β
globerglobe,t + β
HW
1{HW}m,t + βHL1{HL}m,t
+ βW1{W}m,t + βL1{L}m,t + βRW1{RW}m,t + m,t (3.6)
where rm,t is the seasonally detrended five-minute intra-day return of market m at time t and rglobe,t is
the seasonally detrended five-minute return on the S&P Global Broad Market Index at time t. The indica-
tor variable, 1{HW}m,t, takes the value of one during half-time of a football match in which the national
football team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that team winning at half-time.
The indicator variables, 1{HL}m,t, takes the value of one during half-time of a football match in which
the national football team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that team losing at
half-time. The indicator variable, 1{W}m,t, takes the value of one between full-time of a football match
and the market close of market m on match day, conditional on the national football team associated with
market m winning the match. The indicator variable, 1{L}m,t, takes the value of one between full-time
of a football match and the market close of market m on match day, conditional on the national football
team associated with market m losing the match. The indicator variable, 1{RW}m,t, takes the value of
one between full-time of a football match and the market close of market m on match day, conditional
on the national football team associated with market m winning the match over a traditional rival. The
t-statistics are reported in italics. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. The 99%, 95%,
and 90% confidence levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. R2W is a weighted coefficient of deter-
mination that only utilises observations for which at least one match outcome indicator variable is nonzero.
(1) (2)
βglobe *** 0.056***
*** 1.72 ***
βHW 0.032*** 0.037***
1.62 *** 1.56 ***
βHL -0.007*** -0.008***
-0.72 *** -0.69 ***
βW 0.005*** 0.006***
1.75 *** 1.70 ***
βL 0.002*** 0.001***
0.52 *** 0.15 ***
βRW 0.010*** 0.009***
3.83 *** 2.49 ***
Observations 7144776*** 6360781***
R2W (%) 0.28
*** 0.38***
(or local currency) paid less the seller-initiated dollars (or local currency) received, both for market
m, time t and World Cup sub-sample w.
I make two adjustments to the OIBNUMm,t,w, OIBSHm,t,w and OIBDOLm,t,w data to allow
for robust economic and statistical inference. First, I standardise each variable to have a mean
of zero and standard deviation of one. This is because the magnitude of each variable is not
consistent over the cross-section. This is due to the fact that each market index is comprised of a
unique number of constituents and is often denominated in a unique currency. Second, I use the
Gallant et al. (1992) detrending process to remove all variation in the data that can be explained by
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seasonal and intra-day variables. Similar to the previous sub-section, the seasonal variables include
month-of-the-year indicator variables; day-of-the-week indicator variables; and, five-minute time-
of-the-day indicator variables. For simplicity, for the remainder of the paper let OIBNUMm,t,w,
OIBSHm,t,w and OIBDOLm,t,w refer to the adjusted variables.
To determine whether investor sentiment influences buying and selling behaviour, I estimate
the following equation:
ym,t,w =αm,w + β
globerglobe,t,w + β
HW
1{HW}m,t,w + βHL1{HL}m,t,w
+ βW1{W}m,t,w + βL1{L}m,t,w + m,t,w (3.8)
where ym,t,w is the seasonally detrended and standardised dependent variable of market m at five-
minute intra-day time period t and World Cup sub-sample w. Equation 3.8 is simultaneously
estimated for all countries and World Cup sub-samples with errors clustered at the country-year
level.
Table 3.16 presents the estimation results of Equation 3.8 for the OIBNUMm,t,w, OIBSHm,t,w
and OIBDOLm,t,w dependent variables. Similar to the stock return analysis, Table 3.16 provides
some evidence in favour of the sentiment hypothesis. All statistically significant coefficients pre-
sented in Table 3.16 are of the sign predicted by the sentiment literature. Specifically, Table 3.16
documents a half-time decline in order imbalance following losses. The estimated βHL coefficients
for the OIBDOLm,t,w dependent variable are negative and statistically significant from zero. The
results indicate a decrease in dollar order imbalance of 27.3% to 29.3% of a standard deviation
during a half-time observation, conditional on the national team associated with market m, losing
at half-time. Nonetheless, most coefficients presented in Table 3.16 are not statistically different
from zero.
It is possible to exploit variation in trade characteristics to determine the trades that are most
affected by sentiment. Accordingly, for each market m and World Cup sub-sample w, I dissect
trades into quintiles according to dollar volume. For each quintile, I construct a unique dollar
order imbalance measure. This gives five new order imbalance measures, OIBDOLqm,t,w where
q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The dollar order imbalance measure for the first quintile of trades is denoted
by OIBDOL1m,t,w while the analogous measure for the fifth quintile is denoted by OIBDOL
5
m,t,w.
The OIBDOLqm,t,w variables are detrended and standardised prior to empirical investigation in
the same fashion as the OIBDOLm,t,w variable. Thus, let OIBDOL
q
m,t,w denote the adjusted
variables.
Table 3.17 presents the Equation 3.8 estimation results with respect to the OIBDOLqm,t,w
dependent variables. In the interest of brevity, the results for OIBDOL2m,t,w and OIBDOL
4
m,t,w
are not shown. The estimation results suggest that the half-time loss-effect identified in Table 3.16 is
prevalent among trades of all sizes. For every quintile, the estimated βHL coefficient ranges between
-0.242 and -0.292. It is also interesting to note that Table 3.17 provides some evidence that smaller
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Table 3.16
Abnormal Order Imbalance during International Football Matches
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
ym,t,w =αm,w + β
globerglobe,t,w + β
HW
1{HW}m,t,w + βHL1{HL}m,t,w
+ βW1{W}m,t,w + βL1{L}m,t,w + m,t,w (3.8)
where ym,t,w is the seasonally detrended and standardised dependent variable of market m at five-minute intra-
day time period t and World Cup sub-sample w. The OIBNUMm,t,w dependent variable is the number of
buyer-initiated trades less the number of seller-initiated trades on market m at time t in World Cup sub-sample
w. The OIBSHm,t,w dependent variable is the number of buyer-initiated shares purchased less the number
the seller-initiated shares sold and the OIBDOLm,t,w dependent variable is the buyer-initiated dollars (or
local currency) paid less the seller-initiated dollars (or local currency) received, both for market m, time t and
World Cup sub-sample w. Buyer- and seller-initiated trades are determined using the Lee and Ready (1991)
algorithm. The rglobe,t,w variable is the seasonally detrended five-minute return on the S&P Global Broad
Market Index at time t during World Cup sub-sample w. The indicator variable, 1{HW}m,t,w, takes the
value of 1 during half-time of a football match in World Cup sub-sample w and in which the national football
team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that team winning at half-time. The indicator
variables, 1{HL}m,t,w, takes the value of 1 during half-time of a football match in World Cup sub-sample w
in which the national football team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that team losing
at half-time. The indicator variable, 1{W}m,t,w, takes the value of 1 between full-time of a football match in
World Cup sub-sample w and the market close of market m on match day, conditional on the national football
team associated with market m winning the match. The indicator variable, 1{L}m,t,w, takes the value of 1
between full-time of a football match in World Cup sub-sample w and the market close of market m on match
day, conditional on the national football team associated with market m losing the match. The t-statistics are
reported in italics. The standard errors are clustered at the country-World Cup sub-sample level. The 99%,
95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. R2W is a weighted coefficient of
determination that only utilises observations for which at least one match outcome indicator variable is nonzero.
Dependent Variable OIBNUMm,t,w OIBSHm,t,w OIBDOLm,t,w
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
βglobe *** 0.081*** *** 0.060*** *** 0.076***
*** 1.43 *** *** 1.20 *** *** 1.38 ***
βHW 0.063*** 0.053*** 0.003*** 0.047*** 0.033*** 0.042***
0.30 *** 0.25 *** 0.02 *** 0.28 *** 0.22 *** 0.25 ***
βHL -0.265*** -0.256*** -0.168*** -0.143*** -0.273*** -0.293***
-1.76 *** -1.50 *** -1.57 *** -1.20 *** -1.97 *** -1.86 ***
βW 0.013*** 0.004*** 0.022*** 0.026*** -0.027*** -0.029***
0.29 *** 0.08 *** 0.51 *** 0.55 *** -0.72 *** -0.72 ***
βL 0.068*** 0.074*** -0.040*** -0.053*** -0.019*** -0.037***
1.01 *** 1.01 *** -0.62 *** -0.79 *** -0.31 *** -0.59 ***
Observations 273736*** 243981*** 273736*** 243981*** 273736*** 243981***
R2W (%) 0.29
*** 0.30*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.21***
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Table 3.17
Abnormal Order Imbalance by Quintiles during International Football Matches
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
ym,t,w =αm,w + β
globerglobe,t,w + β
HW
1{HW}m,t,w + βHL1{HL}m,t,w
+ βW1{W}m,t,w + βL1{L}m,t,w + m,t,w (3.8)
where ym,t,w is the seasonally detrended and standardised dependent variable of market m at five-minute
intra-day time period t and World Cup sub-sample w. The dependent variables are constructed by dissecting
trades into quintiles according to dollar volume. For each quintile, I construct a unique dollar order imbalance
measure. The dollar order imbalance measure for the qth quintile of trades is denoted by OIBDOLqm,t,w.
The OIBDOLqm,t,w measure is the buyer-initiated dollars (or local currency) paid less the seller-initiated
dollars (or local currency) received, for market m, time t, World Cup sub-sample w and dollar volume quintile
q. Buyer- and seller-initiated trades are determined using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The rglobe,t,w
variable is the seasonally detrended five-minute return on the S&P Global Broad Market Index at time t dur-
ing World Cup sub-sample w. The indicator variable, 1{HW}m,t,w, takes the value of 1 during half-time of a
football match in World Cup sub-sample w and in which the national football team associated with market m
is participating, conditional on that team winning at half-time. The indicator variables, 1{HL}m,t,w, takes
the value of 1 during half-time of a football match in World Cup sub-sample w in which the national football
team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that team losing at half-time. The indicator
variable, 1{W}m,t,w, takes the value of 1 between full-time of a football match in World Cup sub-sample w
and the market close of market m on match day, conditional on the national football team associated with
market m winning the match. The indicator variable, 1{L}m,t,w, takes the value of 1 between full-time of
a football match in World Cup sub-sample w and the market close of market m on match day, conditional
on the national football team associated with market m losing the match. The t-statistics are reported in
italics. The standard errors are clustered at the country-World Cup sub-sample level. The 99%, 95%, and
90% confidence levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. R2W is a weighted coefficient of determi-
nation that only utilises observations for which at least one match outcome indicator variable is nonzero.
Dependent Variable OIBDOL1m,t,w OIBDOL
3
m,t,w OIBDOL
5
m,t,w
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
βglobe 0.001 0.026 -0.015
0.02 0.39 -0.24
βHW 0.316* 0.113 0.290 0.311 0.160 0.176
1.74 0.76 1.37 1.39 1.02 1.00
βHL -0.258* -0.271* -0.292* -0.281 -0.242* -0.266
-1.85 -1.72 -1.87 -1.60 -1.68 -1.64
βW 0.012 -0.005 0.031 -0.013 -0.095 -0.110
0.14 -0.06 0.47 -0.21 -1.28 -1.42
βL -0.077 -0.057 0.108 0.129 -0.030 -0.037
-0.54 -0.38 0.97 1.05 -0.34 -0.39
Observations 225683 198445 225683 198445 225683 198445
R2W (%) 0.61 0.31 0.71 0.79 0.75 0.92
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trades are more susceptible to sentiment effects. For the OIBDOL1m,t,w dependent variable and
first specification with a larger sample period, all estimated βHW , βHL, βW and βL coefficients are
of the sign predicted by the sentiment literature. Further, the estimated βHW coefficient is 0.316
and statistically different from zero at the 90% confidence level. Thus, following a winning half-time
match outcome smaller trades experience a 31.6% of a standard deviation increase in dollar order
imbalance.
3.4.3.2 Quote Revisions Analysis
The previous sub-section finds evidence that trade-initiators are impacted by sentiment shocks;
however, it could be the case that liquidity providers are also impacted by sentiment shocks. Liq-
uidity providers may be directly or indirectly influenced by investor sentiment. The direct channel
involves sentiment-inducing events impacting on their levels of optimism. An indirect channel
could involve a flow-on effect through trade initiators. That is, if trade initiators are influenced by
sentiment shocks, their abnormal order flow may be mistakenly interpreted by liquidity providers
as informative. Accordingly, liquidity providers may adjust their quotes in reaction to sentiment-
induced order flow. If this is the case, quote revisions may be correlated to football match out-
comes. Accordingly, I examine quote revisions that are not the result of price impact. The variable,
BIDREV Sm,t,w, is the number of upwards bid revisions minus the number of downward bid re-
visions that are not caused by price impact for market m and World Cup sub-sample w at time
t. The variable ASKREV Sm,t,w is similarly defined for ask revisions. Thus, similar to the order
imbalance measures, BIDREV Sm,t,w and ASKREV Sm,t,w should be positively related to investor
sentiment. The BIDREV Sm,t,w and ASKREV Sm,t,w variables are standardised and detrended in
the same fashion as the order imbalance measures presented in Sub-section 3.4.3.1.
To test for abnormal quoting activity surrounding World Cup football matches, I estimate
Equation 3.8 with respect to BIDREV Sm,t,w and ASKREV Sm,t,w. Table 3.18 demonstrates that
the βHL estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant for the BIDREV Sm,t,w
dependent variable. This is indicative of liquidity providers revising bid-quotes downwards fol-
lowing losing half-time match outcomes. The bid revisions variable, BIDREV Sm,t,w, decreases
by 19.1% to 24.7% of a standard deviation during losing half-time observations. Interestingly,
Table 3.18 indicates that there is no significant contemporaneous decline in the ask revisions vari-
able, ASKREV Sm,t,w. This suggests that liquidity providers on average simultaneously decrease
bid-quotes and increase spreads during losing half-time periods. Table 3.16 also indicates that the
half-time losing time period is the most active period for declines in order imbalance. That is, trade
initiators predominantly sell shares during losing half-time match outcomes. Given that liquidity
providers appear to revise bid-quotes downwards and increase spreads, the evidence suggests that
liquidity providers mistakenly interpret sentiment-induced order flow as informative, resulting in a
revision of the mid-quote price and an increase to the bid-ask spread, in reaction to a perceived risk
of adverse selection. Thus, their is evidence that quoting behaviour can be indirectly influenced by
113
Table 3.18
Abnormal Quote Revisions during International Football Matches
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
ym,t,w =αm,w + β
globerglobe,t,w + β
HW
1{HW}m,t,w + βHL1{HL}m,t,w
+ βW1{W}m,t,w + βL1{L}m,t,w + m,t,w (3.8)
where ym,t,w is the seasonally detrended and standardised dependent variable of market m at five-minute
intra-day time period t and World Cup sub-sample w. The BIDREV Sm,t,w dependent variable is the num-
ber of upwards bid revisions minus the number of downward bid revisions that are not caused by price impact
for market m and World Cup sub-sample w at time t. The variable ASKREV Sm,t,w is similarly defined for
ask revisions. The rglobe,t,w variable is the seasonally detrended five-minute return on the S&P Global Broad
Market Index at time t during World Cup sub-sample w. The indicator variable, 1{HW}m,t,w, takes the
value of 1 during half-time of a football match in World Cup sub-sample w and in which the national football
team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that team winning at half-time. The indicator
variables, 1{HL}m,t,w, takes the value of 1 during half-time of a football match in World Cup sub-sample w
in which the national football team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that team losing
at half-time. The indicator variable, 1{W}m,t,w, takes the value of 1 between full-time of a football match in
World Cup sub-sample w and the market close of market m on match day, conditional on the national football
team associated with market m winning the match. The indicator variable, 1{L}m,t,w, takes the value of 1
between full-time of a football match in World Cup sub-sample w and the market close of market m on match
day, conditional on the national football team associated with market m losing the match. The t-statistics are
reported in italics. The standard errors are clustered at the country-World Cup sub-sample level. The 99%,
95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. R2W is a weighted coefficient of de-
termination that only utilises observations for which at least one match outcome indicator variable is nonzero.
Dependent Variable BIDREV Sm,t,w ASKREV Sm,t,w
(1) (2) (1) (2)
βglobe *** -0.064*** *** 0.153***
*** -0.97 *** *** 3.10 ***
βHW -0.044*** -0.077*** 0.097*** 0.090***
-0.23 *** -0.37 *** 0.87 *** 0.73 ***
βHL -0.191*** -0.247*** -0.096*** -0.124***
-1.86 *** -2.35 *** -0.72 *** -0.82 ***
βW 0.041*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.019***
0.70 *** 0.44 *** 0.35 *** 0.28 ***
βL 0.154*** 0.161*** 0.091*** 0.100***
1.21 *** 1.20 *** 1.13 *** 1.22 ***
Observations 220780*** 192804*** 220780*** 192804***
R2W (%) 0.89
*** 1.00*** 0.37*** 0.45***
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investor sentiment.
3.5. Conclusion
This paper begins by re-examining the findings of the influential Edmans et al. (2007) study
for an updated sample of stock market data. I consider all World Cup match outcomes up until
2014 to determine that the Edmans et al. (2007) loss-effect following negative sentiment shocks is
still prevalent using the larger sample period. The sentiment effect is strongest among the sample
of countries used in the Edmans et al. (2007) study and from 1973 to 1994. The second and third
portions of the paper concentrate on a sub-sample of World Cup football matches that occur during
the trading hours of the participating countries of each match. The analysis reveals that countries
experience positive abnormal stock returns between full-time of a football match and market close,
following a victory. Further, unexpected victories and victories over traditional rivals have a positive
and significant marginal impact on abnormal intra-day stock returns. Thus, their is evidence of a
predominant overnight loss-effect following negative sentiment shocks and an intra-day win-effect
following positive sentiment shocks. This result provides support for a contemporaneous study,
Cai et al. (2018), that argues that a proportion of the overnight loss-effect can be attributed to
the physiological impacts of investors disrupting their regular sleeping patterns to monitor football
matches.
The third portion of the paper makes use of trade and quote data to test an implicit assumption
of the sentiment literature. The assumption is that sentiment influences investors’ levels of opti-
mism, which in turn influences their buying and selling behaviour. The sentiment literature often
indirectly tests this assumption by observing abnormal stock returns. This paper examines whether
abnormal buying and selling behaviour can be explained by football match outcomes that coincide
with trading hours. Following a losing half-time match outcome, markets exhibit a 27.3% to 29.3%
of a standard deviation decline in abnormal dollar order imbalance. Moreover, for small trades,
there is some evidence that dollar order imbalance increases following winning half-time match
outcomes. Thus, there is significant evidence in favour of the sentiment literature assumptions.
Finally, this paper examines whether liquidity providers may be influenced by sentiment. This is
achieved by isolating quote revisions that are not the result of immediate price impact. The analysis
reveals that downward bid-quote revisions are more likely to occur following losing half-time match
outcomes. On the other hand, there is no significant impact on ask-quote revisions. The empirical
results suggest that liquidity providers react to sentiment-driven selling behaviour by reducing mid-
quotes and increasing the bid-ask spread. Thus, the evidence suggests that liquidity suppliers are
indirectly impacted by investor sentiment and interpret sentimental investors’ abnormal order flow
as potentially informative.
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3.6. Appendix: Placebo Tests
In this appendix, I test a number of the key findings of the study by performing placebo analyses.
The placebo tests are performed by constructing counterfactual match outcomes. Section 3.6.1
tests the daily stock market returns results presented in Table 3.8. Section 3.6.2 tests the intra-day
stock market return results presented in Table 3.11. Section 3.6.3 tests the order imbalance results
presented in Table 3.16.
3.6.1. Placebo Test of the Daily Stock Market Return Results
The first placebo test relates to the Equation 3.2 estimation results presented in Table 3.8. The
placebo test is performed by repeatedly estimating Equation 3.2 for a randomly generated set of
football match outcomes. I utilise the empirical distribution of goals scored per match for each
World Cup iteration to construct the counter-factual match outcomes. Thus, I use five goal distri-
butions corresponding to each World Cup iteration. For each counter-factual match observation,
I randomly draw the number of goals for the national team of interest and the opposition team
from the relevant empirical goal distribution. After estimating Equation 3.2 for the counter-factual
match observations, I store the estimated regression coefficients. This process is repeated 1000
times to arrive at a distribution of estimated beta coefficients. Finally, the true beta coefficients
are tested for statistical significance against the counter-factual coefficient distributions.
The placebo results for the daily stock market return analysis are presented in Table 3.19.
Table 3.19 demonstrates that the daily stock market return results presented in Table 3.8 are
robust to the placebo test. In fact, every significant coefficient presented in Table 3.8 remains
statistically significant in Table 3.19. Further, the estimated βEL coefficient for the 1973 to 2014
sample period is found to be significantly different from zero by the placebo test, despite being
insignificantly different from zero in Table 3.8.
3.6.2. Placebo Test of the Intra-Day Stock Market Return Results
I utilise the same procedure discussed in the previous sub-section, 3.6.1, to conduct the placebo
test for the intra-day stock market return results. I perform a placebo test for the Equation 3.4
results presented in Table 3.11. The results of the intra-day stock market return placebo test are
presented in Table 3.20. Importantly, every significant coefficient presented in Table 3.20 has a sign
that is consistent with the sentiment predictions. Further, the counter-intuitive results presented
in Table 3.11 are not present in Table 3.20. In particular, the t-statistic of -1162.77 for βEHL and
specification (3) in Table 3.11 is found to be −2.50 by the placebo test. Recall that the t-statistic
of −1162.77 in Table 3.11 was driven by a single Elimination Stage half-time winning observation.
Further, the counter-intuitive positive estimated βEL coefficients presented Table 3.11 are shown
to be insignificantly different from zero by the placebo test.
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Table 3.19
Placebo Test of the Abnormal Daily Stock Market Return Results
This table reports the placebo test results for the Equation 3.2 estimation presented in Table 3.8. The equation of interest is:
m,d = α+ β
W
1{W}m,d + βL1{L}m,d + βGW1{GW}m,d + βGL1{GL}m,d + βEW1{EW}m,d + βEL1{EL}m,d + um,d (3.2)
where 1{W}m,d is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if country m wins a FIFA World Cup football match on a day that makes d the first trading
day after the match and zero otherwise and 1{L}m,d is an indicator variable analogously defined for losses. The indicator variable, 1{GW}m,d, takes the value
of one if country m wins a Group Stage FIFA World Cup football match on a day that makes d the first trading day after the match and zero otherwise, while
1{EW}m,d is analogously defined for Elimination Stage matches. The indicator variable, 1{GL}m,d, takes the value of one if country m loses a Group Stage FIFA
World Cup football match on a day that makes d the first trading day after the match and zero otherwise, while 1{EL}m,d is analogously defined for Elimination
Stage matches. The dependent variable, m,d, is defined by the following equation:
rm,d = αm + β
1rm,d−1 + β2rglobe,d−1 + β3rglobe,d + β4rglobe,d+1 + β5Dt + β6Qt−1 + m,d (3.1)
where rm,d is the return on market m on day d, rglobe,d is the daily U.S. dollar return on Datastream’s world market index on day d, Dt = {D1,d, D2,d, D3,d, D4,d}
are indicator variables for Monday through to Thursday and Qt−1 = {Qm,d−1, Qm,d−2, Qm,d−3, Qm,d−4, Qm,d−5} where Qm,d−1 is an indicator variables that take
the value of one if country m experienced a non-weekend public holiday on day d− 1 and zero otherwise. The placebo test is performed by repeatedly estimating
Equation 3.2 for a randomly generated set of football match outcomes. I utilise the empirical distribution of goals scored per match for each World Cup iteration
to construct the counter-factual match outcomes. Thus, I use five goal distributions corresponding to each World Cup iteration. Then, for each counter-factual
match observation, I randomly draw the number of goals for the national team of interest and the opposition team from the relevant empirical goal distribution.
After estimating Equation 3.2 for the counter-factual match observations, I store the estimated regression coefficients. This process is repeated 1000 times to arrive
at a distribution of estimated beta coefficients. Finally, the t-statistics for the true beta coefficients are derived from the counter-factual coefficient distributions.
The t-statistics are reported in italics. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Year Range No. of βW No. of βL No. of βGW No. of βGL No. of βEW No. of βEL
Games Games Games Games Games Games
1973-2014 320 0.014*** 248 -0.171*** *** *** *** ***
0.22 -2.60
*** *** 200 -0.047*** 147 -0.164*** 120 0.116*** 101 -0.181***
-0.55 -1.92 1.18 -1.83
1973-2004 185 0.035*** 146 -0.330*** *** *** *** ***
0.41 -3.70
*** *** 108 0.008*** 84 -0.325*** 77 0.073*** 62 -0.338***
0.07 -2.95 0.51 -2.22
1973-1994 106 0.097*** 79 -0.345*** *** *** *** ***
0.90 -3.01
*** *** 57 0.081*** 43 -0.329*** 49 0.117*** 36 -0.364***
0.53 -2.14 0.73 -2.29
1995-2014 214 -0.026*** 169 -0.089*** *** *** *** ***
-0.30 -1.06
*** *** 143 -0.096*** 104 -0.095*** 71 0.116*** 65 -0.079***
-0.90 -0.86 0.84 -0.55
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Table 3.20
Placebo Test of the Abnormal Intra-Day Stock Market Return Results
This table reports the placebo test results for the Equation 3.4 estimation presented in Table 3.11. The
equation of interest is:
rm,t = αm + β
globerglobe,t + β
HW
1{HW}m,t + βHL1{HL}m,t + βGHW1{GHW}m,t + βGHL1{GHL}m,t
+ βW1{W}m,t + βL1{L}m,t + βGW1{GW}m,t + βGL1{GL}m,t + βEW1{EW}m,t + βEL1{EL}m,t + m,t
(3.4)
where rm,t is the seasonally detrended five-minute intra-day return of market m at time t and rglobe,t is the
seasonally detrended five-minute return on the S&P Global Broad Market Index at time t. The indicator
variable, 1{HW}m,t, takes the value of one during half-time of a football match in which the national
football team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that team winning at half-time.
The indicator variables, 1{GHW}m,t and 1{EHW}m,t, are the equivalents of 1{HW}m,t with respect to
Group Stage matches and Elimination Stage matches, respectively. The indicator variables, 1{HL}m,t, takes
the value of one during half-time of a football match in which the national football team associated with
market m is participating, conditional on that team losing at half-time. The indicator variables, 1{GHL}m,t
and 1{EHL}m,t, are the equivalents of 1{HL}m,t with respect to Group Stage matches and Elimination
Stage matches, respectively. The indicator variable, 1{W}m,t, takes the value of one between full-time of a
football match and the market close of market m on match day, conditional on the national football team
associated with market m winning the match. The indicator variables, 1{GW}m,t and 1{EW}m,t, are the
equivalents of 1{W}m,t with respect to Group Stage matches and Elimination Stage matches, respectively.
The indicator variable, 1{L}m,t, takes the value of one between full-time of a football match and the market
close of market m on match day, conditional on the national football team associated with market m losing
the match. The indicator variables, 1{GL}m,t and 1{EL}m,t, are the equivalents of 1{W}m,t with respect
to Group Stage matches and Elimination Stage matches, respectively. The placebo test is performed by
repeatedly estimating Equation 3.4 for a randomly generated set of football match outcomes. I utilise the
empirical distribution of goals scored per match for each World Cup iteration to construct the counter-factual
match outcomes. Thus, I use five goal distributions corresponding to each World Cup iteration. Then, for
each counter-factual match observation, I randomly draw the number of goals for the national team of
interest and the opposition team from the relevant empirical goal distribution. After estimating Equation
3.4 for the counter-factual match observations, I store the estimated regression coefficients. This process
is repeated 1000 times to arrive at a distribution of estimated beta coefficients. Finally, the t-statistics for
the true beta coefficients are derived from the counter-factual coefficient distributions. The t-statistics are
reported in italics. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
βglobe *** *** 0.056*** 0.056***
2.96 2.96
βHW *** 0.032*** *** 0.037***
1.64 1.63
βHL *** -0.007*** *** -0.008***
-0.60 -0.62
βGHW 0.021*** *** 0.020*** ***
1.86 1.58
βGHL -0.001*** *** -0.001*** ***
-0.10 -0.08
βEHW 0.071*** *** 0.089*** ***
1.70 1.70
βEHL -0.064*** *** -0.130*** ***
-1.49 -2.50
βW 0.005*** *** 0.006*** ***
1.43 1.73
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Table 3.20
(continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
βL 0.002*** *** 0.001*** ***
0.58 0.19
βGW *** 0.002*** *** 0.003***
0.45 0.66
βGL *** -0.002*** *** -0.003***
-0.47 -0.72
βEW *** 0.015*** *** 0.018***
1.88 1.64
βEL *** 0.011*** *** 0.012***
1.35 1.10
Observations 7144776 7144776 6360781 6360781
3.6.3. Placebo Test of the Order Imbalance Results
I utilise the same placebo test procedure as described in Sub-section 3.6.1 to examine the
validity of the abnormal order imbalance results presented in Table 3.16. The placebo test results
are presented in Table 3.21. The t-statistics derived from the placebo test are remarkably similar to
those of the original analysis. All significant coefficients presented in Table 3.16 remain statistically
significant in Table 3.21. Thus, the abnormal order imbalance results presented in Table 3.16 are
robust.
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Table 3.21
Placebo Test of Abnormal Order Imbalance Results
This table reports the placebo test results for the Equation 3.8 estimation presented in Table 3.16. The
equation of interest is:
ym,t,w =αm,w + β
globerglobe,t,w + β
HW
1{HW}m,t,w + βHL1{HL}m,t,w
+ βW1{W}m,t,w + βL1{L}m,t,w + +m,t,w (3.8)
where ym,t,w is the seasonally detrended and standardised dependent variable of market m at five-minute
intra-day time period t and World Cup sub-sample w. The OIBNUMm,t,w dependent variable is the
number of buyer-initiated trades less the number of seller-initiated trades on market m at time t in
World Cup sub-sample w. The OIBSHm,t,w dependent variable is the number of buyer-initiated shares
purchased less the number the seller-initiated shares sold and the OIBDOLm,t,w dependent variable is the
buyer-initiated dollars (or local currency) paid less the seller-initiated dollars (or local currency) received,
both for market m, time t and World Cup sub-sample w. Buyer- and seller-initiated trades are determined
using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The rglobe,t,w variable is the seasonally detrended five-minute
return on the S&P Global Broad Market Index at time t during World Cup sub-sample w. The indicator
variable, 1{HW}m,t,w, takes the value of 1 during half-time of a football match in World Cup sub-sample
w and in which the national football team associated with market m is participating, conditional on that
team winning at half-time. The indicator variables, 1{HL}m,t,w, takes the value of 1 during half-time of
a football match in World Cup sub-sample w in which the national football team associated with market
m is participating, conditional on that team losing at half-time. The indicator variable, 1{W}m,t,w, takes
the value of 1 between full-time of a football match in World Cup sub-sample w and the market close of
market m on match day, conditional on the national football team associated with market m winning the
match. The indicator variable, 1{L}m,t,w, takes the value of 1 between full-time of a football match in
World Cup sub-sample w and the market close of market m on match day, conditional on the national
football team associated with market m losing the match. The placebo test is performed by repeatedly
estimating Equation 3.8 for a randomly generated set of football match outcomes. I utilise the empirical
distribution of goals scored per match for each World Cup iteration to construct the counter-factual match
outcomes. Thus, I use five goal distributions corresponding to each World Cup iteration. Then, for each
counter-factual match observation, I randomly draw the number of goals for the national team of interest
and the opposition team from the relevant empirical goal distribution. After estimating Equation 3.8
for the counter-factual match observations, I store the estimated regression coefficients. This process is
repeated 1000 times to arrive at a distribution of estimated beta coefficients. Finally, the t-statistics for
the true beta coefficients are derived from the counterfactual coefficient distributions. The t-statistics are
reported in italics. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Dependent Variable OIBNUMm,t,w OIBSHm,t,w OIBDOLm,t,w
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
βglobe *** 0.081*** *** 0.060*** *** 0.076***
*** 271.41 *** *** 173.59 *** *** 247.68 ***
βHW 0.063*** 0.053*** 0.003*** 0.047*** 0.033*** 0.042***
0.42 *** 0.34 *** 0.02 *** 0.23 *** 0.23 *** 0.26 ***
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Table 3.21
(continued)
βHL -0.265*** -0.256*** -0.168*** -0.143*** -0.273*** -0.293***
-1.76 *** -1.64 *** -0.95 *** -0.73 *** -1.91 *** -1.86 ***
βW 0.013*** 0.004*** 0.022*** 0.026*** -0.027*** -0.029***
0.18 *** 0.05 *** 0.27 *** 0.31 *** -0.35 *** -0.37 ***
βL 0.068*** 0.074*** -0.040*** -0.053*** -0.019*** -0.037***
1.00 *** 1.05 *** -0.49 *** -0.63 *** -0.25 *** -0.48 ***
Observations 273736*** 243981*** 273736*** 243981*** 273736*** 243981***
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4. Concluding Remarks
This dissertation examines liquidity and investment sentiment in financial markets. Chapter 1
“Asymmetric Liquidity Persistence” provides a comprehensive analysis of the time-series properties
of liquidity. Chapter 1 demonstrates that market liquidity can be characterised as a long-memory
process. Moreover, the persistence of liquidity is conditional on past market states, represented by
stock market returns. Large negative returns cause liquidity persistence to initially decrease and
then increase in the long-run. Thus, the persistence of liquidity is asymmetric. To account for
asymmetric liquidity persistence, Chapter 1 proposes the threshold heterogeneous autoregressive
(THAR) model for estimating the liquidity process. The THAR model provides for more accurate
in-sample and out-of-sample estimations of liquidity. Chapter 1 concludes by testing the Amihud
(2002) hypothesis of expected and unexpected liquidity. Under the assumptions of the Amihud
(2002) hypotheses, the THAR model can accurately filter liquidity into its expected and unexpected
components.
Chapter 2 “Discretionary Trading Surrounding Anticipated Distraction Events: the Case of
the FIFA World Cup” examines discretionary liquidity trading surrounding distraction events.
The analysis takes advantage of World Cup football matches that occur during trading hours to
identify distraction events and shocks to the opportunity cost of monitoring markets. The analysis
shows that World Cup football matches induce a decline in contemporaneous trading activity,
as well as an increase in trading activity prior to match time. This is evidence of discretionary
trading behaviour, whereby investors fulfil their trading demand prior to match time. The analysis
concludes by demonstrating that the liquidity, volatility and price discovery dynamics on match
days are consistent with the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) discretionary trading predictions.
Chapter 3 “Sports Sentiment and Stock Returns: An Intra-day Study”, utilises a similar dataset
to Chapter 2 to test for investor sentiment effects surrounding football matches within 19 stock
markets. Chapter 3 provides an array of empirical results that are consistent with the investor sen-
timent predictions. For example, winning full-time outcomes are associated with positive abnormal
stock returns for the remainder of the trading day; while, unexpected victories and victories over
traditional rivals have a positive and significant marginal impact on abnormal stock returns. Chap-
ter 3 extends the investor sentiment literature by analysing trade and quote data to gain an insight
into the underlying mechanism of sentiment effects. Chapter 3 demonstrates that football match
outcomes can predict abnormal buying and selling behaviour. Further, liquidity suppliers appear
to interpret this abnormal buying and selling behaviour as potentially informative. The evidence
suggests that, in reaction to abnormal order imbalance, liquidity providers adjust mid-quotes and
increase bid-ask spreads to counteract potential adverse selection costs.
The final chapter of this thesis provides some further discussion regarding the analyses presented
in chapters 1, 2 and3 and outlines some opportunities for further research.
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5. Limitations and Future Research
This chapter outlines opportunities for further research with respect to the three major disser-
tation chapters:
 Chapter 1 Asymmetric Liquidity Persistence;
 Chapter 2 Discretionary Trading Surrounding Anticipated Distraction Events: the Case of
the FIFA World Cup; and,
 Chapter 3 Sports Sentiment and Stock Returns: An Intra-day Study.
5.1. Asymmetric Liquidity Persistence - Limitations and Future Research
The following sub-sections discuss limitations and opportunities for further research with respect
to Chapter 1 “Asymmetric Liquidity Persistence”. Sub-section 5.2.1 discusses recent developments
in the illiquidity-asset-pricing literature that have limiting implications for Chapter 1. Sub-section
5.2.2 outlines some theories of long-memory that could be incorporated into Chapter 1. Sub-section
5.2.3 discusses the opportunity to include alternative illiquidity measures in the analysis.
5.1.1. Recent Developments in the Illiquidity-Asset-Pricing Literature
A major limitation for further research with respect to Chapter 1 relates to recent developments
in the illiquidity-asset-pricing literature. Developments in this literature have been driven by a
forthcoming issue of the Critical Finance Review titled Liquidity: Replications, Extensions, and
Critique. This issue seeks to replicate and verify findings in some of the most influential papers
within this literature: Amihud (2002); Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003); and, Acharya and Pedersen
(2005). With respect to the Amihud (2002) study, the results of the Drienko et al. (2018) and Harris
and Amato (2018) replication studies are similar to those presented in Section 1.6 Amihud (2002)
Hypotheses. Section 1.6 finds evidence in favour of Amihud’s (2002) second hypothesis and limited
evidence in favour of his first. Drienko et al. (2018) attribute this to “a decline in the sensitivity of
investors to illiquidity risk over the last two decades, a period during which technological innovations
and decimalization have markedly reduced transaction costs and increased stock liquidity”.
In two new replication and extension studies, Eiichiro Kazumori and Yu (2018) and Holden and
Nam (2018) evaluate the validity of the Acharya and Pedersen (2005) Liquidity-adjusted Capital
Asset Pricing Model (LCAPM). Holden and Nam (2018) find that the predictions of the LCAPM
do not hold for a more recent sample period of 2000 to 2015. Eiichiro Kazumori and Yu (2018)
test the “net beta” LCAPM of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and find that the net-beta LCAPM
has a failure rate of 64% in their replication tests. Eiichiro Kazumori and Yu (2018) attribute this
result to severe multi-collinearity problems. For example, during the 2000 to 2006 sample period,
Eiichiro Kazumori and Yu (2018) find a correlation of -0.983 between Acharya and Pederson’s
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(2005) second and fourth liquidity betas at the portfolio level.
The original intention of Chapter 1 was to apply the THAR(3) model to the theoretical predic-
tions of the Amihud (2002) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) studies. While, the THAR(3) model
is applied to the theoretical predictions of Amihud (2002) in Section 1.6, the model could also be
applied to the LCAPM by utilising illiquidity innovations derived from the model to calculate the
illiquidity risk factors of Acharya and Pedersen (2005).31 The motivation for this application of the
THAR(3) model would be to obtain a more accurate estimation of the liquidity-adjusted market
risk premium and to test whether the LCAPM is robust to a different specification of the liquidity
process. This analysis intended to replicate the Acharya and Pedersen (2005) methodology for es-
timating the LCAPM and to subsequently compare the results to the LCAPM results derived from
the THAR(3) model. Unfortunately, this avenue of research was not feasible. This is because, in
results not shown, we were unable to replicate the baseline results of Acharya and Pedersen (2005).
Given the recent findings of Eiichiro Kazumori and Yu (2018) and Holden and Nam (2018), it is
apparent that other researchers have encountered similar difficulties.
5.1.2. Theories of Long-Memory
A potential avenue for further research could be to draw closer ties between the THAR(3) model
the theoretical explanations for long-memory in market variables. For example, Corsi (2009) moti-
vates his HAR model by citing the Heterogeneous Market Hypothesis of Mu¨ller, Dacorogna, Dave´,
Pictet, Olsen, and Ward (1993). Corsi (2009) postulates that long-run dependencies in volatility
could be the result of heterogeneous agents and in particular, agents with different investment
horizons.
In the quantitative finance literature, long-memory properties of intra-day market variables are
attributed to various explanations. Bouchaud, Farmer, and Lillo (2009) divide these explanations
into two classes. The first class of explanations identify long-memory as a function of individuals’
order flows. The second class of explanations promote long-memory as the result of the aggregation
of individuals’ order flow.
The predominant theory of the first class of explanations is order-splitting or “delayed market
clearing”. This hypothesis is first stipulated by Bouchaud, Gefen, Potters, and Wyart (2004) and
formalised in Lillo, Mike, and Farmer (2005). Evidence of order-splitting can be found in Chan
and Lakonishok (1993, 1995), where approximately one half of large institutional ‘‘package’’ trades
take longer than a week to clear. Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang (2014) assert that “asset managers
often...[acquire] positions over days, weeks, or even months”. Perhaps the most profound evidence
of the order-splitting explanation of long-memory in liquidity is found in Gerig (2007). Using
brokerage ID data for London Stock Exchange-listed stocks, Gerig (2007) shows that order flow
from the same brokerage demonstrates the strongest long-memory (autocorrelation function with
31Acharya and Pedersen (2005) utilise AR(1) innovations of monthly illiquidity to arrive at their liquidity risk
factors.
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power law exponent -0.4); all order flow demonstrates very strong long-memory (autocorrelation
function with power law exponent -0.67); while, order flow from different brokerages do not display
any significant autocorrelation. Hence, it appears as though, order-splitting by individuals is the
primary cause for long-memory in order flow.
Despite the strong evidence of the order-splitting explanation of long-memory in liquidity,
there are a number of other explanations from the aggregated order flow perspective. Wyart and
Bouchaud’s (2007) self-referential behaviour theory claims that agents build strategies using corre-
lations estimated from historical financial data. This leads to a feedback or self-fulfilling prophecy
effect, whereby the market switches between two long-lived states. LeBaron and Yamamoto (2007)
show that long-memory in trading volume, volatility and market order signs, in an efficient market,
could be the result of the learning and adaptation of heterogeneous investors. Yamamoto (2011)
attributes long-memory in order flow to agents placing more (less) aggressive orders when the same
side of the order book is deep (thin). In addition, long-memory in volatility has been attributed to
herding behaviour (Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner (2008)) and chartists’s trend-following behaviour
(Chiarella, Iori, and Perello´ (2009)).
To test the theories of long-memory in financial markets, the analysis of Chapter 1 could be
extended to examine long-memory and the performance of the THAR(3) model in different settings.
For example, as investors in more illiquid stocks can be expected to have longer investment horizons
(Stoll and Whaley (1983)), it could be that these stocks have greater persistence in liquidity.
Further, it could be that illiquid stocks are more vulnerable to liquidity dry-ups. Thus, the benefits
of incorporating a threshold component into the HAR framework might be more significant for
illiquid stocks. Moreover, it could be that package trades and delayed market clearing are negatively
correlated to block trades negotiated in an upstairs market. If this is the case, under the order-
splitting theory of Bouchaud et al. (2004) and Lillo et al. (2005), long-memory in liquidity might
be more severe for stocks without an active upstairs market. Finally, it might be possible to obtain
broker ID data in a similar manner to Gerig (2007) to identify package trades in order to assess the
performance of the THAR(3) model as a function of order-splitting. If such data is not available,
it might be possible to identify package trades around index reconstitutions submitted by those
managers of index-tracking funds looking to reduce their price impact.
5.1.3. Additional Illiquidity Measures
Another potential avenue for further research could be to include alternative illiquidy measures
into the analysis of Chapter 1. As it stands, Chapter 1 only presents results concerning the modified
Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity, ILLIQt. In results, not shown, similar findings are made
for the standard Amihud (2002) measure, AMIHUDt. This is not surprising as the measures
are closely related and highly correlated, as shown in Table 1.2. Alternative illiquidity measures
could include a daily average bid-ask spread measure, dollar-weighted effective spread measure or
a dollar-weighted realised spread measure. It is likely that the THAR(3) model would perform well
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for these processes, given the long-memory properties of the bid-ask spread, presented by Plerou,
Gopikrishnan, and Stanley (2005).
5.2. Discretionary Trading Surrounding Anticipated Distraction Events: the
Case of the FIFA World Cup - Limitations and Future Research
There are a number of opportunities to be explored with respect to Chapter 2. Sub-section
5.2.1 discusses opportunities to exploit country-level and stock-level cross-sectional variation. Sub-
section 5.2.2 considers the USA sub-sample in isolation. Sub-section 5.2.3 discusses controlling
for news events within trading hours. In Sub-section 5.2.4, I conduct a preliminary analysis of
alternative high-frequency measures of liquidity.
5.2.1. Country-level and Stock-level Cross-sectional Variation
Chapter 2 utilises intra-day stock market data from 22 countries from 1998 to 2014. One
opportunity for future research is to exploit time-series and cross-sectional variation afforded by
the comprehensive stock market sample. For example, Table 2.5 gives an insight into possible cross-
sectional variation that is yet to be explored. Table 2.5 indicates that some countries experience
significant declines in trading activity for the entire trading day when football matches coincide
with football matches. For example, the Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland and
Italy sub-samples all experience a statistically significant decline in daily V OLm,t,w, DV OLm,t,w,
TRADESm,t,w, BDV OLm,t,w and BDV OLm,t,w. These countries are generally considered to have
a strong football following. Thus, it may be worthwhile isolating these countries with a strong
football following for further analysis.32 Further, considering that these countries experience a
significant decrease in daily trading activity for the entire match-day, it could be that these countries
experience discretionary liquidity trading at the daily frequency, as in Foster and Viswanathan
(1990). If this is the case, a positive abnormal amount of trading activity may occur on the trading
days before match days.33
Another opportunity for further research is to concentrate on a sub-sample of liquid countries,
with higher turnover, that are more likely to have elevated levels of discretionary liquidity trading.
For example, Figure 5.1 compares the 1998 to 2006 sample period to the 2010 to 2014 sample
period. Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the more recent sample period exhibits a greater level of
abnormal trading activity in the pre-match period of the trading day. This is unsurprising as the
more recent sample period can be expected to be the more liquid portion of the sample.
32 For example, in their contemporaneous study, Cai et al. (2018) limit their analysis to 16 countries that have
a successful football history. Cai et al. (2018) select countries that have finished first, second, third or fourth in a
World Cup between 1982 and 2014, conditional on data availability.
33Edmans et al. (2007) do not find any evidence of abnormal trading volume on trading days after matches; however,
their sample of football matches includes matches that occurred outside of trading hours.
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Panel A: V OLm,t,w Panel B: DV OLm,t,w
Panel C: BDV OLm,t,w Panel D: SDV OLm,t,w
Panel E: NBBOBIDSm,t,w Panel F: NBBOASKSm,t,w
Fig. 5.1. Trading Activity on Match Days by World Cup. This figure plots the mean standardised, sea-
sonally detrended trading activity variables on match days for the 1998 to 2006 (blue line) sample period
and the 2010 to 2014 sample period (orange line). The market variables are detrended using the methodol-
ogy of Gallant et al. (1992) for month-of-the-year, day-of-the-week and five-minute time-of-the-day effects.
Volume for market m at time t is denoted by V OLm,t,w, dollar volume by DV OLm,t,w, number of trades
by TRADESm,t,w, buyer-initiated dollar trading volume by BDV OLm,t,w, seller-initiated dollar trading
volume by SDV OLm,t,w, number of bids at the national best bid price by NBBOBIDSm,t,w and number of
asks at the national best ask price is denoted by NBBOASKSm,t,w. The average first-half and second-half
time periods are shaded in grey. The x-axis of each plot indicates the number of minutes from kick-off time.
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5.2.2. USA Sub-sample
The inclusion of the United States in the Chapter 2 stock market sample is somewhat con-
tentious. This is because the United States is not generally considered a country with a large
football following. For example, the premier American football (or soccer) league, Major League
Soccer (MLS), is not defined as one of the United States’ major professional sports leagues. The
major sports leagues, known as the “Big Four”, are defined as Major League Baseball (MLB),
the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL) and the National
Hockey League (NHL). Given the limited popularity of football in the United States, it could be
that World Cup football matches do not have a significant impact on trading activity. If this is
the case, it might be more appropriate to exclude the United States from the analysis presented in
Chapter 2. Indeed, Edmans et al. (2007) exclude the United States from their study for this exact
reason. In light of this, this sub-section presents the trading activity and market condition results
for the USA sub-sample. It should be noted; however, that the United States was only involved
in seven World Cup football matches that occurred during trading hours between 1998 and 2014.
Thus, I only consider this sub-sample analysis to be anecdotal, rather than scientifically rigorous.
Table 5.1 Panel A shows the Equation 2.2 estimation results for m = USA and the V OLUSA,t,w,
DV OLUSA,t,w, TRADESUSA,t,w, BDV OLUSA,t,w and SDV OLUSA,t,w dependent variables. The
estimation results reveal that there is a reduction in trading activity during and in the immediate
vicinity of match time in the United States. All estimated β1, β7, β8, β9 and β11 coefficients are
negative. Further, all estimated βτ coefficients for τ ∈ {12, 13, 14, 15, 16} in Table 5.1 Panel A are
negative. Thus, trading activity is generally reduced following a World Cup football match in the
United States. With respect to the pre-match period, the empirical results are mixed. That is,
some estimated βτ coefficients for τ ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} are negative and some are positive. Thus, for
the USA sub-sample, their is no clear evidence of discretionary trading on match days. This is
consistent with the notion that the USA does not have an overly strong football following.
Table 5.1 Panel B shows the Equation 2.2 estimation results for m = USA and the
AMIHUDUSA,t,w, MAMIHUDUSA,t,w, σUSA,t,w and PDUSA,t,w dependent variables. As trading
activity is not significantly increased prior to match time for the USA sub-sample, I do not form
expectations regarding market conditions during this time period. Thus, Hypothesis H1 is not valid
for the USA sub-sample. Nonetheless, with respect to a decrease in trading activity during match
time, one might expect a contemporaneous increase in price impact costs, as well as a correspond-
ing decrease to volatility and price discovery, as predicted by Hypothesis H2. Table 5.1 Panel B
demonstrates that volatility and price discovery are generally decreased during match time but price
impact costs, represented by the MAMIHUDUSA,t,w measure, are similarly reduced during match
time. Thus, the market conditions observed for the USA sub-sample are not consistent with the
notion of discretionary trading behaviour, which is in turn consistent with the Table 5.1 Panel A re-
sults that do not find significant evidence of discretionary trading behaviour in the USA sub-sample.
For this reason, it may be appropriate to exclude the USA sub-sample from further research, as in
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Table 5.1
USA Trading Activity and Market Conditions On Match Days
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
DEPm,t,w =α0 + β0GDm,t,w +
6∑
τ=1
PREK−τm,t,wβτ + β7D
F
m,t,w + β8D
H
m,t,w + β9D
S
m,t,w
+ β10D
E
m,t,w +
6∑
τ=1
POSTF+τm,t,wβ10+τ + m,t,w (2.2)
where DEPm,t,w is the dependent variable for m = USA at time t and World Cup sub-sample w. Each
dependent variable is formed by pooling the standardised, detrended market-level observations. The GDm,t,w
indicator variable is a match day indicator variable that takes the value of one if five-minute intra-day time
period t coincides with a trading day in which country m is open for trading simultaneous to country m
participating in a football match. The DFm,t,w indicator variable takes the value of one if country m is playing
in the first-half of a football match at time t in World Cup sub-sample w. The DSm,t,w indicator variable is
the analogous variable for the second-half of a football match. The DHm,t,w indicator variable takes the value
of one if it is half-time at time t for a match involving country m in World Cup sub-sample w. The DEm,t,w
indicator variable takes the value of one if it is extra-time at time t for a match involving country m in World
Cup sub-sample w. The remaining indicator variables capture abnormal trading activity outside of match
time on match days. The PREK−τm,t,w indicator variables take the value of one if t is 30τ minutes before a
first-half kick-off observation or between 30τ and 30(τ − 1) minutes before a first-half kick-off observation,
given that country m is participating in the match in World Cup sub-sample w. The POSTF+τm,t,w indicator
variables take the value of one if t is 30τ minutes after a full-time observation or between 30τ and 30(τ + 1)
minutes after a full-time observation, given that country m is participating in the match in World Cup
sub-sample w. Volume for market m at time t and World Cup sub-sample w is denoted by V OLm,t,w,
dollar volume by DV OLm,t,w, number of trades by TRADESm,t,w, buyer-initiated dollar trading volume by
BDV OLm,t,w, seller-initiated dollar trading volume by SDV OLm,t,w, the mean Amihud (2002) measure by
AMIHUDm,t,w, the mean modified Amihud (2002) measure by MAMIHUDm,t,w, the mean volatility by
σm,t,w and the mean gross price discovery by PDm,t,w. The t-statistics are reported in italics. The standard
errors are clustered at the country level. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by ***, **,
and *, respectively. R2W is a weighted coefficient of determination that only utilises observations for which
at least one non-constant independent variable is nonzero.
Panel A: Trading Activity
DEPUSA,t,w V OLUSA,t,w
*** DV OLUSA,t,w
*** TRADESUSA,t,w
***BDV OLUSA,t,w
***SDV OLUSA,t,w
***
GDm,t,w 0.174
*** 0.233*** 0.321*** 0.105*** 0.193***
0.64 *** 0.84 *** 0.76 *** 0.49 *** 0.91 ***
PREK−6m,t,w 0.089
*** -0.001*** 0.153*** -0.467*** 0.695***
0.34 *** -0.01 *** 0.37 *** -2.18 *** 3.35 ***
PREK−5m,t,w -0.199
*** -0.288*** -0.219*** -0.267*** -0.084***
-1.31 *** -1.87 *** -1.11 *** -3.28 *** -0.46 ***
PREK−4m,t,w -0.181
*** -0.192*** -0.135*** -0.140*** -0.069***
-1.25 *** -1.34 *** -0.56 *** -1.02 *** -0.26 ***
PREK−3m,t,w -0.079
*** -0.156*** -0.186*** -0.098*** -0.141***
-0.42 *** -0.79 *** -0.52 *** -0.70 *** -0.58 ***
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Table 5.1
(continued)
DEPUSA,t,w V OLUSA,t,w
*** DV OLUSA,t,w
***TRADESUSA,t,w
***BDV OLUSA,t,w
***SDV OLUSA,t,w
***
PREK−2m,t,w -0.184*** -0.226*** -0.116*** -0.273*** -0.003***
-0.89 *** -1.09 *** -0.30 *** -1.04 *** -0.01 ***
PREK−1m,t,w -0.294*** -0.363*** -0.456*** -0.216*** -0.368***
-1.74 *** -2.26 *** -1.65 *** -1.89 *** -2.15 ***
DFm,t,w -0.200
*** -0.310*** -0.512*** -0.229*** -0.174***
-0.77 *** -1.29 *** -2.12 *** -0.72 *** -2.23 ***
DHm,t,w -0.237
*** -0.302*** -0.631*** -0.244*** -0.262***
-5.80 *** -5.26 *** -6.05 *** -3.48 *** -2.20 ***
DSm,t,w -0.423
*** -0.454*** -0.670*** -0.308*** -0.397***
-1.66 *** -1.75 *** -1.59 *** -1.41 *** -1.98 ***
POSTF+1m,t,w -0.575
*** -0.557*** -0.882*** -0.404*** -0.474***
-2.23 *** -2.13 *** -2.22 *** -1.99 *** -2.24 ***
POSTF+2m,t,w -0.370
*** -0.437*** -0.566*** -0.318*** -0.319***
-1.28 *** -1.50 *** -1.24 *** -1.52 *** -1.15 ***
POSTF+3m,t,w -0.415
*** -0.454*** -0.624*** -0.329*** -0.379***
-1.53 *** -1.63 *** -1.44 *** -1.56 *** -1.70 ***
POSTF+4m,t,w -0.233
*** -0.265*** -0.370*** -0.121*** -0.172***
-0.83 *** -0.97 *** -0.77 *** -0.56 *** -0.76 ***
POSTF+5m,t,w -0.365
*** -0.370*** -0.375*** -0.258*** -0.206***
-1.38 *** -1.35 *** -0.89 *** -1.16 *** -0.99 ***
POSTF+6m,t,w -0.300
*** -0.294*** -0.241*** -0.209*** -0.282***
-0.79 *** -0.75 *** -0.37 *** -0.65 *** -0.95 ***
Observations 19645*** 19647*** 19656*** 19648*** 19649***
R2W (%) 5.77
*** 6.69*** 8.10*** 3.08*** 9.17***
Panel B: Market Conditions
DEPm,t,w AMIHUDUSA,t,w MAMIHUDUSA,t,w σUSA,t,w PDUSA,t,w
GDm,t,w 0.040
*** 0.468*** 0.454*** 0.350***
1.41 *** 3.21 *** 1.25 *** 1.61 ***
PREK−6m,t,w -0.068*** -0.273*** -0.155*** ***
-2.36 *** -2.05 *** -0.43 *** ***
PREK−5m,t,w -0.058*** -0.353*** -0.102*** ***
-1.90 *** -2.41 *** -0.46 *** ***
PREK−4m,t,w -0.083*** -0.155*** -0.027*** 0.063***
-0.38 *** -0.60 *** -0.12 *** 0.29 ***
PREK−3m,t,w 0.182*** -0.385*** -0.035*** -0.173***
1.29 *** -2.71 *** -0.13 *** -0.68 ***
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(continued)
DEPm,t,w AMIHUDUSA,t,w MAMIHUDUSA,t,w σUSA,t,w PDUSA,t,w
PREK−2m,t,w -0.147*** -0.459*** 0.021*** 0.148***
-1.14 *** -3.09 *** 0.06 *** 0.79 ***
PREK−1m,t,w 0.212*** -0.384*** -0.448*** -0.490***
1.50 *** -3.76 *** -1.79 *** -2.12 ***
DFm,t,w -0.055
*** -0.183*** -0.433*** -0.344***
-1.36 *** -1.79 *** -2.42 *** -2.01 ***
DHm,t,w -0.158
*** -0.488*** -0.633*** -1.007***
-1.96 *** -1.51 *** -5.53 *** -3.00 ***
DSm,t,w 0.072
*** -0.062*** -0.573*** -0.515***
0.39 *** -0.30 *** -1.62 *** -2.14 ***
POSTF+1m,t,w -0.087
*** 0.123*** -0.829*** -0.553***
-0.87 *** 0.62 *** -2.40 *** -2.29 ***
POSTF+2,wm,t -0.314
*** -0.034*** -0.542*** -0.615***
-1.48 *** -0.17 *** -1.42 *** -2.07 ***
POSTF+3m,t,w 0.022
*** -0.499*** -0.548*** -0.781***
0.41 *** -2.59 *** -1.49 *** -1.83 ***
POSTF+4m,t,w -0.168
*** -0.200*** -0.528*** -0.638***
-1.46 *** -1.76 *** -1.28 *** -1.74 ***
POSTF+5m,t,w -0.054
*** 0.129*** -0.169*** -0.773***
-0.94 *** 0.73 *** -0.45 *** -2.03 ***
POSTF+6m,t,w 0.289
*** -0.010*** -0.099*** -0.721***
2.80 *** -0.10 *** -0.18 *** -3.54 ***
Observations 18522*** 18785*** 19651*** 16403***
R2W (%) 3.21
*** 6.38*** 9.27*** 12.47***
Edmans et al. (2007).
5.2.3. News Events
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 assumes that the abnormal intra-day trading pattern
observed on match days is driven by the increased opportunity cost associated with monitoring
markets when there is a concurrent football match. Alternatively, it could be that the abnormal
trading activity observed on match days is due to abnormal information flows. While the method-
ology of Gallant et al. (1992) can control for normal intra-day and seasonal trends in information
flow, the adjustment process of Gallant et al. (1992) cannot control for an extraordinary sequence of
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information events.34 While it is not immediately obvious why exogenously determined new events
would be impacted by football matches, it is plausible that information dissemination may be im-
pacted by distraction events. Distraction events may impact investors’ or news distributors’ ability
to process information content in a timely and efficient manner. This disruption to the information
dissemination process may subdue contemporaneous trading activity and price discovery. If this is
the case, one might expect an abnormal positive amount of trading activity and price discovery at
the cessation of the distraction event. As this is not observed in the stock market data, it is unlikely
that the abnormal market conditions observed on match days are the result of a disruption to the
information dissemination process. Thus, the observed market conditions are more likely due to
the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) notion of informed traders with private information timing their
trades to minimise price impact.
On the other hand, it is plausible that endogenously determined news events could be a con-
tributing factor to the main results presented in Chapter 2. An endogenously determined news event
could include any news event that is released under the timing discretion of a firm. For example,
some previous studies have suggested that firms may release poor earnings announcements when
traders are distracted. Patell and Wolfson (1982) demonstrate that overnight earnings announce-
ments are more likely to followed by a negative stock market reaction; while, intra-day earnings
announcements are more likely to be followed by a positive stock market reaction. This result is
validated by Damodaran (1989). Moreover, the empirical evidence of Penman (1987) indicates that
earnings announcements after the close-of-trade on a Friday are more likely to be considered poor
earnings announcements. These studies suggest that managers release poor earnings announce-
ments outside of trading hours in an attempt to avoid a severe devaluation of the firm’s stock price.
In addition, Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) demonstrate that earnings announcements released on
Fridays are associated with greater post-earnings announcement drift, which the authors attribute
to distraction and the limited attention of investors. If this is the case, it could be that managers
might time earnings announcements to coincide with alternative distraction events. This could
include football matches. If this is the case, than the flow of information on match days may be
abnormal. This could comprise the analysis conducted in Chapter 2 if market sensitive information
is frequently released one to two hours before football matches. Accordingly, an important avenue
for further research is to control for information flows on match days. This could be achieved by
incorporating RavenPack News Analytics data into the analysis.
5.2.4. Alternative Illiquidity Measures
The investigation presented in Chapter 2 utilises two measure of illiquidity; the Amihud (2002)
measure, AMIHUDm,t,w, and a modified Amihud (2002) measure, MAMIHUDm,t,w. The Ami-
hud (2002) measure and thereby its modified version are typically used as proxies for alternative
high-frequency measures of illiquidity that are often difficult to calculate. This is because high-
34For example, Penman (1987) finds seasonal trends in the distribution of earnings announcements.
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frequency liquidity measures are derived from processing large intra-day trade and quote datasets.
Given that Chapter 2 makes use of trade and quote data, future research should include high-
frequency measures of illiquidity in the main analysis. Accordingly, in this sub-section, I include
some preliminary results using high-frequency illiquidity measures.
Several high-frequency illiquidity measures could be included in future research. First, a high-
frequency measure of price impact could be included in the analysis. The five-minute price impact
measure, PIi,k, for stock i and trade k is defined by Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) as:
PIi,k =
2 · (ln(Mi,k+5)− ln(Mi,k)) if the kth trade is buy2 · (ln(Mi,k)− ln(Mi,k+5)) if the kth trade is sell (5.1)
where Mi,k is the mid-quote for stock i at the time at which the kth trade is executed and Mi,k+5
is the mid-quote five-minutes after the kth trade is executed for stock i. Further, Goyenko et al.
(2009) define the effective spread measure, ESi,k, for stock i and trade k as:
ESi,k = 2 · |ln(Pi,k)− ln(Mi,k)| (5.2)
where Pi,k is the transaction price for trade k and stock i. Finally, Goyenko et al. (2009) define the
realised spread measure, RSi,k, for stock i and trade k as:
RSi,k =
2 · (ln(Pi,k)− ln(Pi,k+5)) if the kth trade is buy2 · (ln(Pi,k+5)− ln(Pi,k)) if the kth trade is sell (5.3)
where Pi,k+5 is the transaction price for a trade five-minutes after trade k. Market-level high-
frequency illiquidity measures can be obtained by taking a dollar-weighted average of each illiquidity
value associated with each trade within each five-minute period. The market level price impact,
PIm,t,w, effective spread, ESm,t,w, and realised spread, RSm,t,w, variables are defined in this manner.
Similar to the main analysis, the measures are standardised and detrended using the methodology
of Gallant et al. (1992).
Figure 5.2 displays the mean PIm,t,w, ESm,t,w, and RSm,t,w measures on match days. The key
insight from Figure 5.2 is that the high-frequency illiquidity measures do not appear to display
any distinct intra-day patter over match days. Moreover, Figure 5.3 displays the mean PIm,t,w,
ESm,t,w, and RSm,t,w measures on match days for developed and developing countries. Similar
to the entire sample, neither the developed nor the developing sub-sample exhibits an intra-day
trend in high-frequency illiquidity across match days. Table 5.2 reports the estimation results of
Equation 2.2 for the PIm,t,w, ESm,t,w, and RSm,t,w dependent variables. Consistent with figures
5.2 and 5.3, the estimation results presented in Table 5.2 do not reveal a significant high-frequency
liquidity intra-day trend on match days.
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Panel A: PIm,t,w
Panel B: ESm,t,w
Panel C: RSm,t,w
Fig. 5.2. High-Frequency Illiquidity Measures During Match Days. This figure plots the mean standardised,
seasonally detrended high-frequency liquidity variables on match days. The market variables are detrended
using the methodology of Gallant et al. (1992) for month-of-the-year, day-of-the-week and time-of-the-day
effects. Five-minute price impact for market m at time t and World Cup sub-sample w is denoted by
PIm,t,w, effective spread by ESm,t,w and realised spread by RSm,t,w. The average first-half and second-half
time periods are shaded in grey. The x-axis of each plot indicates the number of minutes from kick-off time.
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Panel A: PIm,t,w
Panel B: ESm,t,w
Panel C: RSm,t,w
Fig. 5.3. High-Frequency Liquidity Measures During Match Days for Developed and Developing Countries.
This figure plots the mean standardised, seasonally detrended high-frequency liquidity variables on match
days. The market variables are detrended using the methodology of Gallant et al. (1992) for month-of-the-
year, day-of-the-week and time-of-the-day effects. Five-minute price impact for market m at time t and
World Cup sub-sample w is denoted by PIm,t,w, effective spread by ESm,t,w and realised spread by RSm,t,w.
The average first-half and second-half time periods are shaded in grey. The x-axis of each plot indicates the
number of minutes from kick-off time.
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Table 5.2
High Frequency Liquidity Conditions On Match Days
This table reports the estimation results for the following regression:
DEPm,t,w =α0 + β0GDm,t,w +
6∑
τ=1
PREK−τm,t,wβτ + β7D
F
m,t,w + β8D
H
m,t,w + β9D
S
m,t,w
+ β10D
E
m,t,w +
6∑
τ=1
POSTF+τm,t,wβ10+τ + m,t,w (2.2)
where DEPm,t,w is the dependent variable. Each dependent variable is formed by pooling the standardised,
detrended market-level observations across World Cup sub-samples. The GDm,t,w indicator variable is a
match day indicator variable that takes the value of one if five-minute intra-day time period t coincides with
a trading day in which country m is open for trading simultaneous to country m participating in a football
match. The DFm,t,w indicator variable takes the value of one if country m is playing in the first-half of a
football match at time t in World Cup sub-sample w. The DSm,t,w indicator variable is the analogous variable
for the second-half of a football match. The DHm,t,w indicator variable takes the value of one if it is half-time
at time t for a match involving country m in World Cup sub-sample w. The DEm,t,w indicator variable takes
the value of one if it is extra-time at time t for a match involving country m in World Cup sub-sample
w. The remaining indicator variables capture abnormal trading activity outside of match time on match
days. The PREK−τm,t,w indicator variables take the value of one if t is 30τ minutes before a first-half kick-off
observation or between 30τ and 30(τ − 1) minutes before a first-half kick-off observation, given that country
m is participating in the match in World Cup sub-sample w. The POSTF+τm,t,w indicator variables take the
value of one if t is 30τ minutes after a full-time observation or between 30τ and 30(τ+1) minutes after a full-
time observation, given that country m is participating in the match in World Cup sub-sample w. Effective
Spread for market m at time t during World Cup sub-sample w is denoted by ESm,t,w, realised spread by
RSm,t,w and five-mute price impact by PIm,t,w. The t-statistics are reported in italics. The standard errors
are clustered at the country-year level. The 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels are indicated by ***, **,
and *, respectively. R2W is a weighted coefficient of determination that only utilises observations for which
at least one non-constant independent variable is nonzero.
DEPm,t,w ESm,t,w RSm,t,w PIm,t,w
GDm,t,w 0.025
*** 0.012*** -0.001***
0.94 *** 0.80 *** -0.10 ***
PREK−6m,t,w 0.018
*** 0.006*** -0.029***
0.77 *** 0.16 *** -1.67 ***
PREK−5m,t,w -0.014
*** -0.017*** 0.005***
-0.66 *** -0.71 *** 0.24 ***
PREK−4m,t,w 0.018
*** 0.040*** -0.013***
0.50 *** 1.20 *** -0.60 ***
PREK−3m,t,w -0.003
*** 0.061*** -0.020***
-0.10 *** 2.08 *** -0.98 ***
PREK−2m,t,w -0.013
*** 0.012*** -0.036***
-0.36 *** 0.37 *** -1.87 ***
PREK−1m,t,w -0.037
*** 0.015*** -0.022***
-1.34 *** 0.49 *** -1.07 ***
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Table 5.2
(continued)
DEPm,t,w ESm,t,w RSm,t,w PIm,t,w
DFm,t,w -0.016
*** 0.029*** -0.045***
-0.53 *** 1.07 *** -3.04 ***
DHm,t,w -0.043
*** -0.046*** 0.019***
-1.22 *** -1.10 *** 0.66 ***
DSm,t,w -0.080
*** -0.027*** -0.032***
-2.82 *** -0.90 *** -1.82 ***
DEm,t,w 0.218
*** 0.349*** -0.172***
2.47 *** 16.19 *** -2.66 ***
POSTF+1m,t,w -0.073
*** -0.010*** -0.015***
-2.23 *** -0.34 *** -0.52 ***
POSTF+2m,t,w -0.045
*** -0.008*** -0.025***
-1.41 *** -0.18 *** -0.71 ***
POSTF+3m,t,w -0.061
*** -0.006*** 0.036***
-1.78 *** -0.17 *** 0.77 ***
POSTF+4m,t,w 0.047
*** 0.053*** -0.043***
0.82 *** 1.04 *** -1.16 ***
POSTF+5m,t,w -0.006
*** 0.097*** -0.078***
-0.13 *** 1.78 *** -1.62 ***
POSTF+6m,t,w -0.037
*** -0.061*** 0.039***
-0.77 *** -1.20 *** 0.73 ***
Observations 239767*** 239158*** 256435***
R2W (%) 0.67
*** 0.35*** 0.38***
Given the surprising results of Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3 and Table 5.2, further research should be
dedicated to understanding the dynamics of the high-frequency illiquidity measures. There are a
number of potential explanations for the preliminary results presented. Firstly, it could be that
the trade and quote data used to calculate that high-frequency illiquidity measures is more prone
to reporting errors than the five-minute intra-day data used to calculate the AMIHUDm,t,w and
MAMIHUDm,t,w measures. If this is the case, the trade and quote data will need to be filtered
in a different manner than the five-minute intra-day data. Thus, future research should apply
similar filters and controls to those implemented by Fong et al. (2017), whom use a similar global
dataset of trade and quote data from Thomson Reuters Tick History. Second, it could be that some
high-frequency illiquidity measures are not appropriate for some countries within the dataset. For
example, across the 1998 to 2014 sample period some developing countries are extremely illiquid.
With large differences in illiquidity over the country sub-samples, it is not immediately obvious
that the five-minute lead applied to the PIi,k and RSi,k measures is equally appropriate for all
countries. Finally, given that each high-frequency illiquidity measure captures a different aspect
of illiquidity, it could be that some high-frequency illiquidity measures are more relevant to some
countries than others. This is because there are large structural differences across the 22 markets
in the sample.
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5.3. Sports Sentiment and Stock Returns: An Intra-day Study - Limitations
and Future Research
The following sub-sections discuss opportunities for further research with respect to Chapter 3
“Sports Sentiment and Stock Returns: An Intra-day Study”. Sub-section 5.3.1 outlines plans to
improve the intra-day analyses presented in sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3. Sub-section 5.3.2 discusses
options for exploiting cross-sectional variation within the dataset to provide additional evidence of
the sentiment effect. Sub-section 5.3.3 outlines plans to examine stock return comovement around
shocks to sentiment. Finally, Sub-section 5.3.4 suggests options for identifying retail trades.
5.3.1. A Comparison to Edmans et al. (2007)
The intra-day stock market return results presented in Section 3.4.2 conform with the investor
sentiment predictions – Section 3.4.2 finds significant evidence of an intra-day win-effect. Nonethe-
less, this is in contrast to the daily stock return analysis presented in Section 3.4.1 and Edmans
et al. (2007). Section 3.4.1 and Edmans et al. (2007) find a significant inter-day loss effect.35
Edmans et al. (2007) attribute their asymmetric sentiment effect to a number of factors. First,
Edmans et al. (2007) cite the psychology literature: “while an increase in heart attacks, crimes, and
suicides is shown to accompany sporting losses, there is no evidence of improvements in mood of a
similar magnitude after wins”. Second, if football fans suffer from an “allegiance bias” as in Wann,
Melnick, Russell, and Pease (2001) and Markman and Hirt (2002), they could place unreasonable
expectations on their team winning. Under the reference point argument of Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979), this could mean that losses have a more pronounced impact on sentiment than wins.
This view is supported by Bernile and Lyandres (2011), whom find that “investors overestimate
(underestimate) the probability of winning (losing) by nearly 5 percentage points”. Third, World
Cups are designed with inherent asymmetries. Specifically, when a country losses an Elimination
Stage World Cup match, they are immediately removed from the competition; while, the winner
merely progresses to the next stage of the competition. This argument is used to motivate the
study of Kaplanski and Levy (2010). Thus, it is surprising to find an asymmetric sentiment effect
in the opposite direction at the intra-day level. This motivates further research to reconcile the
intra-day win-effect with the inter-day loss effect.
Several considerations could explain the contrasting asymmetric sentiment effects. First, the
market returns used in Section 3.4.1 and Section 3.4.2 are quite different. Section 3.4.1 makes
use of daily total market returns that include all stocks within a market. This data is available
from Datastream. In contrast, Section 3.4.2 makes use of intra-day market returns derived from
market indices. This data is available from Thomson Reuters Tick History. The sample of market
indices included in the intra-day analysis only includes the most prominent market index of each
country. Thus, the indices included in the intra-day analysis only include the largest and most
35Ashton et al. (2003) only consider a symmetric sentiment effect.
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liquid stocks in each country. This distinction could account for the contrasting sentiment results.
Thus, further research should seek to expand the cross-section of stocks included in the intra-day
stock return analysis. This could be accomplished by selecting market indices with broader market
coverage. Expanding the cross-section of stocks could also be achieved by constructing total market
indices from the intra-day data available from Thomson Reuters Tick History; however, this option
would be rather data intensive. Expanding the cross-section of stock to include less liquid listings
is also likely to improve the results presented in Chapter 3. This is because behavioural biases
should be stronger for those stocks with sizeable limits to arbitrage (De Long, Shleifer, Summers,
and Waldmann (1990); Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). This notion is discussed in more detail in
Sub-section 5.3.2
Second, the daily stock return sample and the intra-day stock return sample have contrasting
sample periods. The daily stock return sample period is from 1973 to 2014; while, the intra-day
stock return sample period is from 1998 to 2014. It could be that since the circulation of the Edmans
et al. (2007) study or the preceding working papers, “Football and Stock Returns” by Diego Garc´ıa
and Øyvind Norli and “Soccer, Sentiment, and Stocks” by Alex Edmans, the market has sought
to gradually correct the documented loss-effect. This notion of a weakening loss-effect is supported
by tables 3.8 and 3.9. A weakening loss-effect at the daily level could have been accompanied with
a weakening loss-effect at the intra-day level, resulting in the remaining win effect at the intra-day
level. Unfortunately, data availability restricts a large longitudinal study of intra-day sentiment
effects. Hence, a thorough investigation of this explanation is not feasible in the foreseeable future.
An explanation for the asymmetric sentiment effects can also be developed from arguments
presented in a contemporaneous study, Cai et al. (2018). Cai et al. (2018) argue that a significant
portion of the loss-effect presented in Edmans et al. (2007) can be attributed to the physiological
impacts of sleeplessness that results from investors watching overnight football matches, particu-
larly in the early morning hours. Further, a limited overnight win-effect could be the result of the
opposing impacts of positive sentiment and sleeplessness. Given that Section 3.4.2 utilises a sample
of football matches that occur during the daylight hours of the participating countries, one should
not expect the same asymmetric sentiment effect at the intra-day level. To test this argument,
further research should utilise open-to-close returns and close-to-open returns as dependent vari-
ables. Under the arguments of Cai et al. (2018), contemporaneous sentiment shocks should have
an asymmetric impact on close-to-open returns and a symmetric or more balanced impact on open
to close returns.
5.3.2. Cross-sectional Variation and Limits to Arbitrage
Future research should seek to take advantage of cross-sectional variation within the intra-day
stock market returns dataset. Ideally, this further research would provide additional evidence of
the sentiment effect. For example, behavioural biases should be stronger for those stocks with
sizeable limits to arbitrage (De Long et al. (1990); Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). Accordingly, it
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should be that the intra-day sentiments effects found in Chapter 3 are stronger for those stocks
that are more illiquid and volatile. For example, Edmans et al. (2007) and Cai et al. (2018) find
that the overnight sports sentiment loss-effect is stronger for small market capitalisation stocks.36
Thus, further research should involve constructing a small market capitalisation sample and testing
whether the sentiment effects are stronger for this sample. Alternatively, I could increase the
number of stocks within dataset and perform illiquidity or volatility sorts.
Another opportunity for further research could be to take advantage of country-level variation.
For example, further research could perform a sub-sample analysis for those countries with a strong
football following. This is an approach taken by Edmans et al. (2007), whom exclude the United
States of America and Canada from their analysis. Moreover, Cai et al. (2018) only consider 16
countries with a history of successful participation in the World Cup. Further, it may be possible
to exploit variation in economic conditions over the sample. For example, Garc´ıa (2013) shows
that sentiment effects can be stronger during recessions. Therefore, future analysis could seek to
determine whether the sentiment effects demonstrated in Chapter 3 are related to the economic
expansions and contractions of the countries within the sample.
5.3.3. Stock Return Comovement
In addition to the analysis presented in Chapter 3, future research should examine stock return
comovement as a variable of interest. This investigation is motivated by previous findings that
behavioural biases can induce stock return comovements. For example, Kumar and Lee (2006)
use data from a United States discount brokerage firm to demonstrate that retail trades increase
stock return comovements. Kumar and Lee (2006) attribute their result to investor sentiment. In
another study, Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009) attribute stock return comovements to behavioural
biases such as the extrapolation of past returns, the disposition effect and limited investor attention.
Moreover, Pantzalis and Park (2014) find that the comovement of stock returns of firms that are
in close geographical proximity is more pronounced in the presence of sports sentiment. Therefore,
it could be that stock return comovement increases in reaction to sentiment effects induced by
World Cup football matches. If this is the case stock return comovement is likely to be increased
following half-time match outcomes and between full-time observations and the close-of-trade. Such
an analysis would provide additional evidence of sentiment effects.
5.3.4. Identifying Retail Trades
Finally, more analysis should be conducted to identify the types of traders that are responsible
for sentiment effects in financial markets. An appropriate ex-ante hypothesis might be that retail
traders are more susceptible to sentiment shocks. Without access to exclusive brokerage data or
36Surprisingly, Edmans et al. (2007) also find a negative overnight win-effect for their small market capitalisation
stock sample.
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data with broker IDs, future analysis should make use of retail trade proxies to test whether retail
traders are more likely to be influenced by investor sentiment. For example, some researchers have
proposed using odd-lot trades to proxy for individuals’ trades (Dyl and Maberly (1992); Lakonishok
and Maberly (1990); Johnson, Ness, and Ness (2017)).37 Further, it could be that retail investors
are attracted to certain stock properties. For example, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) argue that
small market capitalisation stocks are predominantly held and traded by individual traders. Ku-
mar and Lee (2006) document that “small firms, lower priced firms, firms with lower institutional
ownership, and value (high B/M) firms, all are associated with strong retail concentrations and dis-
proportionately high retail trading activities”. If retail investors are more susceptible to sentiment
shocks, sentiment effects should be more prevalent among stocks with these characteristics.
37O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2014) argue that odd-lot trades are submitted by sophisticated investors splitting up their
trades. The findings of O’Hara et al. (2014) are questioned by Upson and Johnson (2017)
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